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Democratization
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=== Cultural factors === ==== Values and religion ==== It is claimed by some that certain cultures are simply more conducive to democratic values than others. This view is likely to be [[Ethnocentrism|ethnocentric]]. Typically, it is [[Western culture]] which is cited as "best suited" to democracy, with other cultures portrayed as containing values which make democracy difficult or undesirable. This argument is sometimes used by undemocratic regimes to justify their failure to implement democratic reforms. Today, however, there are many non-Western democracies. Examples include India, Japan, Indonesia, Namibia, Botswana, Taiwan, and South Korea. Research finds that "Western-educated leaders significantly and substantively improve a country's democratization prospects".<ref>{{Cite journal |title = Who Democratizes? Western-educated Leaders and Regime Transitions|last1 = Gift|first1 = Thomas|last2 = Krcmaric|first2 = Daniel|year = 2015 |journal = Journal of Conflict Resolution |volume = 61|issue = 3|pages = 671–701|doi = 10.1177/0022002715590878|s2cid = 156073540}}</ref> Huntington presented an influential, but also controversial arguments about Confucianism and Islam. Huntington held that "In practice Confucian or Confucian-influenced societies have been inhospitable to democracy."<ref>Huntington, Samuel P. "Democracy's Third Wave." ''Journal of Democracy'' 2(2)(1991): 12–34, p. 24. [https://www.ned.org/docs/Samuel-P-Huntington-Democracy-Third-Wave.pdf]</ref> He also held that "Islamic doctrine ... contains elements that may be both congenial and uncongenial to democracy," but generally thought that Islam was an obstacle to democratization.<ref>Huntington, Samuel P. "Democracy's Third Wave." ''Journal of Democracy'' 2(2)(1991): 12–34, p. 24.</ref> In contrast, [[Alfred Stepan]] was more optimistic about the compatibility of different religions and democracy.<ref>Stepan, Alfred C. "Religion, Democracy, and the "Twin Tolerations"." ''Journal of Democracy'' 11(4) 2000: 37–57.</ref> [[File:Masjid al-Qiblatain.jpg|thumb|upright=1.5|The compatibility of Islam and democracy continues to be a focus of discussion; the image depicts a mosque in Medina, Saudi Arabia.]] [[Steven Fish]] and [[Robert Barro]] have linked Islam to undemocratic outcomes.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Fish|first=M. Steven|date=October 2002|title=Islam and Authoritarianism|journal=World Politics|language=en|volume=55|issue=1|pages=4–37|doi=10.1353/wp.2003.0004|s2cid=44555086|issn=1086-3338}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Barro|first=Robert J.|date=1999-12-01|title=Determinants of Democracy|journal=Journal of Political Economy|volume=107|issue=S6|pages=S158–S183|doi=10.1086/250107|s2cid=216077816 |issn=0022-3808|url=http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3451297}}</ref> However, Michael Ross argues that the lack of democracies in some parts of the Muslim world has more to do with the adverse effects of the resource curse than Islam.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Ross|first=Michael L.|date=February 2008|title=Oil, Islam, and Women|journal=American Political Science Review|language=en|volume=102|issue=1|pages=107–123|doi=10.1017/S0003055408080040|s2cid=54825180|issn=1537-5943}}</ref> Lisa Blaydes and Eric Chaney have linked the democratic divergence between the West and the Middle-East to the reliance on [[mamluk]]s (slave soldiers) by Muslim rulers whereas European rulers had to rely on local elites for military forces, thus giving those elites bargaining power to push for representative government.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Blaydes|first1=Lisa|last2=Chaney|first2=Eric|date=2013|title=The Feudal Revolution and Europe's Rise: Political Divergence of the Christian West and the Muslim World before 1500 CE|journal=American Political Science Review|language=en|volume=107|issue=1|pages=16–34|doi=10.1017/S0003055412000561|s2cid=33455840|issn=0003-0554}}</ref> Robert Dahl argued, in ''On Democracy'', that countries with a "democratic political culture" were more prone for democratization and democratic survival.<ref name=":4" /> He also argued that cultural homogeneity and smallness contribute to democratic survival.<ref name=":4" /><ref>{{Cite book|url=https://archive.org/details/sizedemocracy0000dahl|url-access=registration|title=Size and Democracy|last1=Dahl|first1=Robert Alan|last2=Tufte|first2=Edward R.|date=1973|publisher=Stanford University Press|isbn=978-0-8047-0834-0|language=en}}</ref> Other scholars have however challenged the notion that small states and homogeneity strengthen democracy.