Editing Agreed Framework (section)

==Final breakdown of the agreement==
In January 2002, U.S. President [[George W. Bush]] labeled North Korea in his first [[2002 State of the Union Address|State of the Union Address]] as part of an [[Axis of Evil]].<ref name=nyt-20170112>{{cite news |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/12/opinion/the-us-must-talk-to-north-korea.html |title=The U.S. Must Talk to North Korea |author=Siegfried S. Hecker |newspaper=[[The New York Times]] |date=12 January 2017 |access-date=17 August 2017 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170817210805/https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/12/opinion/the-us-must-talk-to-north-korea.html |archive-date=17 August 2017 }}</ref>

In October 2002, a U.S. delegation led by [[Assistant Secretary of State]] [[James A. Kelly]] visited North Korea to confront the North Koreans with the U.S. assessment that they had a [[uranium enrichment]] program.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2004/34395.htm |title=Dealing With North Korea's Nuclear Programs |author =James A. Kelly |publisher=U.S. Department of State |date=July 15, 2004 }}</ref>  The parties' reports of the meeting differ. The U.S. delegation believed the North Koreans had admitted the existence of a highly enriched uranium program.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kim/nukes/nukes.html |title=frontline: kim's nuclear gamble: nuclear capability: could north korea have a bomb? |publisher=PBS |access-date=2009-06-09| archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20090606180425/http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kim/nukes/nukes.html| archive-date= 6 June 2009 | url-status= live}}</ref>  The North Koreans stated Kelly made his assertions in an arrogant manner, but failed to produce any evidence such as satellite photos, and they responded by denying that North Korea planned to produce nuclear weapons using enriched uranium. They went on to state that as an independent sovereign state North Korea was entitled to possess nuclear weapons for defense, although they did not possess such a weapon at that point in time.<ref name=KCNA-20021025 /><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www1.korea-np.co.jp/pk/188th_issue/2003013001.htm |title="J. Kelly Failed to Produce 'Evidence' in Pyongyang"; Framed up "Admission" Story – DPRK FM Director O Song Chol |publisher=.korea-np.co.jp |access-date=2009-06-09 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090908012957/http://www1.korea-np.co.jp/pk/188th_issue/2003013001.htm |archive-date=2009-09-08 }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=https://fas.org/irp/congress/2004_hr/012104hecker.pdf |title=Archived copy |access-date=2015-04-04 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140628181341/http://fas.org/irp/congress/2004_hr/012104hecker.pdf |archive-date=2014-06-28 }}</ref>  Relations between the two countries, which had seemed hopeful two years earlier, quickly deteriorated into open hostility.<ref name=bridge-hecker-2010 />

The HEU intelligence that James Kelly's accusation is based on is still controversial: According to the CIA fact sheet to Congress on 19 November 2002, there was "clear evidence indicating the North has begun constructing a centrifuge facility" and this plant could produce annually enough HEU for two or more nuclear weapons per year when it is finished. However, some experts assessed that the equipment North Korea imported was insufficient evidence of a production-scale enrichment program.<ref name=albright-20070223>{{cite web |url=https://isis-online.org/publications/dprk/DPRKenrichment22Feb.pdf |title=North Korea's Alleged Large-Scale Enrichment Plant: Yet Another Questionable Extrapolation Based on Aluminum Tubes |last=Albright |first=David |publisher=Institute for Science and International Security |date=23 February 2007 |access-date=25 April 2022}}</ref>

[[Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization|KEDO]] members considered in November 2002 whether to halt the fuel oil shipments in response to the previous month's developments.  U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James A. Kelly warned Japanese officials that the [[United States Congress|U.S. Congress]] would not fund such shipments in the face of continued violations. The shipments were halted in December.<ref>{{cite web |author=Tim Carter |url=http://www.kedo.org/news_detail.asp?NewsID=23 |title=KEDO Executive Board Meeting Concludes – November 14, 2002 |publisher=KEDO |date=14 November 2002 |access-date=2010-05-31 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110607230234/http://www.kedo.org/news_detail.asp?NewsID=23 |archive-date=7 June 2011 }}</ref>

On 10 January 2003, North Korea again announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.<ref name=KCNA-20030110>{{cite news|url=http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2003/200301/news01/11.htm#12 |title=DPRK FM sends letter to UNSC president |publisher=[[Korean Central News Agency|KCNA]] |date=January 10, 2003 |access-date=2009-05-27 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090920185607/http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2003/200301/news01/11.htm |archive-date=2009-09-20 }}</ref> On February 10, 2005, North Korea finally declared that it had manufactured nuclear weapons as a "nuclear deterrent for self-defence".<ref name=KCNA-20050210>{{cite news|url=http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2005/200502/news02/11.htm#1|title=DPRK FM on Its Stand to Suspend Its Participation in Six-party Talks for Indefinite Period|publisher=[[Korean Central News Agency|KCNA]]|date=February 10, 2005|access-date=2009-05-27|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090531175657/http://kcna.co.jp/item/2005/200502/news02/11.htm#1|archive-date=31 May 2009|url-status=dead}}</ref> On October 9, 2006, [[2006 North Korean nuclear test|North Korea conducted a nuclear test]]. US intelligence agencies believe that North Korea has manufactured a handful of simple nuclear weapons.

