Editing Democratization (section)

=== Political-economic factors ===
==== Rulers' need for taxation ====
[[Robert Bates (political scientist)|Robert Bates]] and Donald Lien, as well as David Stasavage, have argued that rulers' need for taxes gave asset-owning elites the bargaining power to demand a say on public policy, thus giving rise to democratic institutions.<ref name=":3">{{Cite journal|last1=Bates|first1=Robert H.|last2=Donald Lien|first2=Da-Hsiang|date=March 1985|title=A Note on Taxation, Development, and Representative Government|journal=Politics & Society|language=en-US|volume=14|issue=1|pages=53–70|doi=10.1177/003232928501400102|s2cid=154910942|issn=0032-3292|url=https://authors.library.caltech.edu/81503/1/sswp567.pdf}}</ref><ref name=":5">{{Cite journal|last=Stasavage|first=David|date=2016-05-11|title=Representation and Consent: Why They Arose in Europe and Not Elsewhere|journal=Annual Review of Political Science|volume=19|issue=1|pages=145–162|doi=10.1146/annurev-polisci-043014-105648| doi-access=free | issn=1094-2939}}</ref><ref name=":6">{{Cite book|last=Stasavage, David|title=Decline and rise of democracy: a global history from antiquity to today|date=2020|publisher=Princeton University Press|isbn=978-0-691-17746-5|oclc=1125969950}}</ref> [[Montesquieu]] argued that the mobility of commerce meant that rulers had to bargain with merchants in order to tax them, otherwise they would leave the country or hide their commercial activities.<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://muse.jhu.edu/book/30312|title=Bounding Power: Republican Security Theory from the Polis to the Global Village|last=Deudney|first=Daniel H.|date=2010|publisher=Princeton University Press|isbn=978-1-4008-3727-4|language=en}}</ref><ref name=":3" /> Stasavage argues that the small size and backwardness of European states, as well as the weakness of European rulers, after the fall of the Roman Empire meant that European rulers had to obtain consent from their population to govern effectively.<ref name=":6" /><ref name=":5" />

According to Clark, Golder, and Golder, an application of  [[Albert O. Hirschman]]'s exit, voice, and loyalty model is that if individuals have plausible exit options, then a government may be more likely to democratize. [[James C. Scott]] argues that governments may find it difficult to claim a sovereignty over a population when that population is in motion.<ref name="C. 2010 7">{{Cite book|last=Scott |first=James C. |url=https://archive.org/details/artofnotbeinggov0000scot/page/7 |title=The Art of not being governed: an anarchist history of upland Southeast Asia|date=2010|publisher=NUS Press|isbn=9780300152289|pages=[https://archive.org/details/artofnotbeinggov0000scot/page/7 7]|oclc=872296825}}</ref> Scott additionally asserts that exit may not solely include physical exit from the territory of a coercive state, but can include a number of adaptive responses to coercion that make it more difficult for states to claim sovereignty over a population. These responses can include planting crops that are more difficult for states to count, or tending livestock that are more mobile. In fact, the entire political arrangement of a state is a result of individuals adapting to the environment, and making a choice as to whether or not to stay in a territory.<ref name="C. 2010 7" /> If people are free to move, then the exit, voice, and loyalty model predicts that a state will have to be of that population representative, and appease the populace in order to prevent them from leaving.<ref name=":1">{{Cite web|title=Power and politics: insights from an exit, voice, and loyalty game.|url=http://projects.iq.harvard.edu/files/pegroup/files/clark_golder.pdf}}</ref> If individuals have plausible exit options then they are better able to constrain a government's arbitrary behaviour through threat of exit.<ref name=":1" />

==== Inequality and democracy ====
Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson argued that the relationship between [[social equality]] and democratic transition is complicated: People have less incentive to revolt in an egalitarian society (for example, [[Singapore]]), so the likelihood of democratization is lower. In a highly unequal society (for example, [[South Africa]] under [[Apartheid]]), the [[redistribution of wealth]] and power in a democracy would be so harmful to elites that these would do everything to prevent democratization. Democratization is more likely to emerge somewhere in the middle, in the countries, whose elites offer concessions because (1) they consider the threat of a revolution credible and (2) the cost of the concessions is not too high.<ref name="acemoglu">{{cite book | last = Acemoglu | first = Daron |author2=James A. Robinson | title = Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy | publisher = Cambridge University Press | year = 2006 | location = Cambridge}}</ref> This expectation is in line with the empirical research showing that democracy is more stable in egalitarian societies.<ref name="przeworski" />

