Editing Problem of evil (section)

====Soul-making or Irenaean theodicy====
{{Main|Irenaean theodicy}}

The soul-making (or Irenaean) theodicy is named after the 2nd-century Greek theologian [[Irenaeus]] whose ideas were adopted in Eastern Christianity.<ref name=johnhickp201/> It has been modified and advocated in the twenty-first century by [[John Hick]].<ref name=johnhickp201>{{cite book|first=John|last=Hick|title=Evil and the God of Love|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=KMcYDAAAQBAJ |year=2016|publisher=Palgrave Macmillan|isbn=978-1-349-18048-6 |pages=201–216}}</ref> Irenaen theodicy stands in sharp contrast to the Augustinian. For Augustine, humans were created perfect but fell, and thereafter continued to choose badly of their own freewill. In Irenaeus' view, humans were not created perfect, but instead, must strive continuously to move closer to it.<ref name="Lars Fr. H. Svendsen">{{cite book |last1=Svendsen |first1=Lars Fr. H. |title=A Philosophy of Evil |date=2010 |publisher=Dalkey Archive Press |isbn=9781564785718 |page=51}}</ref>

The key points of a soul-making theodicy begin with its metaphysical foundation: that "(1) The purpose of God in creating the world was soul-making for rational moral agents".<ref name="G. Stanley Kane">{{cite journal |last1=Kane |first1=G. Stanley |title=The Failure of Soul-Making Theodicy |journal=International Journal for Philosophy of Religion |date=1975 |volume=6 |issue=1 |pages=1–22 |doi=10.1007/BF00136996 |jstor=40021034 |s2cid=170214854 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/40021034}}</ref>  (2) Humans choose their responses to the soul-making process thereby developing moral character. (3) This requires that God remain hidden, otherwise freewill would be compromised. (4) This hiddenness is created, in part, by the presence of evil in the world. (5) The distance of God makes moral freedom possible, while the existence of obstacles makes meaningful struggle possible. (6) The result of beings who complete the soul-making process is "a good of such surpassing value" that it justifies the means. (7) Those who complete the process will be admitted to the kingdom of God where there will be no more evil.<ref name="G. Stanley Kane"/> Hick argues that, for suffering to have soul-making value, "human effort and development must be present at every stage of existence including the afterlife".<ref name="Anderson, A. K."/>{{rp|132, 138}}

[[C. S. Lewis]] developed a theodicy that began with freewill and then accounts for suffering caused by disease and natural disasters by developing a version of the soul-making theodicy. [[Nicholas Wolterstorff]] has raised challenges for Lewis's soul-making theodicy. Erik J. Wielenberg draws upon Lewis's broader corpus beyond ''The Problem of Pain'' but also, to a lesser extent, on the thought of two other contemporary proponents of the soul-making theodicy, John Hick and Trent Dougherty, in an attempt to make the case that Lewis's version of the soul-making theodicy has depth and resilience.<ref>{{cite journal|last =Wielenberg|first=Erik J. |title=In Defence of C.S. Lewis' Soul-Making Theodicy: A Reply to Wolterstorff|journal=Journal of Inklings Studies|year=2019 |volume=9|issue=2|pages=192–199 |doi=10.3366/ink.2019.0048 |s2cid=211937140 |url=https://www.euppublishing.com/doi/abs/10.3366/ink.2019.0048|url-access=subscription}}</ref>

===== Critique =====
The Irenaean theodicy is challenged by the assertion that many evils do not promote spiritual growth, but can instead be destructive of the human spirit. Hick acknowledges that this process often fails in the actual world.<ref name="Hick and Evil">{{Cite book  | last = Hick  | first = John  | author-link = John Hick  | title = Evil and the God of Love  | publisher=Macmillan  | place = London  | year = 1966  | isbn = 978-0-06-063902-0  }}{{rp|325, 336}}</ref> Particularly egregious cases known as horrendous evils, which "[constitute] ''[[prima facie]]'' reason to doubt whether the participant's life could (given their inclusion in it) be a great good to him/her on the whole," have been the focus of recent work in the problem of evil.<ref>[[Marilyn McCord Adams]], ''Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God'' (Cornell University, 2000), 203.</ref> Horrendous suffering often leads to dehumanization, and its victims become angry, bitter, vindictive, depressed and spiritually worse.<ref name=Creeganp185/>

