Editing Game theory (section)

===Philosophy===
{{Payoff matrix |Name=Stag hunt | 2L=Stag |2R=Hare |1U=Stag |UL=3, 3 |UR=0, 2 |1D=Hare |DL=2, 0 |DR=2, 2}}
Game theory has been put to several uses in [[philosophy]]. Responding to two papers by {{harvard citations|txt=yes|first=W.V.O.|last=Quine|author1-link=Willard Van Orman Quine|year=1960|year2=1967}}, {{Harvtxt|Lewis|1969}} used game theory to develop a philosophical account of [[Convention (norm)|convention]]. In so doing, he provided the first analysis of [[Common knowledge (logic)|common knowledge]] and employed it in analyzing play in [[coordination game]]s. In addition, he first suggested that one can understand [[Meaning (semiotics)|meaning]] in terms of [[signaling games]]. This later suggestion has been pursued by several philosophers since Lewis.<ref>{{Harvtxt|Skyrms|1996}}</ref>{{sfnp|Grim|Kokalis|Alai-Tafti|Kilb|2004}}<!--<ref>{{harvard citations |txt=yes |last1=Grim |last2=Kokalis |last3=Alai-Tafti |last4=Kilb |last5=St Denis |year=2004}}.</ref>--> Following {{Harvtxt|Lewis|1969}} game-theoretic account of conventions, Edna Ullmann-Margalit (1977) and [[Cristina Bicchieri|Bicchieri]] (2006) have developed theories of [[social norms]] that define them as Nash equilibria that result from transforming a mixed-motive game into a coordination game.<ref>{{citation |first=E. |last=Ullmann-Margalit |title=The Emergence of Norms |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=1977 |isbn=978-0-19-824411-0 |url=https://archive.org/details/emergenceofnorms0024ullm }}{{page needed|date=July 2024}}</ref><ref>{{citation |first=Cristina |last=Bicchieri |author-link=Cristina Bicchieri |title=The Grammar of Society: the Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms |publisher=Cambridge University Press |year=2006 |isbn=978-0-521-57372-6 }}{{page needed|date=July 2024}}</ref>

Game theory has also challenged philosophers to think in terms of interactive [[epistemology]]: what it means for a collective to have common beliefs or knowledge, and what are the consequences of this knowledge for the social outcomes resulting from the interactions of agents. Philosophers who have worked in this area include Bicchieri (1989, 1993),<ref>{{cite journal|title=Self-Refuting Theories of Strategic Interaction: A Paradox of Common Knowledge |journal=Erkenntnis |volume=30 |issue=1–2 |year=1989 |pages=69–85 |doi=10.1007/BF00184816 |last1=Bicchieri |first1=Cristina |s2cid=120848181 |author-link=Cristina Bicchieri}}</ref><ref>{{Citation |last1=Bicchieri |first1=Cristina |author1-link=Cristina Bicchieri |title=Rationality and Coordination |publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]] |isbn=978-0-521-57444-0 |year=1993}}</ref> [[Brian Skyrms|Skyrms]] (1990),<ref>{{citation |first=Brian |last=Skyrms |author-link=Brian Skyrms |title=The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation |publisher=Harvard University Press |year=1990 |isbn=978-0-674-21885-7}}</ref> and [[Robert Stalnaker|Stalnaker]] (1999).<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Stalnaker |first1=Robert |title=Knowledge, Belief and Counterfactual Reasoning in Games |journal=Economics and Philosophy |date=October 1996 |volume=12 |issue=2 |pages=133–163 |doi=10.1017/S0266267100004132 }}</ref>

The synthesis of game theory with [[ethics]] was championed by [[R. B. Braithwaite]].<ref>{{cite book |last1=Braithwaite |first1=Richard Bevan |title=Theory of Games as a Tool for the Moral Philosopher. An Inaugural Lecture Delivered in Cambridge on 2 December 1954 |date=1955 |publisher=University Press |isbn=978-0-521-11351-9 }}{{page needed|date=July 2024}}</ref> The hope was that rigorous mathematical analysis of game theory might help formalize the more imprecise philosophical discussions. However, this expectation was only materialized to a limited extent.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Kuhn |first1=Steven T. |title=Reflections on Ethics and Game Theory |journal=Synthese |date=July 2004 |volume=141 |issue=1 |pages=1–44 |doi=10.1023/B:SYNT.0000035846.91195.cb }}</ref>

In [[ethics]], some (most notably David Gauthier, Gregory Kavka, and Jean Hampton) {{Who|date=July 2012}} authors have attempted to pursue [[Thomas Hobbes]]' project of deriving morality from self-interest. Since games like the [[prisoner's dilemma]] present an apparent conflict between morality and self-interest, explaining why cooperation is required by self-interest is an important component of this project. This general strategy is a component of the general [[social contract]] view in [[political philosophy]] (for examples, see {{Harvtxt|Gauthier|1986}} and {{Harvtxt|Kavka |1986}}).{{efn|For a more detailed discussion of the use of game theory in ethics, see the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy's entry [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/game-ethics/ game theory and ethics].}}

Other authors have attempted to use evolutionary game theory in order to explain the emergence of human attitudes about morality and corresponding animal behaviors. These authors look at several games including the prisoner's dilemma, [[stag hunt]], and the [[Nash bargaining game]] as providing an explanation for the emergence of attitudes about morality (see, e.g., {{harvard citations|txt=yes|last=Skyrms|year=1996|year2=2004}} and {{harvard citations|txt=yes|last1=Sober|last2=Wilson|year=1998}}).