Other approaches to the relationship between inequality and democracy have been presented by [[Carles Boix]], [[Stephan Haggard]] and Robert Kaufman, and [[Ben Ansell]] and [[David Samuels (political scientist)|David Samuels]].<ref>Special issue on "Inequality and Democratization: What Do We Know?"''American Political Science Association. Comparative Democratization'' 11(3)2013.</ref><ref name="krauss">[https://doi.org/10.1080/1350178X.2015.1069372 Krauss, Alexander. "The scientific limits of understanding the (potential) relationship between complex social phenomena: the case of democracy and inequality." Journal of Economic Methodology 23.1 (2016): 97–109.]</ref>

In their 2019 book ''The Narrow Corridor'' and a 2022 study in the ''American Political Science Review'', Acemoglu and Robinson argue that the nature of the relationship between elites and society determine whether stable democracy emerges. When elites are overly dominant, despotic states emerge. When society is overly dominant, weak states emerge. When elites and society are evenly balance, inclusive states emerge.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Acemoglu |first1=Daron |last2=Robinson |first2=James A. |date=2022 |title=Weak, Despotic, or Inclusive? How State Type Emerges from State versus Civil Society Competition |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/abs/weak-despotic-or-inclusive-how-state-type-emerges-from-state-versus-civil-society-competition/FD2C89941F15250D52076EE53F82C013 |journal=American Political Science Review |volume=117 |issue=2 |pages=407–420 |language=en |doi=10.1017/S0003055422000740 |s2cid=251607252 |issn=0003-0554|url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last1=Acemoglu |first1=Daron |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=kTeUwgEACAAJ |title=The Narrow Corridor: States, Societies, and the Fate of Liberty |last2=Robinson |first2=James A. |date=2019 |publisher=Penguin Books |isbn=978-0-241-31431-9 |language=en}}</ref>

==== Natural resources ====
[[File:Oil well.jpg|thumb|The abundance of oil is sometimes seen as a curse.]]
Research shows that oil wealth lowers levels of democracy and strengthens autocratic rule.<ref name="Ross 2001">{{cite journal|last1=Ross|first1=Michael L.|date=13 June 2011|title=Does Oil Hinder Democracy?|journal=World Politics|volume=53|issue=3|pages=325–361|doi=10.1353/wp.2001.0011|s2cid=18404}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Wright|first1=Joseph|last2=Frantz|first2=Erica|last3=Geddes|first3=Barbara|s2cid=988090|author-link3=Barbara Geddes (academic)|date=2015-04-01|title=Oil and Autocratic Regime Survival|journal=British Journal of Political Science|volume=45|issue=2|pages=287–306|doi=10.1017/S0007123413000252|issn=1469-2112}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Jensen|first1=Nathan|last2=Wantchekon|first2=Leonard|date=2004-09-01|title=Resource Wealth and Political Regimes in Africa|url=http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/politics/faculty/wantchekon/research/regimes.pdf|journal=Comparative Political Studies|volume=37|issue=7|pages=816–841|citeseerx=10.1.1.607.9710|doi=10.1177/0010414004266867|s2cid=154999593|issn=0010-4140}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Ulfelder|first=Jay|date=2007-08-01|title=Natural-Resource Wealth and the Survival of Autocracy|journal=Comparative Political Studies|volume=40|issue=8|pages=995–1018|doi=10.1177/0010414006287238|s2cid=154316752|issn=0010-4140}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Basedau|first1=Matthias|last2=Lay|first2=Jann|date=2009-11-01|title=Resource Curse or Rentier Peace? The Ambiguous Effects of Oil Wealth and Oil Dependence on Violent Conflict|url=https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/document/36912/1/ssoar-jpeaceresearch-2009-6-basedau_et_al-Resource_curse_or_rentier_peace.pdf|journal=Journal of Peace Research|volume=46|issue=6|pages=757–776|doi=10.1177/0022343309340500|s2cid=144798465|issn=0022-3433}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Andersen|first1=Jørgen J.|last2=Ross|first2=Michael L.|date=2014-06-01|title=The Big Oil Change A Closer Look at the Haber–Menaldo Analysis|url=https://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/195819/Andersen_CPS_2014.pdf?sequence=1|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180723095213/https://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/195819/Andersen_CPS_2014.pdf?sequence=1|archive-date=2018-07-23|journal=Comparative Political Studies|volume=47|issue=7|pages=993–1021|doi=10.1177/0010414013488557|issn=0010-4140|hdl=11250/195819|s2cid=154653329}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Girod|first1=Desha M.|last2=Stewart|first2=Megan A.|last3=Walters|first3=Meir R.|date=2016-07-27|title=Mass protests and the resource curse: The politics of demobilization in rentier autocracies|journal=Conflict Management and Peace Science|volume=35|issue=5|pages=503–522|doi=10.1177/0738894216651826|s2cid=157573005|issn=0738-8942}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Wright|first1=Joseph|last2=Frantz|first2=Erica|date=2017-07-01|title=How oil income and missing hydrocarbon rents data influence autocratic survival: A response to Lucas and Richter (2016)|journal=Research & Politics|volume=4|issue=3|pages=2053168017719794|doi=10.1177/2053168017719794|issn=2053-1680|doi-access=free}}</ref><ref name=":10">{{Cite journal|last=Wigley|first=Simon|date=December 2018|title=Is There a Resource Curse for Private Liberties?|journal=International Studies Quarterly|volume=62|issue=4|pages=834–844|doi=10.1093/isq/sqy031|hdl=11693/48786|hdl-access=free}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Cassidy|first=Traviss|year=2019|title=The Long-Run Effects of Oil Wealth on Development: Evidence from Petroleum Geology|journal=The Economic Journal|volume=129|issue=623|pages=2745–2778|doi=10.1093/ej/uez009|url=https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/97778/1/MPRA_paper_97777.pdf}}</ref> According to Michael Ross, [[petroleum]] is the sole resource that has "been consistently correlated with less democracy and worse institutions" and is the "key variable in the vast majority of the studies" identifying some type of [[resource curse]] effect.<ref name=":2">{{Cite journal|last=Ross|first=Michael L.|s2cid=154308471|date=May 2015|title=What Have We Learned about the Resource Curse?|journal=Annual Review of Political Science|volume=18|pages=239–259|doi=10.1146/annurev-polisci-052213-040359|doi-access=free}}</ref> A 2014 meta-analysis confirms the negative impact of oil wealth on democratization.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Ahmadov|first=Anar K.|date=2014-08-01|title=Oil, Democracy, and Context A Meta-Analysis|journal=Comparative Political Studies|language=en|volume=47|issue=9|pages=1238–1267|doi=10.1177/0010414013495358|s2cid=154661151|issn=0010-4140}}</ref>

