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Holodomor
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== Notes == {{notelist|refs= {{efn|name=note-anodyne|The term ''anodyne administrative measure'' in the quote means a measure that was not meant to solve the problem but to calm the hungry crowds, or a measure which, in of itself, would not create opposition (See [[wikt:anodyne]]). The term '[[Anodyne]]' refers to pain relieving methods, drugs or remedies, used prior to the 20th century.}} {{efn|name=Andriewsky 2015, p. 17|[[#CITEREFAndriewsky2015|Andriewsky 2015, (page 17)]]. "Finally, new studies have revealed the very selective — indeed, highly politicized — nature of state assistance in Ukraine in 1932–1933. Soviet authorities, as we know, took great pains to guarantee the supply of food to the industrial workforce and to certain other categories of the population — Red Army personnel and their families, for example. As the latest research has shown, however, in the spring of 1933, famine relief itself became an ideological instrument. The aid that was provided in rural Ukraine at the height of the Famine, when much of the population was starving, was directed, first and foremost, to 'conscientious' collective farm workers — those who had worked the highest number of workdays. Rations, as the sources attest, were allocated in connection with spring sowing). The bulk of assistance was delivered in the form of grain seed that was 'lent' to collective farms (from reserves that had been seized in Ukraine) with the stipulation that it would be repaid with interest. State aid, it seems clear, was aimed at trying to salvage the collective farm system and a workforce necessary to maintain it. At the very same time, Party officials announced a campaign to root out 'enemy elements of all kinds who sought to exploit the food problems for their own counter-revolutionary purposes, spreading rumours about the famine and various 'horrors'. Famine-relief, in this way, became yet another way to determine who lived and who died."}} {{efn|name=Britannica "Holodomor"|[[#CITEREFBritannica Holodomor|Britannica "Holodomor"]]. "The Great Famine (Holodomor) of 1932–1933 – a man-made demographic catastrophe unprecedented in peacetime. Of the estimated six to eight million people who died in the Soviet Union, about four to five million were Ukrainians ... Its deliberate nature is underscored by the fact that no physical basis for famine existed in Ukraine ... Soviet authorities set requisition quotas for Ukraine at an impossibly high level. Brigades of special agents were dispatched to Ukraine to assist in procurement, and homes were routinely searched and foodstuffs confiscated ... The rural population was left with insufficient food to feed itself.}} {{efn|name=Davies 2004, p. 190|[[#CITEREFDaviesWheatcroft2004|Davies, Wheatcroft 2004, (page 109)]]. "In a considerable number of districts in Ukraine and the North Caucasus counter-revolutionary elements – kulaks, former officers, Petlyurians, supporters of the Kuban' Rada and others – were able to penetrate into the kolkhozy as chairmen or influential members of the board, or as bookkeepers and storekeepers, and as brigade leaders at the threshers, and were able to penetrate into the village soviets, land agencies and cooperatives. They attempt to direct the work of these organisations against the interests of the proletarian state and the policy of the party; they try to organise a counter-revolutionary movement, the sabotage of the grain collections, and the sabotage of the village."}} {{efn|name=Davies 2004, p. 437|[[#CITEREFDaviesWheatcroft2004|Davies, Wheatcroft 2004, (page 437)]]. "It was not until the autumn of 1932 that the restoration of proper crop rotation received the strong support of the authorities (see pp. 231–4). Meanwhile, much damage had been done. Such a dramatic expansion of sown area and reduction of fallow, without improved crop rotation and the careful introduction of alternative means for rejuvenating the soil with fertilisers or manure, was bound to lead to the reduction of yields and an increased likelihood of crop diseases. By 1932, in many regions, and particularly in Ukraine, soil exhaustion and crop diseases were widespread."}} {{efn|name= UN signatory nations, 2003|[[#CITEREFUN signatory nations2003|UN signatory nations, 2003]]. "In the former Soviet Union millions of men, women and children fell victims to the cruel actions and policies of the totalitarian regime. The Great Famine of 1932–1933 in Ukraine (Holodomor), which took from 7 million to 10 million innocent lives and became a national tragedy for the Ukrainian people. ... [A]s a result of civil war and forced collectivization, leaving deep scars in the consciousness of future generations. ... [W]e deplore the acts and policies that brought about mass starvation and death of millions of people. We do not want to settle scores with the past, it could not be changed, but we are convinced that exposing violations of human rights, preserving historical records and restoring the dignity of victims through acknowledgement of their suffering, will guide future societies and help to avoid similar catastrophes in the future. ...