Yet, life crises are a catalyst for change that is often positive.<ref>{{cite book |editor1-last=Tedeschi |editor1-first=Richard G. |editor2-last=Park |editor2-first=Crystal L. |editor3-last=Calhoun |editor3-first=Lawrence G. |title=Posttraumatic Growth: Positive Changes in the Aftermath of Crisis |date=1998 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=9781135689803 |pages=99, 117}}</ref> Neurologists [[Bryan Kolb]] and [[Bruce Wexler]] indicate this has to do with the plasticity of the brain. The brain is highly plastic in childhood development, becoming less so by adulthood once development is completed. Thereafter, the brain resists change.<ref name="Bruce E. Wexler">{{cite book |last1=Wexler |first1=Bruce E.|title=Brain and Culture Neurobiology, Ideology, and Social Change |date=2008 |publisher=MIT Press |isbn=9780262265140}}</ref>{{rp|5–9}} The neurons in the brain can only make permanent changes "when the conditions are right" because the brain's development is dependent upon the stimulation it receives.<ref name="Bryan Kolb">{{cite book |last1=Kolb |first1=Bryan |title=Brain Plasticity and Behavior |date=2013 |publisher=Psychology Press |isbn=9781134784141}}</ref>{{rp|7}} <ref name="Bruce E. Wexler"/>{{rp|13}} When the brain receives the powerful stimulus that experiences like bereavement, life-threatening illness, the trauma of war and other deeply painful experiences provide, a prolonged and difficult internal struggle, where the individual completely re-examines their self-concept and perceptions of reality, reshapes neurological structures.<ref name="Bruce E. Wexler"/>{{rp|6–7}}<ref name="Horowitz and Van Eeden">{{cite journal |last1=Horowitz |first1=D. S. |last2=Van Eeden |first2=R. |title=Exploring the learnings derived from catalytic experiences in a leadership context |journal=SA Journal of Human Resource Management/SA Tydskrif vir Menslikehulpbronbestuur |date=2015 |volume=13 |issue=1 |url=https://sajhrm.co.za/index.php/sajhrm/article/view/598/895}}</ref>{{rp|4}} The literature refers to ''turning points,''<ref name="McAdams">{{cite book |last1=McAdams |first1=Dan P. |title=The Redemptive Self: Stories Americans Live By |date=2013 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=9780199969760 |edition=Revised and Expanded}}</ref> ''defining moments,''<ref name="Badaracco">{{cite book |last1=Badaracco |first1=Joseph L. Jr. |title=Defining Moments When Managers Must Choose Between Right and Right |date=2016 |publisher=Harvard Business Review Press |isbn=9781633692404}}</ref> ''crucible moments,''<ref name="Bennis and Thomas">{{cite book |last1=Bennis |first1=Warren G. |last2=Thomas |first2=Robert J. |title=Geeks and Geezers: How Era, Values, and Defining Moments Shape Leaders – How Tough Times Shape Good Leaders |date=2002 |publisher=Harvard Business School Press}}</ref> and ''life-changing events.''<ref name="Boyatzis and McKee">{{cite book |last1=Boyatzis |first1=Richard E. |last2=McKee |first2=Annie |title=Resonant Leadership: Renewing Yourself and Connecting with Others Through Mindfulness, Hope, and Compassion |date=2005 |publisher=Harvard Business Press |isbn=9781591395638 |edition=illustrated}}</ref> These are experiences that form a catalyst in an individual's life so that the individual is personally transformed, often emerging with a sense of learning, strength and growth, that empowers them to pursue different paths than they otherwise would have.<ref name="Horowitz and Van Eeden"/>{{rp|2}}