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Erk|first1=Jan|last2=Veenendaal|first2=Wouter|date=2014-07-14|title=Is Small Really Beautiful?: The Microstate Mistake|url=https://muse.jhu.edu/article/549504|journal=Journal of Democracy|language=en|volume=25|issue=3|pages=135–148|doi=10.1353/jod.2014.0054|s2cid=155086258|issn=1086-3214|url-access=subscription}}</ref> A 2012 study found that areas in Africa with Protestant missionaries were more likely to become stable democracies.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Woodberry|first=Robert D.|date=2012|title=The Missionary Roots of Liberal Democracy|journal=The American Political Science Review|volume=106|issue=2|pages=244–274|doi=10.1017/S0003055412000093|jstor=41495078|s2cid=54677100|issn=0003-0554}}</ref> A 2020 study failed to replicate those findings.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Nikolova|first1=Elena|last2=Polansky|first2=Jakub|date=2020|title=Conversionary Protestants Do Not Cause Democracy|url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/british-journal-of-political-science/article/abs/conversionary-protestants-do-not-cause-democracy/89D4552E3CEED18F62E94E4ABEF322F6|journal=British Journal of Political Science|volume=51|issue=4|language=en|pages=1723–1733|doi=10.1017/S0007123420000174|hdl=10419/214629 |s2cid=234540943|issn=0007-1234|hdl-access=free}}</ref> Sirianne Dahlum and Carl Henrik Knutsen offer a test of the Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel revised version of modernization theory, which focuses on cultural traits triggered by economic development that are presumed to be conducive to democratization.<ref>Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, ''Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy''. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005; Dahlum, S., & Knutsen, C., "Democracy by Demand? Reinvestigating the Effect of Self-expression Values on Political Regime Type." ''British Journal of Political Science'' 47(2)(2017): 437–61.</ref> They find "no empirical support" for the Inglehart and Welzel thesis and conclude that "self-expression values do not enhance democracy levels or democratization chances, and neither do they stabilize existing democracies."<ref>Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, ''Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy''. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005; Dahlum, S., & Knutsen, C., "Democracy by Demand? Reinvestigating the Effect of Self-expression Values on Political Regime Type." ''British Journal of Political Science'' 47(2)(2017): 437–61, p 437</ref> ==== Education ==== It has long been theorized that education promotes stable and democratic societies.<ref>{{Cite book|title = Capitalism and Freedom|last = Friedman|first = Milton|year = 1962|pages = 86}}</ref> Research shows that education leads to greater political tolerance, increases the likelihood of political participation and reduces inequality.<ref name=":0">{{Cite journal|title = The democratizing effect of education |journal = Research & Politics|date = 2015-10-01|issn = 2053-1680|pages = 2053168015613360|volume = 2|issue = 4|doi = 10.1177/2053168015613360|language = en|first1 = Eduardo|last1 = Alemán|first2 = Yeaji|last2 = Kim|doi-access = free}}</ref> One study finds "that increases in levels of education improve levels of democracy and that the democratizing effect of education is more intense in poor countries".<ref name=":0" /> It is commonly claimed that democracy and democratization were important drivers of the expansion of primary education around the world. However, new evidence from historical education trends challenges this assertion. An analysis of historical student enrollment rates for 109 countries from 1820 to 2010 finds no support for the claim that democratization increased access to primary education around the world. It is true that transitions to democracy often coincided with an acceleration in the expansion of primary education, but the same acceleration was observed in countries that remained non-democratic.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Paglayan|first=Agustina S.|date=February 2021|title=The Non-Democratic Roots of Mass Education: Evidence from 200 Years|journal=American Political Science Review|language=en|volume=115|issue=1|pages=179–198|doi=10.1017/S0003055420000647|issn=0003-0554|doi-access=free}}</ref> Wider adoption of [[voting advice application]]s can lead to increased education on politics and increased [[voter turnout]].<ref>{{cite journal | url=https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2018.1526237 | doi=10.1080/10584609.2018.1526237 | title=Getting Out the Vote with Voting Advice Applications | year=2019 | last1=Germann | first1=Micha | last2=Gemenis | first2=Kostas | journal=Political Communication | volume=36 | pages=149–170 | hdl=20.500.14279/30071 | s2cid=149640396 }}</ref> ==== Social capital and civil society ==== [[File:CI boardwalk Sandy sweepers jeh.jpg|thumb|upright=1.5|[[Civic engagement]], including [[volunteering]], is conducive to democratization. These volunteers are cleaning up after the 2012 [[Hurricane Sandy]].]] [[Civil society]] refers to a collection of non-governmental organizations and institutions that advance the interests, priorities and will of citizens. [[Social capital]] refers to features of social life—networks, norms, and trust—that allow individuals to act together to pursue shared objectives.