Editing Communicating sequential processes (section)

=== Applications ===
An early and important application of CSP was its use for specification and verification of elements of the INMOS T9000 [[Transputer]], a complex superscalar pipelined processor designed to support large-scale multiprocessing. CSP was employed in verifying the correctness of both the processor pipeline and the Virtual Channel Processor, which managed off-chip communications for the processor.<ref name="barrett" />

Industrial application of CSP to software design has usually focused on dependable and safety-critical systems. For example, the Bremen Institute for Safe Systems and [[DaimlerChrysler Aerospace|Daimler-Benz Aerospace]] modeled a fault-management system and avionics interface (consisting of about 23,000 lines of code) intended for use on the International Space Station in CSP, and analyzed the model to confirm that their design was free of [[deadlock (computer science)|deadlock]] and [[livelock]].<ref>{{cite conference |first=B. |last=Buth |author2=M. Kouvaras |author3=J. Peleska |author4=H. Shi |title=Deadlock analysis for a fault-tolerant system |book-title=Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Algebraic Methodology and Software Technology (AMAST’97) |pages=60–75 |date=December 1997}}</ref><ref>{{cite conference |first=B. |last=Buth |author2=J. Peleska |author3=H. Shi |title=Combining methods for the livelock analysis of a fault-tolerant system |book-title=Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Algebraic Methodology and Software Technology (AMAST’98) |pages=124–139 |date=January 1999}}</ref> The modeling and analysis process was able to uncover a number of errors that would have been difficult to detect using testing alone. Similarly, [[Praxis High Integrity Systems]] applied CSP modeling and analysis during the development of software (approximately 100,000 lines of code) for a secure smart-card certification authority to verify that their design was secure and free of deadlock. Praxis claims that the system has a much lower defect rate than comparable systems.<ref name="hall" />

Since CSP is well-suited to modeling and analyzing systems that incorporate complex message exchanges, it has also been applied to the verification of communications and security protocols. A prominent example of this sort of application is Lowe's use of CSP and the [[FDR2|FDR refinement-checker]] to discover a previously unknown attack on the [[Needham–Schroeder protocol|Needham–Schroeder public-key authentication protocol]], and then to develop a corrected protocol able to defeat the attack.<ref>{{cite conference |first=G. |last=Lowe |title=Breaking and fixing the Needham–Schroeder public-key protocol using FDR |book-title=Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems (TACAS) |pages=147–166 |publisher=Springer-Verlag |date=1996 |url= http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/lowe96breaking.html}}</ref>