Editing Scientific method (section)

===Sociology of knowledge===
{{Main|Sociology of scientific knowledge}}

The sociology of knowledge is a concept in the discussion around scientific method, claiming the underlying method of science to be sociological. King explains that sociology distinguishes here between the system of ideas that govern the sciences through an inner logic, and the social system in which those ideas arise.{{efn-lg|"The sociology of knowledge is concerned with "the relationship between human thought and the social context in which it arises."<ref>Here, King quotes [[Peter L. Berger]] and [[Thomas Luckmann|Thomas Luckman]], ''[[The Social Construction of Reality]]'' (London, 1967), 16.</ref> So, on this reading, the sociology of science may be taken to be considered with the analysis of the social context of scientific thought. But scientific thought, most sociologists concede, is distinguished from other modes of thought precisely by virtue of its immunity from social determination — insofar as it is governed by reason rather than by tradition, and insofar as it is rational it escapes determination by "non-logical" social forces." — M. D. King leading into his article on ''Reason, tradition, and the progressiveness of science (1971)''<ref name="King_JA1971">{{cite journal | last=King | first=M. D. | title=Reason, Tradition, and the Progressiveness of Science | journal=History and Theory | publisher=[Wesleyan University, Wiley] | volume=10 | issue=1 | year=1971 | issn=1468-2303 | jstor=2504396 | doi=10.2307/2504396 | pages=3–32}}</ref>}}{{efn-lr|name=Tanqih |1= {{harvp|Sabra|2007}} recounts how [[Kamāl al-Dīn al-Fārisī]] came by his manuscript copy of [[Alhacen]]'s ''[[Book of Optics]]'', which by then was some two centuries old: al-Fārisī's project was to write an advanced optics treatise, but he could not understand optical [[refraction]] using his best resources. His mentor, [[Qutb al-Din al-Shirazi]] recalled having seen Alhacen's manuscript as a youth, and arranged to get al-Fārisī a copy "from a distant country". al-Fārisī is now remembered for his Commentary on Alhacen's ''Book of Optics'' in which he found a satisfactory explanation for the phenomenon of the [[rainbow]]: light rays from the sun are doubly refracted within the raindrops in the air, back to the observer.<ref>{{cite web
 | author1=O'Connor, J. J. |author2=Robertson, E. F. | date=November 1999
 | url=http://www-gap.dcs.st-and.ac.uk/~history/Biographies/Al-Farisi.html
 | title=Kamal al-Din Abu'l Hasan Muhammad Al-Farisi
 | publisher=University of St. Andrews | access-date=2007-06-07 }}</ref> Refraction of the colors from the sun's light then forms the spread of colors in the rainbow.}}

====Thought collectives====

A perhaps accessible lead into what is claimed is [[Ludwik Fleck|Fleck's]] thought, echoed in [[Thomas Kuhn|Kuhn's]] concept of [[normal science]]. According to Fleck, scientists' work is based on a thought-style, that cannot be rationally reconstructed. It gets instilled through the experience of learning, and science is then advanced based on a tradition of shared assumptions held by what he called [[Thought collective|''thought collectives'']]. Fleck also claims this phenomenon to be largely invisible to members of the group.<ref name="Fleck_comp_w/Kuhn">{{cite journal|last=Harwood | first=Jonathan | title=Ludwik Fleck and the Sociology of Knowledge | journal=Social Studies of Science | volume=16 | number=1 | date=1986 | pages=173–187 | doi=10.1177/030631286016001009 | jstor=285293}}</ref>

