Editing Truth (section)

=== Sartre (1905–1980) ===
In ''[[Being and Nothingness]]'' (1943), partially following Heidegger, [[Jean-Paul Sartre]] identified our knowledge of the truth as a relation between the [[Being in itself|in-itself]] and [[for-itself]] of [[being]] - yet simultaneously closely connected in this vein to the data available to the material personhood, in the body, of an individual in their interaction with the world and others - with Sartre's description that "the world is human" allowing him to postulate all truth as strictly ''understood'' by [[self-consciousness]] as self-consciousness ''of'' something,<ref>{{Cite book |last=Sartre |first=Jean-Paul |title=Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontolgoy |publisher=Philosophical Library |year=1956 |edition=1st |location=New York}}</ref> a view also preceded by [[Henri Bergson]] in ''[[Time and Free Will]]'' (1889), the reading of which Sartre had credited for his interest in philosophy.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Sartre |first=Jean-Paul |title=The imaginary: a phenomenological psychology of the imagination |date=2004 |publisher=Routledge |others=Arlette Elkaïm-Sartre, Jonathan Webber |isbn=0-203-64410-7 |location=London |oclc=56549324}}</ref> This first [[Existentialism|existentialist]] theory, more fully fleshed out in Sartre's essay ''Truth and Existence'' (1948), which already demonstrates a more radical departure from Heidegger in its emphasis on the primacy of the idea, already formulated in ''Being and Nothingness'', of [[Existence precedes essence|existence as preceding essence]] in its role in the formulation of truth, has nevertheless been critically examined as [[Idealism|idealist]] rather than [[Materialism|materialist]] in its departure from more traditional idealist epistemologies such as those of [[Ancient Greek philosophy]] in Plato and Aristotle, and staying as does Heidegger with Kant.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Wilder |first=Kathleen |title=Truth and existence: The idealism in Sartre's theory of truth |journal=International Journal of Philosophical Studies |year=1995 |volume=3 |issue=1 |pages=91–109|doi=10.1080/09672559508570805 }}</ref>

Later, in the ''[[Search for a Method]]'' (1957), in which Sartre used a unification of existentialism and [[Marxism]] that he would later formulate in the ''[[Critique of Dialectical Reason]]'' (1960), Sartre, with his growing emphasis on the [[Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel|Hegelian]] totalisation of [[historicity]], posited a conception of truth still defined by its process of relation to a container giving it material meaning, but with specific reference to a role in this broader totalisation, for "subjectivity is neither everything nor nothing; it represents a moment in the objective process (that in which externality is internalised), and this moment is perpetually eliminated only to be perpetually reborn": "For us, truth is something which becomes, it ''has'' and ''will have'' become. It is a totalisation which is forever being totalised. Particular facts do not signify anything; they are neither true nor false so long as they are not related, through the mediation of various partial totalities, to the totalisation in process." Sartre describes this as a "''[[Philosophical realism|realistic]]'' epistemology", developed out of [[Karl Marx|Marx]]'s ideas but with such a development only possible in an existentialist light, as with the theme of the whole work.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Sartre |first=Jean-Paul |title=Search for a Method |publisher=Knopf |year=1963 |location=New York}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last=Skirke |first=Christian |section=Jean-Paul Sartre |date=2014-04-28 |title=Philosophy |publisher=Oxford University Press |doi=10.1093/obo/9780195396577-0192 |isbn=978-0-19-539657-7}}</ref> In an early segment of the lengthy two-volume ''Critique'' of 1960, Sartre continued to describe truth as a "totalising" "truth of history" to be interpreted by a "Marxist historian", whilst his break with Heidegger's epistemological ideas is finalised in the description of a seemingly antinomous "[[Dualism in cosmology|dualism]] of Being and Truth" as the essence of a truly Marxist epistemology.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Sartre |first=Jean-Paul |title=Critique of Dialectical Reason |publisher=Verso |year=2004 |location=London |pages=15–41}}</ref>