}} {{efn|name=Marples 2009.|[[#CITEREFMarples2009|Marples 2009.]] "Ukrainian scholars who write most regularly on the famine, such as Yurii Shapoval ([35]), Stanislav Kul'chyts'kyi ([15], [16], [17], [18]), Vasyl Marochko ([22], [23]) and Petro Panchenko et al. ([28]), place emphasis on several factors that appear to elucidate the true causes of the famine: the rapid introduction of collectivisation in Ukraine compared to other regions; the unreasonable grain quotas placed upon Ukraine; the closure of the borders of Ukraine and the North Caucasus according to Stalin's directive of 22 January 1933 to prevent the migration of starving peasants; the fact that Ukrainian officials informed Moscow of the situation in Ukraine and the imminence of famine as early as 1932 but without any results; Stalin's letter to Kaganovich of 11 August 1932 that outlined his suspicions of the Ukrainian peasantry and his fear of 'losing Ukraine' (Davies et al.[ 4]); the fact that the Extraordinary Commission in Ukraine led by Molotov took draconian measures, with its decree of 18 November 1932, confiscating not only grain, but also meat and vegetables, ensuring the inevitability of the peasants starving; the lack of such starvation in other republics, and most specifically Russia and Byelorussia; the link between the famine and the assault on the Ukrainian nation, as manifested by terror and deportations; the purge of cultural and national leaders; and the cessation of the earlier policy of Ukrainisation.}} {{efn|name=Martin 2001, pp. 306-307.|[[#CITEREFMartin2001|Martin 2001, pp. 306-307]]. "TsK VKP/b/ and Sovnarkom have received information that in the Kuban and Ukraine a massive outflow of peasants 'for bread' has begun into Belorussia and the Central-Black Earth, Volga, Western, and Moscow regions. / TsK VKP/b/ and Sovnarkom do not doubt that the outflow of peasants, like the outflow from Ukraine last year, was organized by the enemies of Soviet power, the SRs and the agents of Poland, with the goal of agitation 'through the peasantry' ... TsK VKP/b/ and Sovnarkom order the OGPU of Belorussia and the Central-Black Earth, Middle Volga, Western and Moscow regions to immediately arrest all 'peasants' of Ukraine and the North Caucasus who have broken through into the north and, after separating out the counterrevolutionariy elements, to return the rest to their place of residence.' ... Molotov, Stalin}} {{efn|name=Werth, 2008.|[[#CITEREFWerth2008|Werth, 2008.]] "And while hunger hit the peasants harder than any other group, resulting in the death of millions in atrocious conditions, another form of repression, of a police nature, struck others in Ukraine at the same moment — the political and intellectual elites, from village teachers to national leaders, via the intelligentsia. Tens of thousands of Ukrainians were arrested and punished with camp sentences"}} }} <!-- Dead note "SovietDoc": [http://www.ibiblio.org/expo/soviet.exhibit/famine.html U.S. Congress Library Exhibit on Ukrainian Famine], ''"Resolution of the Council Of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic And of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) Of Ukraine On Blacklisting Villages That Maliciously Sabotage The Collection Of Grain"'', 6 December 1932. --> <!-- Dead note "Dalrymple": Dana G. Dalrymple, ''"The Soviet famine of 1932–1934"'' [http://www.ukrweekly.com/Archive/1983/158321.shtml] in ''Soviet Studies'', Vol. 15, No. 3 (January 1964). Pages 250–284. --> <!-- Dead note "Serczyk": {{in lang|pl}} Władysław A. Serczyk, ''"Historia Ukrainy"'', 3rd ed., Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, Wrocław 2001, {{ISBN|83-04-04530-3}} --> <!-- Dead note "Schiller": Dr. Otto Schiller, ''"Famine's Return to Russia, Death and Depopulation in Wide Areas of the Grain Country"'' [http://www.colley.co.uk/garethjones/otto_schiller_daily_telegraph_1.htm], The Daily Telegraph, 25 August 1933, as well as [http://www.faminegenocide.com/resources/british.html British Diplomatic Reports on the Ukrainian Famine]. --> <!-- Dead note "Rajca": Czesław Rajca, ''"Głód na Ukrainie"'', Werset, Lublin/Toronto 2005, {{ISBN|83-60133-04-2}} --> <!-- Dead note "Hrycak": Ярослав Грицак (Jarosław Hrycak), ''"Historia Ukrainy 1772–1999. Narodziny nowoczesnego narodu"'', Lublin 2000, {{ISBN|83-85854-50-9}}, [http://www.vesna.org.ua/txt/grytsakj/formuv/ available online in Ukrainian language] --> <!-- Dead note "Shapoval": Yuri Shapoval, ''"The famine-genocide of 1932–1933 in Ukraine"'', Kashtan Press, Ontario 2005, {{ISBN|1-896354-38-6}} (a collection of source documents) --> <!-- Dead note O.M. Asatkin National Economy of Ukrainian SRR statistical compendium, Kyiv 1935-->
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