Open main menu
Home
Random
Recent changes
Special pages
Community portal
Preferences
About Wikipedia
Disclaimers
Incubator escapee wiki
Search
User menu
Talk
Dark mode
Contributions
Create account
Log in
Editing
IEEE 802.11
(section)
Warning:
You are not logged in. Your IP address will be publicly visible if you make any edits. If you
log in
or
create an account
, your edits will be attributed to your username, along with other benefits.
Anti-spam check. Do
not
fill this in!
==Security== {{Update section|date=February 2024|reason=WPA2 is no longer the latest version of WPA}} In 2001, a group from the [[University of California, Berkeley]] presented a paper describing weaknesses in the [[802.11]] Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) security mechanism defined in the original standard; they were followed by [[Fluhrer, Mantin and Shamir attack|Fluhrer, Mantin, and Shamir]]'s paper titled "Weaknesses in the Key Scheduling Algorithm of [[RC4]]". Not long after, Adam Stubblefield and [[AT&T Corporation|AT&T]] publicly announced the first verification of the attack. In the attack, they were able to intercept transmissions and gain unauthorized access to wireless networks.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Security Flaws in 802.11 Data Link Protocols |url=https://people.eecs.berkeley.edu/~daw/papers/wireless-cacm.pdf}}</ref> The IEEE set up a dedicated task group to create a replacement security solution, 802.11i (previously, this work was handled as part of a broader 802.11e effort to enhance the [[MAC layer]]). The Wi-Fi Alliance announced an interim specification called [[Wi-Fi Protected Access]] (WPA) based on a subset of the then-current IEEE 802.11i draft. These started to appear in products in mid-2003. [[IEEE 802.11i]] (also known as WPA2) itself was ratified in June 2004, and uses the [[Advanced Encryption Standard]] (AES), instead of [[RC4]], which was used in WEP. The modern recommended encryption for the home/consumer space is WPA2 (AES Pre-Shared Key), and for the enterprise space is WPA2 along with a [[RADIUS]] authentication server (or another type of authentication server) and a strong authentication method such as [[EAP-TLS]].{{citation needed|date=May 2020}} In January 2005, the IEEE set up yet another [[IEEE 802.11w-2009|task group "w"]] to protect management and broadcast frames, which previously were sent unsecured. Its standard was published in 2009.<ref>{{cite web |title= Status of Project IEEE 802.11 Task Group w: Protected Management Frames |author= Jesse Walker, Chair |date= May 2009 |url= https://grouper.ieee.org/groups/802/11/Reports/tgw_update.htm |access-date= 24 August 2020}}</ref> In December 2011, a security flaw was revealed that affects some wireless routers with a specific implementation of the optional [[Wi-Fi Protected Setup]] (WPS) feature. While WPS is not a part of 802.11, the flaw allows an attacker within the range of the wireless router to recover the WPS PIN and, with it, the router's 802.11i password in a few hours.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://sviehb.files.wordpress.com/2011/12/viehboeck_wps.pdf |website=.braindump β RE and stuff |title=Brute forcing Wi-Fi Protected Setup |date=2011-12-26 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120118105726/http://sviehb.files.wordpress.com/2011/12/viehboeck_wps.pdf |archive-date=2012-01-18 }}</ref><ref>[[US CERT]] [http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/723755 Vulnerability Note VU#723755] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120103152902/http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/723755 |date=2012-01-03 }}</ref> In late 2014, [[Apple Inc.|Apple]] announced that its [[iOS]] 8 mobile operating system would scramble MAC addresses during the pre-association stage to thwart [[People counter|retail footfall tracking]] made possible by the regular transmission of uniquely identifiable probe requests.<ref>{{cite web |date=9 June 2014 |title=iOS 8 strikes an unexpected blow against location tracking |url=https://www.theverge.com/2014/6/9/5792970/ios-8-strikes-an-unexpected-blow-against-location-tracking |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150402001224/http://www.theverge.com/2014/6/9/5792970/ios-8-strikes-an-unexpected-blow-against-location-tracking |archive-date=2015-04-02}}</ref> Android 8.0 "Oreo" introduced a similar feature, named "MAC randomization".<ref>{{cite web |title=Implementing MAC Randomization |url=https://source.android.com/docs/core/connect/wifi-mac-randomization}}</ref> Wi-Fi users may be subjected to a [[Wi-Fi deauthentication attack]] to eavesdrop, attack passwords, or force the use of another, usually more expensive access point.{{cn|date=October 2024}}
Edit summary
(Briefly describe your changes)
By publishing changes, you agree to the
Terms of Use
, and you irrevocably agree to release your contribution under the
CC BY-SA 4.0 License
and the
GFDL
. You agree that a hyperlink or URL is sufficient attribution under the Creative Commons license.
Cancel
Editing help
(opens in new window)