<ref name=":9" /> [[Robert D. Putnam|Robert Putnam]] argues that certain characteristics make societies more likely to have cultures of civic engagement that lead to more participatory democracies. According to Putnam, communities with denser horizontal networks of [[Civic engagement|civic association]] are able to better build the "norms of trust, reciprocity, and civic engagement" that lead to democratization and well-functioning participatory democracies. By contrasting communities in Northern Italy, which had dense horizontal networks, to communities in Southern Italy, which had more vertical networks and [[Clientelism|patron-client relations]], Putnam asserts that the latter never built the culture of civic engagement that some deem as necessary for successful democratization.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Putnam|first=Robert|date=March 1993|title=What makes democracy work?|journal=National Civic Review|volume=82|issue=2|pages=101–107|doi=10.1002/ncr.4100820204}}</ref> [[Sheri Berman]] has rebutted Putnam's theory that civil society contributes to democratization, writing that in the case of the Weimar Republic, civil society facilitated the rise of the Nazi Party.<ref name=":14">{{Cite journal|last=Berman|first=Sheri|author-link=Sheri Berman|date=1997|title=Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic|journal=World Politics|language=en|volume=49|issue=3|pages=401–429|doi=10.1353/wp.1997.0008|s2cid=145285276|issn=1086-3338}}</ref> According to Berman, Germany's democratization after World War I allowed for a renewed development in the country's civil society; however, Berman argues that this vibrant civil society eventually weakened democracy within Germany as it exacerbated existing social divisions due to the creation of exclusionary community organizations.<ref name=":14" /> Subsequent empirical research and theoretical analysis has lent support for Berman's argument.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Satyanath|first1=Shanker|last2=Voigtländer|first2=Nico|last3=Voth|first3=Hans-Joachim|date=2017-04-01|title=Bowling for Fascism: Social Capital and the Rise of the Nazi Party|journal=Journal of Political Economy|volume=125|issue=2|pages=478–526|doi=10.1086/690949|s2cid=3827369|issn=0022-3808|url=http://www.nber.org/papers/w19201.pdf}}</ref> Yale University political scientist Daniel Mattingly argues civil society in China helps the authoritarian regime in China to cement control.<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/art-of-political-control-in-china/4FE177A409064E67DBB3D5A08081F80A|title=The Art of Political Control in China|last=Mattingly|first=Daniel C.|date=2019|publisher=Cambridge University Press|language=en|doi=10.1017/9781108662536|isbn=9781108662536|s2cid=213618572|access-date=2020-02-06}}</ref> Clark, M. Golder, and S. Golder also argue that despite many believing democratization requires a [[Civic political culture|civic culture]], empirical evidence produced by several reanalyses of past studies suggest this claim is only partially supported.<ref name=":12" /> [[Philippe C. Schmitter]] also asserts that the existence of civil society is not a prerequisite for the transition to democracy, but rather democratization is usually followed by the resurrection of civil society (even if it did not exist previously).<ref name=":13" /> Research indicates that democracy protests are associated with democratization. According to a study by Freedom House, in 67 countries where dictatorships have fallen since 1972, nonviolent civic resistance was a strong influence over 70 percent of the time. In these transitions, changes were catalyzed not through foreign invasion, and only rarely through armed revolt or voluntary elite-driven reforms, but overwhelmingly by democratic civil society organizations utilizing nonviolent action and other forms of civil resistance, such as strikes, boycotts, civil disobedience, and mass protests.<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=70&release=275 |title=Study: Nonviolent Civic Resistance Key Factor in Building Durable Democracies, May 24, 2005 |access-date=June 18, 2009 |archive-date=December 23, 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111223135218/http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=70&release=275 }}</ref> A 2016 study found that about a quarter of all cases of democracy protests between 1989 and 2011 lead to democratization.<ref name="brancati">{{cite book|last=Brancati|first=Dawn|title=Democracy Protests: Origins, Features and Significance|publisher=Cambridge University Press|year=2016|location=Cambridge}}</ref>
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