Editing Hard problem of consciousness (section)

==Meta-problem==
In 2018, Chalmers highlighted what he calls the "'''meta-problem of consciousness'''", another problem related to the hard problem of consciousness:<ref name="meta-problem"/>

<blockquote>The meta-problem of consciousness is (to a first approximation) the problem of explaining why we think that there is a [hard] problem of consciousness.</blockquote>

In his "second approximation", he says it is the problem of explaining the behaviour of "[[Consciousness#Types of consciousness|phenomenal]] reports", and the behaviour of expressing a belief that there is a hard problem of consciousness.<ref name="meta-problem"/>

Explaining its significance, he says:<ref name="meta-problem"/>
<blockquote>Although the meta-problem is strictly speaking an easy problem, it is deeply connected to the hard problem. We can reasonably hope that a solution to the meta-problem will shed significant light on the hard problem. A particularly strong line holds that a solution to the meta-problem will solve or dissolve the hard problem. A weaker line holds that it will not remove the hard problem, but it will constrain the form of a solution.</blockquote>In other words, the 'strong line' holds that the solution to the meta-problem would provide an explanation of our beliefs about consciousness that is independent of consciousness. That would debunk our beliefs about consciousness, in the same way that explaining beliefs about god in evolutionary terms may provide arguments against theism itself.<ref>{{Citation|title=The Meta-Problem of Consciousness {{!}} Professor David Chalmers {{!}} Talks at Google| date=2 April 2019 |url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OsYUWtLQBS0|language=en|access-date=2022-01-11}}</ref>