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Submarine communications cable
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=== Legal perspective === ==== Legal vulnerabilities ==== Submarine cables are internationally regulated within the framework of the [[United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea]] (UNCLOS), in particular through the provisions of Articles 112 and 97, 112 and 115, which mandate operational freedom to lay cables in international waters and beyond the continental shelf and reward measures to protect against shipping accidents.<ref name=":22">Davenport, T. (2018). The high seas freedom to lay submarine cables and the protection of the marine environment: Challenges in high seas governance. ''AJIL Unbound'', ''112'', 139–143. https://doi.org/10.1017/aju.2018.48</ref> However, submarine cables face significant legal challenges and lack specific legal protection in UNCLOS and enforcement mechanisms against emerging threats, particular in international waters.<ref name=":0" /><ref name=":22" /><ref name=":17" /><ref name=":8" /> This is further complicated by the non-ratification of the treaty by key states such as the U.S. and [[Turkey]].<ref name=":5" /> Many countries lack explicit legal provisions to criminalize the destruction or theft of undersea cables, creating jurisdictional ambiguities that organized crime can exploit.<ref name=":1" /><ref name=":8" /><ref name=":17" /> Other legal frameworks, such as the 1884 [[Convention for the Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables]] are outdated and fail to address modern threats like cyberattacks and hybrid warfare tactics.<ref name=":8" /> The unclear jurisdiction and weak enforcement mechanisms, demonstrate the difficulty to protect submarine cables from organized crime. The Arctic Ocean in particular exemplifies the challenges associated with surveillance and enforcement in vast and remote areas, leaving a legal vacuum that criminals may exploit. In the [[Arctic]], the absence of a central international authority to oversee submarine cable protection and the reliance on military organizations like NATO hinders general coordinated global responses.<ref name=":18" /> Organizations such as the [[International Cable Protection Committee|ICPC]] thus highlight the need for updated and more comprehensive legal frameworks to ensure the security of submarine cables.<ref>{{Cite news |date=July 13, 2021 |title=International Cable Protection Committee Launches 'Best Practices for Cable Protection and Resilience as Resource for Governments' |url=https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20210713006068/en/International-Cable-Protection-Committee-Launches-%E2%80%98Best-Practices-for-Cable-Protection-and-Resilience-as-Resource-for-Governments%E2%80%99 |work=Businesswire}}</ref> ==== Legal countermeasures ==== The legal challenges of protecting submarine cables from organized crime have resulted in recommendations ranging from treaty amendments to domestic law reforms and [[multi-level governance]] models. Some scholars argue that UNCLOS should be updated to protect cables extensively, including cooperative monitoring and enforcement protocols.<ref name=":22" /> Additionally, principles from the [[law of the sea]], state responsibility, and the laws on the use of force could be creatively applied to strengthen protections for cables.<ref name=":8" /> Enforcement issues could be tackled by aligning domestic laws with UNCLOS, implementing national response protocols, and creating streamlined points of contact for cable incidents.<ref name=":8" /> Given the increased involvement of organizations like NATO, others recommend to clarify the roles of military and non-military actors in cable security and enhanced multi-level governance models.<ref name=":18" /><ref name=":21" /> While these proposed legal solutions seem promising, their practical implementation still remains a challenge due to the complexity of international treaties, the need for international cooperation, the lack of domestic criminalization of cable damage, and the evolving nature of technological threats.<ref name=":0" /><ref name=":1" /><ref name=":8" /><ref name=":17" /> Additionally, while UNCLOS's ambiguous jurisdiction in international waters hinders effective enforcement, limited political interests seems to hamper treaty development.<ref name=":0" /><ref name=":1" /><ref name=":6" />
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