Thad Dunning proposes a plausible explanation for Ecuador's return to democracy that contradicts the conventional wisdom that natural resource rents encourage authoritarian governments. Dunning proposes that there are situations where natural resource rents, such as those acquired through oil, reduce the risk of distributive or social policies to the elite because the state has other sources of revenue to finance this kind of policies that is not the elite wealth or income.<ref>Thad Dunning. 2008. ''Crude Democracy: Natural Resource Wealth and Political Regimes''. Cambridge University Press. Ch. 1.Pp. 3.</ref> And in countries plagued with high inequality, which was the case of Ecuador in the 1970s, the result would be a higher likelihood of democratization.<ref>Thad Dunning. 2008. ''Crude Democracy: Natural Resource Wealth and Political Regimes''. Cambridge University Press. Ch. 1, p. 21.</ref> In 1972, the military coup had overthrown the government in large part because of the fears of elites that redistribution would take place.<ref name="Thad Dunning 2008. Pp. 34">Thad Dunning. 2008. ''Crude Democracy: Natural Resource Wealth and Political Regimes''. Cambridge University Press. Ch. 1, p. 34.</ref> That same year oil became an increasing financial source for the country.<ref name="Thad Dunning 2008. Pp. 34" /> Although the rents were used to finance the military, the eventual second oil boom of 1979 ran parallel to the country's re-democratization.<ref name="Thad Dunning 2008. Pp. 34" /> Ecuador's re-democratization can then be attributed, as argued by Dunning, to the large increase of oil rents, which enabled not only a surge in public spending but placated the fears of redistribution that had grappled the elite circles.<ref name="Thad Dunning 2008. Pp. 34" /> The exploitation of Ecuador's resource rent enabled the government to implement price and wage policies that benefited citizens at no cost to the elite and allowed for a smooth transition and growth of democratic institutions.<ref name="Thad Dunning 2008. Pp. 34" />

The thesis that oil and other natural resources have a negative impact on democracy has been challenged by historian [[Stephen Haber]] and political scientist Victor Menaldo in a widely cited article in the ''American Political Science Review'' (2011). Haber and Menaldo argue that "natural resource reliance is not an exogenous variable" and find that when tests of the relationship between natural resources and democracy take this point into account "increases in resource reliance are not associated with authoritarianism."<ref>Stephen Haber and Victor Menaldo, "Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism? A Reappraisal of the Resource Curse," ''American Political Science Review'' 105(1) 2011: 1–26.</ref>