Editing Direction of fit (section)

==In philosophy of mind==

According to Velleman, when used in the domain of the [[philosophy of mind]], the concept direction of fit represents the distinguishing feature between two types of [[intentionality|intentional]] [[:wikt:mental state|mental state]]s:

:Facta (singular factum', states that currently exist) are states with a mind-to-world direction of fit.
: Examples include [[belief]]s, [[perception]]s, [[hypotheses]], and [[Fantasy (psychology)|fantasies]].  In the event of a mismatch between the mental state and the world, the mental state is in some sense false or wrong and should perhaps be changed.

:Facienda (singular faciendum, states that are yet to exist) are states with a world-to-mind direction of fit.
:Examples include [[Intentionality|intentions]] and desires.  If there is a mismatch between the mental state and the world, the world is, in some sense, wrong and should perhaps be changed.

In some forms of [[dualism (philosophy of mind)|mind-body dualism]], a matching ''factum'' and ''faciendum'' must be present in a person's [[mind]] in order for him to [[action (philosophy)|act]] intentionally.  If a person has the belief that action (A) will lead to state (S), and has the desire that state (S) obtain, then he will perform action (A). The action is directly [[Causality|caused]] by simultaneous presence of the two mental states; no further explanation is needed.

According to Velleman:
::''The term "direction of fit" refers to the two ways in which attitudes can relate [[proposition]]s to the world.''
::''In [[cognitive]] attitudes [such as belief], a proposition is grasped as patterned after the world; whereas in [[Conatus|conative]] attitudes [such as desire], the proposition is grasped as a pattern for the world to follow.''
::''The propositional object of desire is regarded not as fact – not, that is, as factum, having been brought about – but rather as faciendum, to be brought about: it's regarded not as true but as to be made true.''<ref>Velleman, (1992), p.8.</ref>

[[Ruth Millikan]] has also written influentially about representations, noting that many primitive representations used by animals are characterized by a dual direction of fit; she terms such representations "pushmi-pullyu representations."<ref>Millikan, p. 186</ref> As an example, she cites the role of bee dances in both informing other bees about the location of resources (indicative, or dance-to-world) and directing their action (imperative, or world-to-dance):

{{quotation|What then occurs in the head of a bee who understands a fellow
bee's dance? Does the bee come to believe there is nectar at location L, desire to collect nectar, know that to collect nectar at L requires going to L, hence desire to go to L, hence, no other desires being stronger at the moment, decide to go to L, and proceed accordingly? Surely not. To posit anything more complicated than, as it were, a literal translation of the dance into bee mentalese is surely superfluous. The comprehending bee merely acquires an inner representation that is at the same time a picture, as it were, of the location of nectar (relative to its hive) and that guides the bee's direction of flight. The very same representation tells in one breath both what is the case and what to do about it. I call representations having this sort of double aspect "pushmi-pullyu" representations (or "PPRs") after Hugh Lofting's charming two-headed Janus-faced creature by that name.<ref>Ruth Millikan, "On Reading Signs: Some Differences Between Us and Others," in ''Evolution of Communication Systems: A Comparative Approach'', ed. D. Kimbrough Oller and Ulrike Griebel, MIT Press, 2004.</ref>}}

Millikan suggests that many perceptual representations (including those in humans) have such a dual function, both providing an agent information about the state of affairs in the world and suggesting action possibilities to change that state of affairs. She further remarked on the similarity between such representations and the role of [[affordances]] in the ecological perception theory of psychologist [[J. J. Gibson]].<ref>Millikan (1995), p. 191</ref> 

However, Millikan's openness to Gibson's framework has not been typical of philosophers of mind, and later philosophers such as [[Bence Nanay]] have explored the possibility of action-oriented perception without endorsing affordance theory.<ref>Nanay, "Action-oriented Perception," ''The European Journal of Philosophy'' 20, 2012, pp. 430–446.</ref><ref>Nanay, "Do we see apples as edible?" ''Pacific Philosophical Quarterly'' 92, 2011, pp. 305–322</ref>

The [[predictive coding]] framework of neural representations developed by neuroscientist [[Karl Friston]] and philosopher [[Andy Clark]] has similarly been observed to be an attempt to construe representations with dual direction of fit, uniting predictions (mind-to-world) and actions (world-to-mind).<ref>Nicholas Shea, "Perception vs Action: The Computations May Be The Same But The Direction Of Fit Differs," ''Behavioral and Brain Sciences'' 36, 2013, pp. 228-229.</ref>