Editing Utilitarianism (section)

=== Aggregating utility ===
The objection that "utilitarianism does not take seriously the distinction between persons" came to prominence in 1971 with the publication of [[John Rawls]]' ''[[A Theory of Justice]]''.<ref>{{cite book|last=Rawls|first=John|title=A Theory of Justice|date=2005|publisher=Harvard University Press|isbn=978-0-674-01772-6|page=27}}</ref> The concept is also important in [[animal rights]] advocate [[Richard D. Ryder|Richard Ryder]]'s rejection of utilitarianism, in which he talks of the "boundary of the individual", through which neither pain nor pleasure may pass.<ref>Ryder, Richard D. ''Painism: A Modern Morality''. Centaur Press, 2001. pp. 27–29</ref>

However, a similar objection was noted in 1970 by [[Thomas Nagel]], who claimed that [[consequentialism]] "treats the desires, needs, satisfactions, and dissatisfactions of distinct persons as if they were the desires, etc., of a mass person;"<ref>{{cite book|last=Nagel|first=Thomas|title=The Possibility of Altruism|publisher=Princeton University Press|year=2012|isbn=978-0-691-02002-0|edition=New|page=134}}</ref> and even earlier by [[David Gauthier]], who wrote that utilitarianism supposes that "mankind is a super-person, whose greatest satisfaction is the objective of moral action.&nbsp;... But this is absurd. Individuals have wants, not mankind; individuals seek satisfaction, not mankind. A person's satisfaction is not part of any greater satisfaction."<ref>{{cite book |last=Gauthier |first=David |title=Practical Reasoning: The Structure and Foundations of Prudential and Moral Arguments and Their Exemplification in Discourse |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=1963 |page=126 |isbn= 978-0-19-824190-4}}</ref> Thus, the aggregation of utility becomes futile as both pain and happiness are intrinsic to and inseparable from the consciousness in which they are felt, rendering impossible the task of adding up the various pleasures of multiple individuals.

A response to this criticism is to point out that whilst seeming to resolve some problems it introduces others. Intuitively, there are many cases where people do want to take the numbers involved into account. As [[Alastair Norcross]] has said:<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Norcross|first1=Alastair|year=2009|title=Two Dogmas of Deontology: Aggregation, Rights and the Separateness of Persons|url=http://homepage.mac.com/anorcross/papers/2Dogmasdeontology.pdf|url-status=dead|journal=Social Philosophy and Policy|volume=26|pages=81–82|doi=10.1017/S0265052509090049|s2cid=45454555|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20091127084839/http://homepage.mac.com/anorcross/papers/2Dogmasdeontology.pdf|archive-date=27 November 2009|access-date=2012-06-29}}</ref><blockquote>[S]uppose that [[Homer Simpson|Homer]] is faced with the painful choice between saving [[Barney Gumble|Barney]] from a burning building or saving both [[Moe Szyslak|Moe]] and [[Apu Nahasapeemapetilon|Apu]] from the building&nbsp;... it is clearly better for Homer to save the larger number, precisely because it is a larger number.&nbsp;... Can anyone who really considers the matter seriously honestly claim to believe that it is worse that one person die than that the entire [[Sentience|sentient]] population of the universe be severely mutilated? Clearly not.</blockquote>It may be possible to uphold the distinction between persons whilst still aggregating utility, if it accepted that people can be influenced by [[empathy]].<ref>In [http://philosophynow.org/issues/100/Moral_Laws_of_the_Jungle Moral Laws of the Jungle (link to ''Philosophy Now'' magazine)], Iain King argues: "The way I reconcile my interests with those of other people is not for all of us to pour everything we care about into a pot then see which of the combination of satisfied wants would generate the most happiness (benefit). If we did that, I could be completely outnumbered... No, the way we reconcile interests is through empathy. Empathy is one-to-one, since we only imagine ourselves in the mind of one other person at a time. Even when I empathise with 'the people' here... I am really imagining what it is like to be just one woman. I cannot imagine myself to be more than one person at a time, and neither can you." Link accessed 2014-01-29.</ref> This position is advocated by [[Iain King]],<ref>{{cite book|last=King|first=Iain|title=How to Make Good Decisions and Be Right All the Time|title-link=How to Make Good Decisions and Be Right All the Time|publisher=Continuum|year=2008|isbn=978-1-84706-347-2|page=225}}</ref> who has [[How to Make Good Decisions and Be Right All the Time|suggested]] the [[evolution]]ary basis of empathy means humans can take into account the interests of other individuals, but only on a one-to-one basis, "since we can only imagine ourselves in the mind of one other person at a time."<ref>This quote is from Iain King's article in issue 100 of Philosophy Now magazine, [http://philosophynow.org/issues/100/Moral_Laws_of_the_Jungle Moral Laws of the Jungle (link)], accessed 29 January 2014.</ref> King uses this insight to adapt utilitarianism, and it may help reconcile Bentham's philosophy with [[Deontological ethics|deontology]] and [[virtue ethics]].<ref name="24 and Philosophy King">{{cite web|title=24 and Philosophy|author=Chandler Brett|url=http://andphilosophy.com/2014/07/16/24-and-philosophy|publisher=Blackwell|date=2014-07-16|access-date=2019-12-27}}</ref><ref name="MedicalEthics">{{cite book|first=Eldo|last=Frezzo |title=Medical Ethics: A Reference Guide|publisher= Routledge | date=2018-10-25|isbn=978-1-138-58107-4|page=5}}</ref><ref name="Zuckerman">{{cite book|first=Phil|last= Zuckerman |title=What it Means to be Moral|publisher= Published by Counterpoint | date=2019-09-10 |isbn=978-1-64009-274-7|page=21}}</ref>

Philosopher John Taurek also argued that the idea of adding happiness or pleasures across persons is quite unintelligible and that the numbers of persons involved in a situation are morally irrelevant.<ref>John M. Taurek, "Should the Numbers Count?", ''Philosophy and Public Affairs'', 6:4 (Summer 1977), pp. 293–316.</ref> Taurek's basic concern comes down to this: we cannot explain what it means to say that things would be five times worse if five people die than if one person dies. "I cannot give a satisfactory account of the meaning of judgments of this kind," he wrote (p.&nbsp;304). He argues that each person can only lose one person's happiness or pleasures. There is not five times more loss of happiness or pleasure when five die: who would be feeling this happiness or pleasure? "Each person's potential loss has the same significance to me, only as a loss to that person alone. because, by hypothesis, I have an equal concern for each person involved, I am moved to give each of them an equal chance to be spared his loss" (p.&nbsp;307). [[Derek Parfit]] (1978) and others have criticized Taurek's line,<ref>[[Derek Parfit|Parfit, Derek]]. 1978. "Innumerate Ethics." ''[[Philosophy & Public Affairs]]'' 7(4):285–301.</ref><ref>[[Frances Kamm|Kamm, Frances Myrna]]. 1985. "Equal Treatment and Equal Chances." ''[[Philosophy & Public Affairs]]'' 14(2):177–94.</ref><ref>[[Gregory S. Kavka|Kavka, Gregory S.]] 1979. "The Numbers Should Count", ''[[Philosophical Studies]]'' 36(3):285–94.</ref> and it continues to be discussed.<ref>[[Michael Otsuka|Otsuka, Michael]]. 2004. "Skepticism about Saving the Greater Number." ''[[Philosophy & Public Affairs]]'' 32(4):413–26.</ref><ref>Lawlor, Rob. 2006. "Taurek, Numbers and Probabilities." ''[[Ethical Theory and Moral Practice]]'' 9(2):149–66.</ref>