Editing Democratization (section)

==== Rulers' need for taxation ====
[[Robert Bates (political scientist)|Robert Bates]] and Donald Lien, as well as David Stasavage, have argued that rulers' need for taxes gave asset-owning elites the bargaining power to demand a say on public policy, thus giving rise to democratic institutions.<ref name=":3">{{Cite journal|last1=Bates|first1=Robert H.|last2=Donald Lien|first2=Da-Hsiang|date=March 1985|title=A Note on Taxation, Development, and Representative Government|journal=Politics & Society|language=en-US|volume=14|issue=1|pages=53–70|doi=10.1177/003232928501400102|s2cid=154910942|issn=0032-3292|url=https://authors.library.caltech.edu/81503/1/sswp567.pdf}}</ref><ref name=":5">{{Cite journal|last=Stasavage|first=David|date=2016-05-11|title=Representation and Consent: Why They Arose in Europe and Not Elsewhere|journal=Annual Review of Political Science|volume=19|issue=1|pages=145–162|doi=10.1146/annurev-polisci-043014-105648| doi-access=free | issn=1094-2939}}</ref><ref name=":6">{{Cite book|last=Stasavage, David|title=Decline and rise of democracy: a global history from antiquity to today|date=2020|publisher=Princeton University Press|isbn=978-0-691-17746-5|oclc=1125969950}}</ref> [[Montesquieu]] argued that the mobility of commerce meant that rulers had to bargain with merchants in order to tax them, otherwise they would leave the country or hide their commercial activities.<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://muse.jhu.edu/book/30312|title=Bounding Power: Republican Security Theory from the Polis to the Global Village|last=Deudney|first=Daniel H.|date=2010|publisher=Princeton University Press|isbn=978-1-4008-3727-4|language=en}}</ref><ref name=":3" /> Stasavage argues that the small size and backwardness of European states, as well as the weakness of European rulers, after the fall of the Roman Empire meant that European rulers had to obtain consent from their population to govern effectively.<ref name=":6" /><ref name=":5" />

According to Clark, Golder, and Golder, an application of  [[Albert O. Hirschman]]'s exit, voice, and loyalty model is that if individuals have plausible exit options, then a government may be more likely to democratize. [[James C. Scott]] argues that governments may find it difficult to claim a sovereignty over a population when that population is in motion.<ref name="C. 2010 7">{{Cite book|last=Scott |first=James C. |url=https://archive.org/details/artofnotbeinggov0000scot/page/7 |title=The Art of not being governed: an anarchist history of upland Southeast Asia|date=2010|publisher=NUS Press|isbn=9780300152289|pages=[https://archive.org/details/artofnotbeinggov0000scot/page/7 7]|oclc=872296825}}</ref> Scott additionally asserts that exit may not solely include physical exit from the territory of a coercive state, but can include a number of adaptive responses to coercion that make it more difficult for states to claim sovereignty over a population. These responses can include planting crops that are more difficult for states to count, or tending livestock that are more mobile. In fact, the entire political arrangement of a state is a result of individuals adapting to the environment, and making a choice as to whether or not to stay in a territory.<ref name="C. 2010 7" /> If people are free to move, then the exit, voice, and loyalty model predicts that a state will have to be of that population representative, and appease the populace in order to prevent them from leaving.<ref name=":1">{{Cite web|title=Power and politics: insights from an exit, voice, and loyalty game.|url=http://projects.iq.harvard.edu/files/pegroup/files/clark_golder.pdf}}</ref> If individuals have plausible exit options then they are better able to constrain a government's arbitrary behaviour through threat of exit.<ref name=":1" />