Editing Democratic peace theory (section)

===As justification for initiating war===
Some fear that the democratic peace theory may be used to justify wars against non-democracies in order to bring lasting peace, in a ''democratic crusade''.{{sfn|Chan|1997|p=59}} [[Woodrow Wilson]] in 1917 asked Congress to declare war against Imperial Germany, citing Germany's sinking of American ships due to [[unrestricted submarine warfare]] and the [[Zimmermann telegram]], but also stating that "A steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations" and "The world must be made safe for democracy."{{sfn|Wilson|1917}}{{efn|Wilson's vision for the world after [[World War I]], his [[Fourteen Points]] (1918), did not mention democracy, but in other aspects "sound almost as though Kant were guiding Wilson's writing hand." They included both Kant’s [[Cosmopolitanism|cosmopolitan]] law and pacific union. The third of the [[Fourteen Points]] specified the removal of economic barriers between peaceful nations; the fourteenth provided for the [[League of Nations]].{{sfn|Russett|1993}}}} [[R. J. Rummel]] was a notable proponent of war for the purpose of spreading democracy, based on this theory.

Some point out that the democratic peace theory has been used to justify the [[2003 Iraq War]], others argue that this justification was used only after the war had already started.{{sfn|Russett|2005}} Furthermore, Weede has argued that the justification is extremely weak, because forcibly democratizing a country completely surrounded by non-democracies, most of which are full autocracies, as Iraq was, is at least as likely to increase the risk of war as it is to decrease it (some studies show that dyads formed by one democracy and one autocracy are the most warlike, and several find that the risk of war is greatly increased in democratizing countries surrounded by non-democracies).{{sfn|Weede|2004}}{{Verify source|date=January 2021}} According to Weede, if the United States and its allies wanted to adopt a rationale strategy of forced democratization based on democratic peace, which he still does not recommend, it would be best to start intervening in countries which border with at least one or two stable democracies, and expand gradually. Also, research shows that attempts to create democracies by using external force has often failed. Gleditsch, Christiansen, and Hegre argue that forced democratization by interventionism may initially have partial success, but often create an unstable democratizing country, which can have dangerous consequences in the long run.{{sfn|Gleditsch|Christiansen|Hegre|2004}} Those attempts which had a permanent and stable success, like democratization in [[Allied-occupied Austria|Austria]], [[Bizone|West Germany]] and [[Occupied Japan|Japan]] after [[World War II]], mostly involved countries which had an advanced economic and social structure already, and implied a drastic change of the whole political culture. Supporting internal democratic movements and using diplomacy may be far more successful and less costly. Thus, the theory and related research, if they were correctly understood, may actually be an argument against a democratic crusade.{{sfn|Weart|1998}}{{sfn|Owen|2005}}{{sfn|Russett|2005}}

[[Michael Haas (political scientist)|Michael Haas]] has written perhaps the most trenchant critique of a hidden normative agenda. Among the points raised: Due to sampling manipulation, the research creates the impression that democracies can justifiably fight non-democracies, snuff out budding democracies, or even impose democracy. And due to sloppy definitions, there is no concern that democracies continue undemocratic practices yet remain in the sample as if pristine democracies.{{sfn|Haas|1997}}

This criticism is confirmed by [[David Keen]] who finds that almost all historical attempts to impose democracy by violent means have failed.{{sfn|Keen|2006}}