Editing Democratization (section)

==== Inequality and democracy ====
Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson argued that the relationship between [[social equality]] and democratic transition is complicated: People have less incentive to revolt in an egalitarian society (for example, [[Singapore]]), so the likelihood of democratization is lower. In a highly unequal society (for example, [[South Africa]] under [[Apartheid]]), the [[redistribution of wealth]] and power in a democracy would be so harmful to elites that these would do everything to prevent democratization. Democratization is more likely to emerge somewhere in the middle, in the countries, whose elites offer concessions because (1) they consider the threat of a revolution credible and (2) the cost of the concessions is not too high.<ref name="acemoglu">{{cite book | last = Acemoglu | first = Daron |author2=James A. Robinson | title = Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy | publisher = Cambridge University Press | year = 2006 | location = Cambridge}}</ref> This expectation is in line with the empirical research showing that democracy is more stable in egalitarian societies.<ref name="przeworski" />

Other approaches to the relationship between inequality and democracy have been presented by [[Carles Boix]], [[Stephan Haggard]] and Robert Kaufman, and [[Ben Ansell]] and [[David Samuels (political scientist)|David Samuels]].<ref>Special issue on "Inequality and Democratization: What Do We Know?"''American Political Science Association. Comparative Democratization'' 11(3)2013.</ref><ref name="krauss">[https://doi.org/10.1080/1350178X.2015.1069372 Krauss, Alexander. "The scientific limits of understanding the (potential) relationship between complex social phenomena: the case of democracy and inequality." Journal of Economic Methodology 23.1 (2016): 97–109.]</ref>

In their 2019 book ''The Narrow Corridor'' and a 2022 study in the ''American Political Science Review'', Acemoglu and Robinson argue that the nature of the relationship between elites and society determine whether stable democracy emerges. When elites are overly dominant, despotic states emerge. When society is overly dominant, weak states emerge. When elites and society are evenly balance, inclusive states emerge.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Acemoglu |first1=Daron |last2=Robinson |first2=James A. |date=2022 |title=Weak, Despotic, or Inclusive? How State Type Emerges from State versus Civil Society Competition |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/abs/weak-despotic-or-inclusive-how-state-type-emerges-from-state-versus-civil-society-competition/FD2C89941F15250D52076EE53F82C013 |journal=American Political Science Review |volume=117 |issue=2 |pages=407–420 |language=en |doi=10.1017/S0003055422000740 |s2cid=251607252 |issn=0003-0554|url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last1=Acemoglu |first1=Daron |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=kTeUwgEACAAJ |title=The Narrow Corridor: States, Societies, and the Fate of Liberty |last2=Robinson |first2=James A. |date=2019 |publisher=Penguin Books |isbn=978-0-241-31431-9 |language=en}}</ref>