Editing Critique of Judgment (section)

==Teleology<!--'Teleological judgement' redirects here-->==
{{Main|Kant's teleology}}
The second half of the ''Critique'' discusses '''[[teleological]] judgement'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA-->. This way of judging things according to their ends (''telos'': [[Greek language|Greek]] for end) is logically connected to the first discussion at least regarding beauty but suggests a kind of (self-) purposiveness (that is, meaningfulness known by one's self).

Kant writes about the [[Teleonomy|biological as teleological]], claiming that there are things, such as living beings, whose parts exist for the sake of their whole and their whole for the sake of their parts. This allows him to open a gap in the physical world: since these "organic" things cannot be brought under the rules that apply to all other appearances, what are we to do with them?

Kant says explicitly that while efficiently causal explanations are always best (x causes y, y is the effect of x), it is absurd to hope for "another [[Isaac Newton|Newton]]" who could explain a blade of grass without invoking teleology, and so the organic must be explained "as if" it were constituted as teleological.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Cassirer|first=H. W.|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ASfxDwAAQBAJ|title=A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Judgement|date=2020-07-24|publisher=Routledge|isbn=978-1-000-15649-2|language=en|author-link=Heinz Cassirer}}</ref> This portion of the Critique is, from some modern theories, where Kant is most radical; he posits man as the ultimate end, that is, that all other forms of nature exist for the purpose of their relation to man, directly or not, and that man is left outside of this due to his faculty of reason. Kant claims that culture becomes the expression of this, that it is the highest teleological end, as it is the only expression of human freedom outside of the laws of nature. Man also garners the place as the highest teleological end due to his capacity for morality, or practical reason, which falls in line with the ethical system that Kant proposes in the ''Critique of Practical Reason ''and the ''[[Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals | Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals]]''.

Kant attempted to legitimize purposive categories in the life sciences, without a theological commitment. He recognized the concept of purpose has epistemological value for finality, while denying its implications about creative intentions at life and the universe's source. Kant described natural purposes as organized beings, meaning that the [[A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge|principle of knowledge]] presupposes living creatures as purposive entities. He called this supposition the finality concept as a [[Norm (philosophy)|regulative use]], which satisfies living beings specificity of knowledge.<ref>Use as a regulative principle contrasts to that of a [[Constructivism (learning theory)|constructive principle]].</ref> This heuristic framework claims there is a teleology principle at purpose's source and it is the mechanical devices of the individual original organism, including its heredity. Such entities appear to be [[self-organizing]] in patterns. Kant's ideas allowed [[Johann Friedrich Blumenbach]] and his followers to formulate the science of types (morphology) and to justify its autonomy.<ref>{{cite book |title=Understanding Purpose |last=Huneman |first=Philippe |year=2007 |publisher=University of Rochester Press |isbn= 978-1-58046-265-5 |pages= [https://archive.org/details/understandingpur00hune/page/n11 1]–37 |url=https://archive.org/details/understandingpur00hune|url-access=limited }}</ref>

Kant held that there was no purpose represented in the [[aesthetic judgement]] of an object's [[beauty]]. A pure aesthetic judgement excludes the object's purpose.<ref>{{cite book |title=A history of philosophy: the enlightenment Voltaire to Kant, Volume 6 |last=Copleston |first=Frederick |year=1960 |publisher=Continuum |isbn= 0826469477 |pages= 360–361 }}"Beauty is the form of the purposefulness of an object, so far as this is perceived without any representation of a purpose."</ref>

[[Lewis White Beck]] suggests that Kant's "Antimony of Teleological Judgement" can also be interpreted as a radical revision of his initial attempt to resolve the antimony between the concepts of ''[[freedom]]'' and ''[[determinism]]'' which he first presented in the ''[[Critique of Pure Reason]]''.<ref>[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/236806211_Lewis_White_Beck_on_Reasons_and_Causes "Lewis White Beck On Reasons and Causes", Guyer, Paul. ''Journal on the History of Ideas'' July, 2002 63 (3) p. 539-548 Lewis White Beck on researchgate.net]</ref>