Steve Gregg acknowledges that much human suffering produces no discernible good, and that the greater good does not fully address every case. "Nonetheless, the fact that sufferings are temporal, and are often justly punitive, corrective, sanctifying and ennobling stands as one of the important aspects of a biblical worldview that somewhat ameliorates the otherwise unanswerable problem of pain".<ref name="Steve Gregg">{{cite book |last1=Gregg |first1=Steve |title=All You Want to Know About Hell: Three Christian Views of God's Final Solution to the Problem of Sin |date=2013 |publisher=Thomas Nelson |isbn=9781401678319 |page=2}}</ref>

A second critique argues that, were it true that God permitted evil in order to facilitate spiritual growth, it might be reasonable to expect that evil would disproportionately befall those in poor spiritual health such as the decadent wealthy, who often seem to enjoy lives of luxury insulated from evil, whereas many of the pious are poor and well acquainted with worldly evils.<ref>The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "The Problem of Evil", James R. Beebe</ref> Using the example of [[Francis of Assisi]], [[G. K. Chesterton]] argues that, contrary "to the modern mind", wealth is condemned in Christian theology for the very reason that wealth insulates from evil and suffering, and the spiritual growth such experiences can produce. Chesterton explains that Francis pursued poverty "as men have dug madly for gold" because its concomitent suffering is a path to piety.<ref name="G. K. Chesterton">{{cite book |last1=Chesterton |first1=G. K. |title=Saint Francis of Assisi |date=2009 |publisher=Floating Press |isbn=9781775413776}}</ref>{{rp|32, 89–90}}

[[G. Stanley Kane]] asserts that human character can be developed directly in constructive and nurturing loving ways, and it is unclear why God would consider or allow evil and suffering to be necessary or the preferred way to spiritual growth.<ref name=johnhickp201/>{{rp|376–379}}  Hick asserts that suffering is necessary, not only for some specific virtues, but that "...one who has attained to goodness by meeting and eventually mastering temptation, and thus by rightly making [responsible] choices in concrete situations, is good in a richer and more valuable sense than would be one created ''ab initio'' in a state either of innocence or of virtue. In the former case, which is that of the actual moral achievements of mankind, the individual's goodness has within it the strength of temptations overcome, a stability based upon an accumulation of right choices, and a positive and responsible character that comes from the investment of costly personal effort."<ref name="Hick and Evil"/>{{rp|255}}

However, the virtues identified as the result of "soul-making" may only appear to be valuable in a world where evil and suffering already exist. A willingness to sacrifice oneself in order to save others from persecution, for example, is virtuous because persecution exists. Likewise, the willingness to donate one's meal to those who are starving is valuable because starvation exists. If persecution and starvation did not occur, there would be no reason to consider these acts virtuous. If the virtues developed through soul-making are only valuable where suffering exists, then it is not clear what would be lost if suffering did not exist.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.rationalrealm.com/downloads/philosophy/ProblemOfEvil.pdf|website=Rational Realm|title=The Problem of Evil|first=Leslie|last=Allan|date=28 July 2015|access-date=12 September 2018}}</ref> [[C. Robert Mesle]] says that such a discussion presupposes that virtues are only instrumentally valuable instead of intrinsically valuable.<ref name="C. Robert Mesle">{{cite journal |last1=Mesle |first1=C. Robert |title=The Problem of Genuine Evil: A Critique of John Hick's Theodicy |journal=The Journal of Religion |date=1986 |volume=66 |issue=4 |page=413 |doi=10.1086/487442 |jstor=1202728 |s2cid=170193070 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/1202728|url-access=subscription }}</ref>

The soul-making reconciliation of the problem of evil, states Creegan, fails to explain the need or rationale for evil inflicted on animals and resultant animal suffering, because "there is no evidence at all that suffering improves the character of animals, or is evidence of soul-making in them".<ref name=Creeganp185>{{cite book|author=Nicola Hoggard Creegan |title=Animal Suffering and the Problem of Evil |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=jWSL-zZ5x4QC |year=2013|publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-993184-2 |page=185 with footnote 3 }}</ref> Hick differentiates between animal and human suffering based on "our capacity imaginatively to anticipate the future".<ref name="Hick and Evil"/>{{rp|314}}