Editing Accountability (section)

==== Electoral manipulation ====
{{Further|Political corruption|Electoral fraud}}
The role of elections in fostering accountability is often undermined by electoral manipulation and fraud.<ref name=":02">{{cite book |title=Why governments and parties manipulate elections: theory, practice, and implications |author1=Simpser, Alberto |date=2013|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-1-107-30688-2|location=Cambridge|oclc=826857655}}</ref> By preventing citizens from removing leaders through elections based on their performance in office, electoral manipulation breaks down accountability and may undercut the consolidation of democratic institutions.<ref>{{cite thesis|url=https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2bs339cm|title=Voting, Fraud, and Violence: Political Accountability in African Elections|last=Long|first=James Dunway|publisher=University of California San Diego|year=2014}}</ref>

Electoral manipulation is not rare; some estimates are that in the 1990s and 2000s, up to one fourth of elections suffered some form of substantial manipulation.<ref name=":02" /> This includes a large array of pre-election and election-day tactics, such as outlawing rival parties and candidates, employing violence and [[intimidation]], and manipulating voter registration and vote count.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Schedler|first=Andreas|date=2002|title=The Menu of Manipulation|journal=Journal of Democracy|language=en|volume=13|issue=2|pages=36–50|doi=10.1353/jod.2002.0031|s2cid=154830665|issn=1086-3214}}</ref> Some efforts to improve accountability by preventing electoral manipulation and fraud have obtained a certain measure of success, such as using cell phone applications for monitoring and disseminating polling station results<ref name=":12b">{{cite journal|last1=Callen|first1=Michael|last2=Long|first2=James D.|date=2015|title=Institutional Corruption and Election Fraud: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan|journal=American Economic Review|language=en|volume=105|issue=1|pages=354–381|doi=10.1257/aer.20120427|s2cid=7016902 |issn=0002-8282|url=http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/102931/1/In.pdf}}</ref> and employing domestic or international election observers.<ref name=":22">{{cite journal|last1=Ichino|first1=Nahomi|last2=Schündeln|first2=Matthias|date=2012|title=Deterring or Displacing Electoral Irregularities? Spillover Effects of Observers in a Randomized Field Experiment in Ghana|journal=The Journal of Politics|language=en|volume=74|issue=1|pages=292–307|doi=10.1017/S0022381611001368|s2cid=10426326|issn=0022-3816|url=http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:9282597|url-access=subscription}}</ref><ref name=":32">{{cite journal|last1=Beaulieu|first1=Emily|last2=Hyde|first2=Susan D.|date=2009|title=In the Shadow of Democracy Promotion: Strategic Manipulation, International Observers, and Election Boycotts|journal=Comparative Political Studies|language=en|volume=42|issue=3|pages=392–415|doi=10.1177/0010414008325571|s2cid=155078768|issn=0010-4140}}</ref> However, governments may simply alter the type of manipulation or where it occurs in order to deceive observers and monitoring agencies.<ref name=":22" /><ref name=":32" />

Governments, politicians, and political parties are more likely to resort to electoral manipulation and fraud when they believe they might be removed from office and when they face few institutional constraints to their power.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Hafner-Burton|first1=Emilie Marie|last2=Hyde|first2=Susan D.|last3=Jablonski|first3=Ryan S.|date=6 September 2012 |title=When Do Governments Resort to Election Violence? |journal=British Journal of Political Science |language=en|location=Rochester, N.Y. |ssrn=1667063}}</ref> Low political competition has also been linked to some forms of manipulation, such as abolishing presidential term limits.<ref>{{cite journal|last=McKie|first=Kristin|date=2019|title=Presidential Term Limit Contravention: Abolish, Extend, Fail, or Respect?|journal=Comparative Political Studies|language=en|volume=52|issue=10|pages=1500–1534|doi=10.1177/0010414019830737|s2cid=159155380|issn=0010-4140|doi-access=free}}</ref> Well-connected{{How|date=July 2023}} candidates are more likely to resort to vote count fraud.<ref name=":12b" /> Governments may engage in electoral manipulation not only to obtain victory at a given election or to remain in office longer, but also for post-election reasons, such as reducing the strength of the opposition or increasing their own bargaining power in the subsequent period.<ref name=":02" />