Editing Problem of evil (section)

=====Hidden reasons=====
The hidden reasons defense asserts the logical possibility of hidden or unknown reasons for the existence of evil as not knowing the reason does not necessarily mean that the reason does not exist.<ref name="Stanford" /><ref name="IepEvidential" /> This argument has been challenged with the assertion that the hidden reasons premise is as plausible as the premise that God does not exist or is not "an almighty, all-knowing, all-benevolent, all-powerful". Similarly, for every hidden argument that completely or partially justifies observed evils it is equally likely that there is a hidden argument that actually makes the observed evils worse than they appear without hidden arguments, or that the hidden reasons may result in additional contradictions.<ref name="Stanford" /><ref name="Frances2013p110"/> As such, from an inductive viewpoint hidden arguments will neutralize one another.<ref name="Stanford" />

A sub-variant of the "hidden reasons" defense is called the "PHOG"{{snd}}profoundly hidden outweighing goods{{snd}}defense.<ref name="Frances2013p110"/> The PHOG defense, states Bryan Frances, not only leaves the co-existence of God and human suffering unanswered, but raises questions about why animals and other life forms have to suffer from natural evil, or from abuse (animal slaughter, animal cruelty) by some human beings, where hidden moral lessons, hidden social good, and other possible hidden reasons do not apply.<ref name="Frances2013p110">{{cite book|first=Bryan |last=Frances |title=Gratuitous Suffering and the Problem of Evil: A Comprehensive Introduction |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ngeIkSJnh4kC&pg=PA110|date=2013 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-0-415-66295-6 |pages=110–123}}</ref>