Editing Daubert standard (section)

==History==
Prior to ''Daubert'', relevancy in combination with the ''Frye'' standard were the dominant standards for determining the admissibility of scientific evidence in Federal courts. ''Frye'' is based on a 1923 Federal Court of appeals ruling involving the admissibility of [[polygraph]] evidence.<ref>Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (DC Cir. 1923)</ref> Under ''Frye'', the court based the admissibility of testimony regarding novel scientific evidence on whether it has "gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs". The trial court's gatekeeper role in this respect is typically described as conservative, thus helping to keep [[pseudoscience]] out of the courtroom by deferring to those in the field.

In ''Daubert'', the Supreme Court ruled that the 1923 ''Frye'' standard was superseded by the 1975 Federal Rules of Evidence, specifically Rule 702 governing expert testimony. Rule 702 originally stated (in its entirety),

{{quote|If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.}}

In ''Daubert'', the court ruled that nothing in the Federal Rules of Evidence governing expert evidence "gives any indication that 'general acceptance' is a necessary precondition to the admissibility of scientific evidence. Moreover, such a rigid standard would be at odds with the Rules' liberal thrust and their general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to 'opinion' testimony." By requiring experts to provide relevant opinions grounded in reliable methodology, proponents of ''Daubert'' were satisfied that these standards would result in a fair and rational resolution of the scientific and technological issues which lie at the heart of product liability adjudication.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Owen |first=D. G. |title=A Decade of ''Daubert'' |year=2002 |volume=80 |journal=Denver University Law Review |pages=345 |issn=0883-9409 }}</ref> ''Daubert'' has not appeared to further the Federal Rules philosophy of admitting generally all relevant testimony, and specifically of relaxing the traditional barriers to 'opinion' testimony. The ''Daubert'' decision has instead been heralded by some political commentators as one of the most important Supreme Court decisions in imposing higher barriers for [[toxic tort]] and [[product liability]] cases, by allegedly reducing the volume of so-called [[junk science]] in the court room.

According to a 2002 [[RAND Corporation|RAND]] study, following ''Daubert'', the percentage of expert testimony by scientists that was excluded from the courtroom significantly rose. This rise likely contributed to a doubling in successful motions for summary judgment in which 90% were against plaintiffs.<ref>Dixon, Lloyd, and Gill, Brian. [https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1439.html "Changes in the Standards for Admitting Expert Evidence in Federal Civil Cases Since the Daubert Decision"]. Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 2001.</ref> Beyond this study, there is little empirical evidence of the impact of ''Daubert''. However, some critics argue that ''Daubert'' has disrupted the balance between plaintiffs and defendants: "The exclusion of expert testimony affects plaintiffs far more than defendants because plaintiffs may then not be able to meet their required [[Burden of proof (law)|burden of proof]]. Furthermore, there is little point in plaintiffs going to the expense of ''Daubert'' motions to exclude defendant's experts until they know if their case will proceed. So if more experts are now being excluded, then ''Daubert'' has undoubtedly shifted the balance between plaintiffs and defendants and made it more difficult for plaintiffs to litigate successfully."{{attribution needed|date=April 2025}}<ref name="Berger" />  Similarly, ''Daubert'' hearings can be subject to various abuses by attorneys attempting to bolster a weak case. These tactics can range from simply attempting to delay the case to driving up the costs of the litigation forcing settlement.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Gutheil |first=Thomas G. |last2=Bursztajn |first2=Harold J. |date=1 June 2005|title=Attorney Abuses of ''Daubert'' Hearings: Junk Science, Junk Law, or Just Plain Obstruction? |journal=Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law |volume=33 |issue= 2|pages=150–152 |pmid=15985655 |url=http://www.jaapl.org/cgi/content/full/33/2/150 }}</ref>

A different pattern has emerged in criminal cases. In criminal cases, the prosecution has the burden of proof and uses a host of forensic science methods as evidence to prove their case; but ''Daubert'' motions are rarely made by criminal defendants and when they do, they lose a majority of the challenges.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Risinger |first=D. Michael |year=2000 |title=Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty Being Left on the Dock? |journal=Albany Law Review |volume=64 |pages=99 |issn=0002-4678 }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last=Neufeld |first=P. |s2cid=45496524 |year=2005 |title=The (Near) Irrelevance of ''Daubert'' to Criminal Justice and Some Suggestions for Reform |journal=American Journal of Public Health |volume=95 |issue=S1 |pages=S107–S113 |doi=10.2105/AJPH.2004.056333 |pmid=16030325 }}</ref> Some critics of the use of unreliable science in court argue that ''Daubert'' has had beneficial effects in civil litigation, but fails to address the underlying pathologies of the forensic science system that leads to dubious verdicts in criminal cases.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Bernstein |first=David E. |year=2007 |title=Expert Witnesses, Adversarial Bias, and the (Partial) Failure of the ''Daubert'' Revolution |journal=Iowa Law Review |ssrn=963461}}</ref>