In December 2003, KEDO suspended work on the pressurized water reactor project. Subsequently, KEDO shifted the focus of its efforts to ensuring that the LWR project assets at the construction site in North Korea and at manufacturers' facilities around the world ($1.5 billion invested to date) are preserved and maintained.<ref>{{cite web |author=Tim Carter |url=http://www.kedo.org/news_detail.asp?NewsID=25 |title=KEDO Executive Board Meeting – November 21, 2003 |publisher=KEDO |date=21 November 2003 |access-date=2010-05-31 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110607230304/http://www.kedo.org/news_detail.asp?NewsID=25 |archive-date=7 June 2011 }}</ref>

Each side blamed the other for ending the Agreed Framework. The United States pointed out that a North Korean uranium enrichment facility would violate the 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.carnegieendowment.org/npp/koreadenuclearization.cfm |title=NPP |publisher=[[Carnegie Endowment for International Peace]] |access-date=2009-06-09 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070930014646/http://www.carnegieendowment.org/npp/koreadenuclearization.cfm |archive-date=2007-09-30 }}</ref>  which states "The South and the North shall not possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities."  North Korea accused the United States of a "hostile policy" including deliberately delaying fuel supplies and progress on the KEDO project that "effectively nullified" the agreement, listing North Korea as part of the "Axis of evil" and a target of the U.S. pre-emptive nuclear strikes.<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2002/200210/news10/25.htm#4 |title=Conclusion of non-aggression treaty between DPRK and U.S. called for |publisher=[[Korean Central News Agency|KCNA]] |date=October 25, 2002 |access-date=2009-06-09 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090908014926/http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2002/200210/news10/25.htm |archive-date=2009-09-08 }}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html |title=President Delivers State of the Union Address |publisher=Georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov |date=2002-01-29 |access-date=2009-06-09 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090608080318/http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html |archive-date=8 June 2009 |url-status=dead }}</ref><ref>{{cite web|author =John Pike |url=http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm |title=Nuclear Posture Review [Excerpts&#93; |publisher=Globalsecurity.org |access-date=2009-06-09| archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20090610094536/http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm| archive-date= 10 June 2009 | url-status= live}}</ref>

Although the agreement had largely broken down, North Korea did not restart work on the two production size nuclear power plants that were frozen under the agreement. These plants could potentially have produced enough weapons-grade plutonium to produce several nuclear weapons per year. The Agreed Framework was successful in freezing North Korean plutonium production in Yongbyon plutonium complex for eight years from 1994 to December 2002;<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.dynamic-korea.com/news/view_news.php?uid=200700154588&main=KHF&sub=&keyword=selig%20harrison|title=A U.S. Foreign Policy Expert Urged 'Continued Backing' of Nuclear Talks|author=Selig Harrison|publisher=Embassy of the Republic of Korea in the United States of America|date=October 25, 2007|access-date=2009-06-09|url-status=usurped|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090909072853/http://www.dynamic-korea.com/news/view_news.php?uid=200700154588&main=KHF&sub=&keyword=selig%20harrison|archive-date=September 9, 2009}}</ref> however, it failed to stop North Korea from developing a secret highly enriched uranium program,<ref>{{cite news|title=Could North Korea Have A Bomb?|url=https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kim/nukes/nukes.html|access-date=11 November 2016|work=PBS.org|quote=[In October 2002] Apparently surprised by how much the U.S. had learned, the Pyongyang officials admitted to the existence of the HUE program, in direct violation of the NPT.|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090606180425/http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kim/nukes/nukes.html|archive-date=6 June 2009}}</ref> begun in the "mid- or late-1990s."<ref>{{cite news|last1=DAVID E. SANGER|title=NORTH KOREA SAYS IT HAS A PROGRAM ON NUCLEAR ARMS|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/17/world/north-korea-says-it-has-a-program-on-nuclear-arms.html?pagewanted=all|access-date=11 November 2016|work=[[The New York Times]]|date=17 October 2002|quote=If the North Korean assertions are true – and administration officials assume they are – the government of Kim Jong Il began in the mid- or late-1990s a secret, parallel program to produce weapons-grade material from highly enriched uranium.|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160313043711/http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/17/world/north-korea-says-it-has-a-program-on-nuclear-arms.html?pagewanted=all|archive-date=13 March 2016}}</ref>

Discussions took place through the [[Six-party talks]] about a replacement agreement, reaching a preliminary accord on 19 September 2005. The accord made no mention of the U.S. contention that North Korea has a secret, underground enriched uranium program. However, the new accord would require North Korea to dismantle all nuclear facilities, not just specific plants as in the Agreed Framework.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/20/international/asia/20korea.html|title=U.S.-Korean Deal on Arms Leaves Key Points Open|author1=Joseph Kahn |author2=David E. Sanger |work=[[The New York Times]]|date=September 20, 2005|access-date=2009-06-09| archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20090205045125/http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/20/international/asia/20korea.html| archive-date=February 5, 2009| url-status= live}}</ref>  Ultimately the Six-party talks were discontinued in 2009.

On May 31, 2006, KEDO decided to terminate the LWR construction project.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.kedo.org/|title=KEDO website homepage|access-date=2009-06-09|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090413090027/http://www.kedo.org/|archive-date=2009-04-13}}</ref>