Comparably, following the [[field research]] in an academic scientific laboratory by [[Bruno Latour|Latour]] and [[Steve Woolgar|Woolgar]], [[Karin Knorr Cetina]] has conducted a comparative study of two scientific fields (namely [[Particle physics|high energy physics]] and [[molecular biology]]) to conclude that the epistemic practices and reasonings within both scientific communities are different enough to introduce the concept of "[[epistemic cultures]]", in contradiction with the idea that a so-called "scientific method" is unique and a unifying concept.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Epistemic cultures: how the sciences make knowledge|last=Knorr-Cetina |first=K. |date=1999|publisher=Harvard University Press |isbn=978-0-674-25893-8|location=Cambridge, Mass.|oclc=39539508}}</ref>{{efn|Comparing 'epistemic cultures' with Fleck 1935, [[Thought collective]]s, (''denkkollektiven''): ''Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache: Einfǖhrung in die Lehre vom Denkstil und Denkkollektiv''<ref>As cited in {{harvp|Fleck|1979|p=27}}, {{harvp|Fleck|1979|pp=38–50}}</ref> {{harvp|Fleck|1979|p=xxvii}} recognizes that [[#genesisOfScientificFact|facts have lifetimes]], flourishing only after incubation periods. His selected question for investigation (1934) was "[[Thought collective#predicateIsNotStatement|HOW, THEN, DID THIS EMPIRICAL FACT ORIGINATE]] AND IN WHAT DOES IT CONSIST?".<ref>{{harvp|Fleck|1979|p=xxviii}}</ref> But by [[#genesisOfScientificFact|Fleck 1979, p.27]], the thought collectives within the respective fields will have to settle on common specialized terminology, publish their results and further intercommunicate with their colleagues using the common terminology, in order to progress.<ref>{{harvp|Fleck | 1979|p=27}}</ref>
{{see also|Cognitive revolution|Perceptual control theory#The methodology of modeling, and PCT as model}}}}

====Situated cognition and relativism====
{{See also|Postpositivism|Relativism}}

On the idea of Fleck's ''thought collectives'' sociologists built the concept of [[situated cognition]]: that the perspective of the researcher fundamentally affects their work; and, too, more radical views.

[[Norwood Russell Hanson]], alongside [[Thomas Kuhn]] and [[Paul Feyerabend]], extensively explored the theory-laden nature of observation in science. Hanson introduced the concept in 1958, emphasizing that observation is influenced by the [[Situated cognition|observer's conceptual framework]]. He used the concept of [[gestalt psychology|gestalt]] to show how preconceptions can affect both observation and description, and illustrated this with examples like the initial rejection of [[Golgi apparatus|Golgi bodies]] as an artefact of staining technique, and the differing interpretations of the same sunrise by Tycho Brahe and Johannes Kepler. [[Intersubjectivity]] led to different conclusions.<ref name="Hanson1958">{{Citation
|last=Hanson
|first=Norwood
|title=Patterns of Discovery
|year=1958
|publisher=Cambridge University Press
|isbn=978-0-521-05197-2
}}</ref>{{efn|name= Kepler1604 }}

Kuhn and Feyerabend acknowledged Hanson's pioneering work,<ref>{{cite book |last=Kuhn |first=Thomas S. |title=The Structure of Scientific Revolutions |publisher=University of Chicago Press |location=Chicago, IL |year=2009 |isbn=978-1-4432-5544-8 |page=113 |title-link=The Structure of Scientific Revolutions}}<!--ISBN matches 2009 publication, not the 1962.-->
</ref><ref>Feyerabend, Paul K (1960) "Patterns of Discovery" The Philosophical Review (1960) vol. 69 (2) pp. 247–252</ref> although Feyerabend's views on methodological pluralism were more radical. Criticisms like those from Kuhn and Feyerabend prompted discussions leading to the development of the [[strong programme]], a sociological approach that seeks to explain scientific knowledge without recourse to the truth or validity of scientific theories. It examines how scientific beliefs are shaped by social factors such as power, ideology, and interests.

The [[postmodernism|postmodernist]] critiques of science have themselves been the subject of intense controversy. This ongoing debate, known as the [[science wars]], is the result of conflicting values and assumptions between [[postmodernist]] and [[scientific realism|realist]] perspectives. Postmodernists argue that scientific knowledge is merely a discourse, devoid of any claim to fundamental truth. In contrast, realists within the scientific community maintain that science uncovers real and fundamental truths about reality. Many books have been written by scientists which take on this problem and challenge the assertions of the postmodernists while defending science as a legitimate way of deriving truth.<ref>For example:
* ''Higher Superstition: The Academic Left and Its Quarrels with Science'', The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997
* ''Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals' Abuse of Science'', Picador. 1999
* ''The Sokal Hoax: The Sham That Shook the Academy'', University of Nebraska Press, 2000 {{ISBN|0-8032-7995-7}}
* ''A House Built on Sand: Exposing Postmodernist Myths About Science'', Oxford University Press, 2000
* ''Intellectual Impostures'', Economist Books, 2003</ref>