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==== Natural resources ==== [[File:Oil well.jpg|thumb|The abundance of oil is sometimes seen as a curse.]] Research shows that oil wealth lowers levels of democracy and strengthens autocratic rule.<ref name="Ross 2001">{{cite journal|last1=Ross|first1=Michael L.|date=13 June 2011|title=Does Oil Hinder Democracy?|journal=World Politics|volume=53|issue=3|pages=325–361|doi=10.1353/wp.2001.0011|s2cid=18404}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Wright|first1=Joseph|last2=Frantz|first2=Erica|last3=Geddes|first3=Barbara|s2cid=988090|author-link3=Barbara Geddes (academic)|date=2015-04-01|title=Oil and Autocratic Regime Survival|journal=British Journal of Political Science|volume=45|issue=2|pages=287–306|doi=10.1017/S0007123413000252|issn=1469-2112}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Jensen|first1=Nathan|last2=Wantchekon|first2=Leonard|date=2004-09-01|title=Resource Wealth and Political Regimes in Africa|url=http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/politics/faculty/wantchekon/research/regimes.pdf|journal=Comparative Political Studies|volume=37|issue=7|pages=816–841|citeseerx=10.1.1.607.9710|doi=10.1177/0010414004266867|s2cid=154999593|issn=0010-4140}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Ulfelder|first=Jay|date=2007-08-01|title=Natural-Resource Wealth and the Survival of Autocracy|journal=Comparative Political Studies|volume=40|issue=8|pages=995–1018|doi=10.1177/0010414006287238|s2cid=154316752|issn=0010-4140}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Basedau|first1=Matthias|last2=Lay|first2=Jann|date=2009-11-01|title=Resource Curse or Rentier Peace? The Ambiguous Effects of Oil Wealth and Oil Dependence on Violent Conflict|url=https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/document/36912/1/ssoar-jpeaceresearch-2009-6-basedau_et_al-Resource_curse_or_rentier_peace.pdf|journal=Journal of Peace Research|volume=46|issue=6|pages=757–776|doi=10.1177/0022343309340500|s2cid=144798465|issn=0022-3433}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Andersen|first1=Jørgen J.|last2=Ross|first2=Michael L.|date=2014-06-01|title=The Big Oil Change A Closer Look at the Haber–Menaldo Analysis|url=https://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/195819/Andersen_CPS_2014.pdf?sequence=1|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180723095213/https://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/195819/Andersen_CPS_2014.pdf?sequence=1|archive-date=2018-07-23|journal=Comparative Political Studies|volume=47|issue=7|pages=993–1021|doi=10.1177/0010414013488557|issn=0010-4140|hdl=11250/195819|s2cid=154653329}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Girod|first1=Desha M.|last2=Stewart|first2=Megan A.|last3=Walters|first3=Meir R.|date=2016-07-27|title=Mass protests and the resource curse: The politics of demobilization in rentier autocracies|journal=Conflict Management and Peace Science|volume=35|issue=5|pages=503–522|doi=10.1177/0738894216651826|s2cid=157573005|issn=0738-8942}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Wright|first1=Joseph|last2=Frantz|first2=Erica|date=2017-07-01|title=How oil income and missing hydrocarbon rents data influence autocratic survival: A response to Lucas and Richter (2016)|journal=Research & Politics|volume=4|issue=3|pages=2053168017719794|doi=10.1177/2053168017719794|issn=2053-1680|doi-access=free}}</ref><ref name=":10">{{Cite journal|last=Wigley|first=Simon|date=December 2018|title=Is There a Resource Curse for Private Liberties?|journal=International Studies Quarterly|volume=62|issue=4|pages=834–844|doi=10.1093/isq/sqy031|hdl=11693/48786|hdl-access=free}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Cassidy|first=Traviss|year=2019|title=The Long-Run Effects of Oil Wealth on Development: Evidence from Petroleum Geology|journal=The Economic Journal|volume=129|issue=623|pages=2745–2778|doi=10.1093/ej/uez009|url=https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/97778/1/MPRA_paper_97777.pdf}}</ref> According to Michael Ross, [[petroleum]] is the sole resource that has "been consistently correlated with less democracy and worse institutions" and is the "key variable in the vast majority of the studies" identifying some type of [[resource curse]] effect.<ref name=":2">{{Cite journal|last=Ross|first=Michael L.|s2cid=154308471|date=May 2015|title=What Have We Learned about the Resource Curse?|journal=Annual Review of Political Science|volume=18|pages=239–259|doi=10.1146/annurev-polisci-052213-040359|doi-access=free}}</ref> A 2014 meta-analysis confirms the negative impact of oil wealth on democratization.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Ahmadov|first=Anar K.|date=2014-08-01|title=Oil, Democracy, and Context A Meta-Analysis|journal=Comparative Political Studies|language=en|volume=47|issue=9|pages=1238–1267|doi=10.1177/0010414013495358|s2cid=154661151|issn=0010-4140}}</ref> Thad Dunning proposes a plausible explanation for Ecuador's return to democracy that contradicts the conventional wisdom that natural resource rents encourage authoritarian governments. Dunning proposes that there are situations where natural resource rents, such as those acquired through oil, reduce the risk of distributive or social policies to the elite because the state has other sources of revenue to finance this kind of policies that is not the elite wealth or income.<ref>Thad Dunning. 2008. ''Crude Democracy: Natural Resource Wealth and Political Regimes''. Cambridge University Press. Ch. 1.Pp. 3.</ref> And in countries plagued with high inequality, which was the case of Ecuador in the 1970s, the result would be a higher likelihood of democratization.<ref>Thad Dunning. 2008. ''Crude Democracy: Natural Resource Wealth and Political Regimes''. Cambridge University Press. Ch. 1, p. 21.</ref> In 1972, the military coup had overthrown the government in large part because of the fears of elites that redistribution would take place.<ref name="Thad Dunning 2008. Pp. 34">Thad Dunning. 2008. ''Crude Democracy: Natural Resource Wealth and Political Regimes''. Cambridge University Press. Ch. 1, p. 34.</ref> That same year oil became an increasing financial source for the country.<ref name="Thad Dunning 2008. Pp. 34" /> Although the rents were used to finance the military, the eventual second oil boom of 1979 ran parallel to the country's re-democratization.<ref name="Thad Dunning 2008. Pp. 34" /> Ecuador's re-democratization can then be attributed, as argued by Dunning, to the large increase of oil rents, which enabled not only a surge in public spending but placated the fears of redistribution that had grappled the elite circles.<ref name="Thad Dunning 2008. Pp. 34" /> The exploitation of Ecuador's resource rent enabled the government to implement price and wage policies that benefited citizens at no cost to the elite and allowed for a smooth transition and growth of democratic institutions.<ref name="Thad Dunning 2008. Pp. 34" /> The thesis that oil and other natural resources have a negative impact on democracy has been challenged by historian [[Stephen Haber]] and political scientist Victor Menaldo in a widely cited article in the ''American Political Science Review'' (2011). Haber and Menaldo argue that "natural resource reliance is not an exogenous variable" and find that when tests of the relationship between natural resources and democracy take this point into account "increases in resource reliance are not associated with authoritarianism."<ref>Stephen Haber and Victor Menaldo, "Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism? A Reappraisal of the Resource Curse," ''American Political Science Review'' 105(1) 2011: 1–26.</ref>
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