Editing Critique of Practical Reason (section)

==Preface and Introduction==
Kant sketches out here what is to follow. Most of these two chapters focus on comparing the situation of [[Pure reason|theoretical]] and of [[practical reason]] and therefore discusses how the ''Critique of Practical Reason'' compares to the ''Critique of Pure Reason''.

The first Critique, "of Pure Reason", was a criticism of the pretensions of those who use pure theoretical reason, who claim to attain metaphysical truths beyond the ken of applied reasoning. The conclusion was that pure theoretical reason must be restrained, because it produces confused arguments when applied outside of its appropriate sphere. However, the ''Critique of Practical Reason'' is ''not'' a critique of ''pure'' practical reason, but rather a defense of it as being capable of grounding behavior superior to that grounded by desire-based practical reasoning. It is actually a critique, then, of the pretensions of ''applied'' or ''empirical'' practical reason.<ref>Kant, KpV 5:15-16</ref><ref>[[Angelica Nuzzo]], ''Kant and the Unity of Reason'', Purdue University Press, 2005, p. 45-46.</ref>

Kant informs us that while the first Critique concluded that God, freedom, and immortality are unknowable on theoretic grounds, the second Critique will mitigate the force this claim on practical grounds. Freedom is revealed by the actuality of practical life because it is revealed by the moral law. God and immortality are also knowable (only on practical grounds), but practical reason now requires belief in these ''postulates of reason''. Kant once again invites his dissatisfied critics to actually provide a proof of God's existence and shows that this is impossible because the various arguments ([[ontological argument|ontological]], [[cosmological argument|cosmological]] and [[teleological argument|teleological]]) for God's existence all depend essentially on the idea that existence is a predicate inherent to the concepts to which it is applied.

Kant insists that the ''Critique'' can stand alone from the earlier ''[[Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals]]'', although it addresses some criticisms leveled at that work (e.g., [[Hermann Andreas Pistorius|Pistorius]]' objection that Kant established the moral principle before the concept of the good<ref>Kant, KpV 5:8-9</ref>). This work will proceed at a higher level of abstraction.

While valid criticisms of the Groundwork are to be addressed, Kant dismisses many criticisms that he finds unhelpful. He suggests that many of the defects that reviewers have found in his arguments are in fact only in their brains, which are too lazy to grasp his ethical system as a whole. As to those who accuse him of writing incomprehensible jargon, he challenges them to find more suitable language for his ideas or to prove that they are really meaningless. He reassures the reader that the second Critique will be more accessible than the first.

Last, a sketch of the second Critique is then presented in the Introduction. It is modeled on the first Critique: the ''Analytic'' will investigate the operations of the faculty in question; the ''Dialectic'' will investigate how this faculty can be led astray; and the ''Doctrine of Method'' will discuss the questions of moral education.