Some commentators believe that ''Daubert'' caused judges to become—in the phrase used in Chief Justice [[William Rehnquist]]'s dissent in ''Daubert''—amateur scientists, many lacking the [[scientific literacy]] to effectively fulfill their role as gatekeeper of scientific evidence.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Gatowski |first1=S. I. |year=2001 |title=Asking the gatekeepers: A National Survey of Judges on Judging Expert Evidence in a Post-''Daubert'' world |journal=[[Law and Human Behavior]] |volume=25 |issue=5 |pages=433–458 |doi=10.1023/A:1012899030937 |pmid=11688367 |display-authors=1 |last2=Dobbin |first2=Shirley A. |last3=Richardson |first3=James T. |last4=Ginsburg |first4=Gerald P. |last5=Merlino |first5=Mara L. |last6=Dahir |first6=Veronica|s2cid=30746470 }}</ref>  Although "science for judges" forums have emerged in the wake of ''Daubert'' in order to educate judges in a variety of scientific fields, many are still skeptical about the usefulness of the ''Daubert'' standard in discerning valid science.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Rothman |first=K. J. |last2=Greenland |first2=S. |author-link2=Sander Greenland  |year=2005 |title=Causation and Causal Inference in Epidemiology |journal=American Journal of Public Health |volume=95 |issue=S1 |pages=S144–S150 |doi=10.2105/AJPH.2004.059204 |pmid=16030331 |hdl=10.2105/AJPH.2004.059204 |hdl-access=free }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last=Melnick |first=R. |year=2005 |title=A ''Daubert'' Motion: A Legal Strategy to Exclude Essential Scientific Evidence in Toxic Tort Litigation |journal=American Journal of Public Health |volume=95 |issue=S1 |pages=S30–S34 |doi=10.2105/AJPH.2004.046250 |pmid=16030335 |url=https://zenodo.org/record/1236407 }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last=Jasanoff |first=S. |year=2005 |title=Law's Knowledge: Science for Justice in Legal Settings |journal=American Journal of Public Health |volume=95 |issue=S1 |pages=S49–S58 |doi=10.2105/AJPH.2004.045732 |pmid=16030338 |hdl=10.2105/AJPH.2004.045732 |hdl-access=free }}</ref> The responsibility to assess scientific relevance has shifted from highly trained expert witnesses to judges deficient in science education. The ''Daubert'' ruling furthermore admits the possible introduction of non-peer reviewed data and conclusions. This increasingly shifts the burden of scientific judgement onto judges who have not had an education which would enable them to properly evaluate such data.<ref>{{cite journal | pmid = 16371283 | volume=1 | issue=3 | title=The admissibility of scientific evidence in psychiatric malpractice: junk science and the Daubert case |date=December 1994 | journal=Journal of Clinical Forensic Medicine |last1=Tancredi |first1=Laurence R. |last2=Giannini |first2=A. James |name-list-style=amp| pages=145–148 | doi=10.1016/1353-1131(94)90082-5}}</ref>

Pursuant to Rule 104(a), in ''Daubert'' the U.S. Supreme Court suggested that the following factors be considered:<ref>See (c) of the [https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/92-102.ZS.html syllabus] of the ''Daubert'' case.</ref>
# Has the technique been tested in actual field conditions (and not just in a laboratory)?
# Has the technique been subject to peer review and publication?
# What is the known or potential rate of error?
# Do standards exist for the control of the technique's operation?
# Has the technique been generally accepted within the relevant scientific community?

The Supreme Court explicitly cautioned that the ''Daubert'' list should not be regarded by judges as "a definitive checklist or test". Yet in practice, judges have judged the admissibility of scientific evidence using the "''Daubert'' factors" as a checklist; for example, the trial court judge in ''Kumho'' admitted to erroneously treating the factors as mandatory.<ref name=Berger/>