Editing C. D. Broad (section)

== Theory ==

=== Psychical research ===
Broad argued that if research could demonstrate that psychic events occur, this would challenge philosophical theories of "[[basic limiting principles]]" in at least five ways:<ref name=":0">{{Cite journal|last1=Broad|first1=C. D.|year=1949|title=The Relevance of Psychical Research to Philosophy|url=http://www.stafforini.com/broad/Broad%20-%20The%20relevance%20of%20psychical%20research%20to%20philosophy.pdf|journal=Philosophy|volume=24|issue=91|pages=291–309|doi=10.1017/S0031819100007452|s2cid=144880410 }}</ref>

# [[Backward causation]] (i.e., the future affecting the past) is rejected by many philosophers, but would be shown to occur if, for example, people could predict the future.
# One common argument against [[Dualism (philosophy of mind)|dualism]] (i.e., the belief that, while bodies are physical entities, minds are a different, non-physical sort of entity) is that physical and non-physical things cannot interact. However, this would be shown to be possible if people can move physical objects by thought ([[telekinesis]]).
# Similarly, philosophers tend to be [[Skepticism|skeptical]] about claims that non-physical 'stuff' could interact with anything. This would also be challenged if [[mind]]s are shown to be able to communicate with each other, as would be the case if [[telepathy|mind-reading]] is possible.
# Philosophers generally accept that we can only learn about the world through [[reason]] and [[perception]]. This belief would be challenged if people were able to psychically perceive events in other places.
# [[Physicalism|Physicalist]] philosophers believe that there cannot be persons without bodies. If ghosts were shown to exist, this view would be challenged.
In his 1949 paper, Broad examined the implications of research by British parapsychologist [[Samuel Soal]], who claimed to have discovered a subject, Basil Shackleton, capable of guessing the identity of [[Zener cards]] with odds of 'billions to one'.<ref name=":0" /> However, the validity of these findings was later questioned by Betty Markwick, following testimony from a colleague suggesting that Soal had manipulated both data and experiment methods.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Markwick |first=Betty |date=1978 |title=The Soal-Goldney experiments with Basil Shackelton: New evidence of data manipulation. |journal=[[Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research]] |volume=56 |pages=250–277}}</ref> 

=== Free will ===
In his essay "Determinism, Indeterminism, and Libertarianism", Broad argued for ''non-occurrent causation'' as "literally determined by the agent or self." The agent could be considered as a substance or continuant, and not by a total cause which contains as factors events in and dispositions of the agent. Thus, our efforts would be completely determined, but their causes would not be prior events. New series of events would then originate, which he called "continuants", which are essentially ''[[causa sui]]''.

[[Peter van Inwagen]] says that Broad formulated an excellent version of what van Inwagen has called the "Consequence Argument" in defence of [[incompatibilism]].<ref>{{Cite journal|last=van Inwagen|first=Peter|date=2008-09-01|title=How to Think about the Problem of Free Will|url=https://andrewmbailey.com/pvi/How_to_Think_About_Free_Will.pdf|journal=The Journal of Ethics|language=en|volume=12|issue=3|pages=337|doi=10.1007/s10892-008-9038-7|s2cid=144635471|issn=1572-8609}}</ref>

===Metaphilosophy and science===
Broad distinguished between critical philosophy and speculative philosophy. He described critical philosophy as analysing "unanalysed concepts in daily life and in science" and then "expos[ing] them to every objection that we can think of". While speculative philosophy's role is to "take over all aspects of human experience, to reflect upon them, and to try to think out a view of Reality as a whole which shall do justice to all of them".<ref name="spec">{{cite book |last=Broad |first=C. D. |url=https://archive.org/details/contemporarybrit0000unse_m4z2 |title=Contemporary British Philosophy Personal Statements · Volume 20 |date=1953 |publisher=London, Allen & Unwin |pages=87–100 |chapter=Critical and Speculative Philosophy |orig-year=1924 |chapter-url=https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.46370/page/n73/mode/1up |url-access=registration}}</ref> 

One aspect of critical philosophy was the Principle of Exceptional Cases, whereby everyday concepts are considered in highly abnormal cases, so as to "clear up the meaning" of a concept.<ref name="spec"/>

Broad saw philosophy and science as supplemental to one another. Scientists who ignore philosophy expose themselves to a "danger to which the natural scientist is peculiarly liable. The extraordinary success of physics and chemistry within their own sphere tempts men to think that the world is simply a physico-chemical system". Whereas philosophers who ignore science are ignoring properties which are "very pervasive" and can shed light on things.<ref name=spec/> 

In terms of empirical propositions Broad distinguished between inspective empirical propositions which he defined "one which asserts of some particular existent with which the mind is acquainted at the time some property which the mind can notice by inspection to belong to it" and inferred empirical propositions which are "derived from a number of perceptual propositions either directly by pure inductive generalization, or indirectly by deduction from one or more inductive generalizations".<ref name=spec/>