Editing Problem of evil (section)

====Skeptical theism====
{{Main|Skeptical theism}}
"According to skeptical theism, if there were a god, it is likely that he would have reasons for acting that are beyond [human] ken, ... the fact that we don't see a good reason for X does not justify the conclusion that there is no good reason for X".<ref name="Trent Dougherty">{{cite web |last1=Dougherty |first1=Trent |title=Skeptical Theism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=skeptical-theism&archive=win2018 |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2018 Edition) |publisher=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=2 February 2021 |date=2018}}</ref> One standard of sufficient reason for allowing evil is by asserting that God allows an evil in order to prevent a greater evil or cause a greater good.<ref name=wilks31>{{cite book|first=Ian |last=Wilks |editor=Justin P. McBrayer and Daniel Howard-Snyder|title=The Blackwell Companion to The Problem of Evil |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=J0ScAgAAQBAJ |year=2014|publisher=Wiley |isbn=978-1-118-60797-8 |chapter=Chapter 31, for context see Chapters 29 and 30}}</ref> ''Pointless evil'', then, is an evil that does not meet this standard; it is an evil God permitted where there is no outweighing good or greater evil.  The existence of such pointless evils would lead to the conclusion there is no benevolent god.<ref name="Rowe, William L.">{{cite journal |last1=Rowe |first1=William L. |title=Friendly Atheism, Skeptical Theism, and the Problem of Evil |journal=International Journal for Philosophy of Religion |date=2006 |volume=59 |issue=2 |pages=79–92 |doi=10.1007/s11153-005-6178-6 |jstor=40023383 |s2cid=170120784 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/40023383|url-access=subscription }}</ref>{{rp|79}}  The skeptical theist asserts that humans can't know that such a thing as pointless evil exists, that humans as limited beings are simply "in the dark" concerning the big picture on how all things work together. "The skeptical theist's skepticism affirms certain limitations to [human] knowledge with respect to the realms of value and modality" (method).<ref name="Michael Bergmann2009">{{cite journal |last1=Bergmann |first1=Michael |title=17. Skeptical Theism and the Problem of Evil |editor1-last=Flint |editor1-first=Thomas |editor2-last=Rea |editor2-first=Michael |journal=Oxford Handbook to Philosophical Theology|year=2009|pages=374–401 |url=https://web.ics.purdue.edu/~bergmann/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/OHPT-bergmann-preprint.pdf |publisher=Oxford University Press|doi=10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199289202.003.0018 |isbn=9780199289202 }}</ref>{{rp|6, 8}} "Thus, skeptical theism purports to undercut most ''a posteriori'' arguments against the existence of God".<ref name="Trent Dougherty"/>

Skeptical theism questions the first premise of [[William L. Rowe|William Rowe's]] argument: "There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse"; how can that be known?<ref name="Michael Bergmann2009"/>{{rp|11–12}} [[J. L. Schellenberg|John Schellenberg's]] argument of divine hiddenness,<ref name="Michael Bergmann2009"/>{{rp|13–14}} and the first premise of [[Paul Draper (philosopher)|Paul Draper's]] Hypothesis of Indifference, which begins "Gratuitous evil exists", are also susceptible to questions of how these claimed concepts can be genuinely known.<ref name="Michael Bergmann2009"/>{{rp|15–18}}

===== Critique =====
Skeptical theism is criticized by [[Richard Swinburne]] on the basis that the appearance of some evils having no possible explanation is sufficient to agree there can be none, (which is also susceptible to the skeptic's response); and it is criticized on the basis that, accepting it leads to skepticism about morality itself.<ref name="Almeida and Oppy">{{cite journal |last1=Almeida |first1=Michael J. |last2=Oppy |first2=Graham |title=Sceptical Theism and Evidential Arguments from Evil |journal=Australasian Journal of Philosophy |date=2003 |volume=81 |issue=4 |page=496 |doi=10.1080/713659758 |s2cid=17867179 |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/713659758}}</ref>

=====Hidden reasons=====
The hidden reasons defense asserts the logical possibility of hidden or unknown reasons for the existence of evil as not knowing the reason does not necessarily mean that the reason does not exist.<ref name="Stanford" /><ref name="IepEvidential" /> This argument has been challenged with the assertion that the hidden reasons premise is as plausible as the premise that God does not exist or is not "an almighty, all-knowing, all-benevolent, all-powerful". Similarly, for every hidden argument that completely or partially justifies observed evils it is equally likely that there is a hidden argument that actually makes the observed evils worse than they appear without hidden arguments, or that the hidden reasons may result in additional contradictions.<ref name="Stanford" /><ref name="Frances2013p110"/> As such, from an inductive viewpoint hidden arguments will neutralize one another.<ref name="Stanford" />

A sub-variant of the "hidden reasons" defense is called the "PHOG"{{snd}}profoundly hidden outweighing goods{{snd}}defense.<ref name="Frances2013p110"/> The PHOG defense, states Bryan Frances, not only leaves the co-existence of God and human suffering unanswered, but raises questions about why animals and other life forms have to suffer from natural evil, or from abuse (animal slaughter, animal cruelty) by some human beings, where hidden moral lessons, hidden social good, and other possible hidden reasons do not apply.<ref name="Frances2013p110">{{cite book|first=Bryan |last=Frances |title=Gratuitous Suffering and the Problem of Evil: A Comprehensive Introduction |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ngeIkSJnh4kC&pg=PA110|date=2013 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-0-415-66295-6 |pages=110–123}}</ref>