Editing Divine simplicity (section)

==Christian thought==
{{Thomism}}
{{See also|Trinity|Nontrinitarianism}}
Simplicity (or metaphysical, absolute simplicity) states that the characteristics of God are not parts of God which make up God. God is simple; God is those characteristics. God does not ''have'' goodness, but ''is'' goodness; God does not {{em|have}} existence, but {{em|is}} existence. According to [[Thomas Aquinas]], God is God's existence and God's essence is God's existence.<ref name="Divine Simplicity | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy-2">{{cite web | url=https://iep.utm.edu/divine-simplicity/#H2 | title=Divine Simplicity &#124; Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy }}</ref> God is goodness, which is his nature, which is his essence, which is his existence.<ref name="Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University-2019a">{{cite book | chapter-url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/divine-simplicity/#IdenDiviAttr | title=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy | chapter=Divine Simplicity | year=2019 | publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University }}</ref> [[William F. Vallicella]] says, "To say that God lacks metaphysical parts is to say ''inter alia'' that God is free of matter-form composition, potency-act composition, and existence-essence composition. There is also no real distinction between God as a subject of his attributes and his attributes."<ref name="Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University-2019c">{{cite book | chapter-url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/divine-simplicity/#GodHisNatu | title=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy | chapter=Divine Simplicity | year=2019 | publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University }}</ref> God exhausts what it means to be God and, in principle, there cannot be more than one God.<ref name="Divine Simplicity | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy-2" /> Divine simplicity is fundamentally about God's attributes: his nature or essence. The doctrine does not state that God cannot have the "property" of creating a universe.<ref name="Divine Simplicity | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy-2" /><ref name="Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University-2019a" />

John [[Duns Scotus]] has a more moderate view of metaphysical simplicity than Aquinas.<ref name="Scotus">{{cite web | url=https://iep.utm.edu/john-duns-scotus/#SH7c | title=Scotus, John Duns &#124; Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy }}</ref><ref name="Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University-2019b">{{cite book | chapter-url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/duns-scotus/#DivInfDocUni | title=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy | chapter=John Duns Scotus | year=2019 | publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University }}</ref> According to Duns Scotus, there is a formal distinction between God's attributes.<ref name="Scotus"/><ref name="Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University-2019b"/> This distinction is not conceptual or metaphysical.<ref name="Scotus"/><ref name="Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University-2019b"/> The formal distinction is logical; omnipotence is not logically equivalent to omniscience.<ref name="Scotus"/><ref name="Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University-2019b"/> Duns Scotus affirms that God's nature is not composed of metaphysical properties or parts.<ref name="Scotus"/><ref name="Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University-2019b"/><ref name="Scotus-2">{{cite web | url=https://iep.utm.edu/john-duns-scotus/#H3 | title=Scotus, John Duns &#124; Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy }}</ref>

Yann Schmitt says,
{{poem quote|text=As I already said, for a better understanding of the compatibility between divine simplicity and the distinction of attributes in God, I propose to use the notion of formal distinction developed by Duns Scotus.
FD X is formally distinct from Y if and only if (1) X and Y are inseparable even for an omnipotent being, (2) X and Y have not the same definition, (3) the distinction exists de re.<ref name="Schmitt" />}}

The notion of ''[[De dicto and de re|de re]]'' is contrasted with ''de dicto''. ''De dicto'' concerns a proposition about what is said, and ''de re'' concerns the thing (or being).<ref name="De re">{{cite web |url=https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/de-re-de-dicto/v-1 |title=De re/De dicto – Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy}}</ref> A [[formal distinction]] exists between the attribute of omnipotence and the attribute of omniscience because omnipotence and omniscience are inseparable for an omnipotent being (God); omnipotence and omniscience do not have the same definition, and the distinction between them exists ''de re'' (not conceptually or propositionally{{snd}}''de dicto'').<ref name="De re"/> A formal distinction is a logical distinction.<ref name="Scotus-2"/> The upshot for Scotus is that omnipotence and omniscience are logically distinct for God, who does not have the metaphysical properties (or attributes) of omnipotence or omniscience;<ref name="Scotus-2"/> metaphysically speaking, God {{em|is}} omnipotence and {{em|is}} omniscient.<ref name="Scotus-2"/>

Spatial simplicity is endorsed by most traditional Christian theists, who do not consider God a physical object. Temporal simplicity is endorsed by many theists, but is controversial among Christian theologians. [[Thomas V. Morris]] controversially describes property simplicity as the property of having no properties.<ref>{{cite book|last=Morris|first=Thomas V.|title=Our idea of God : an introduction to philosophical theology|year=1997|publisher=Regent College Pub. |page=114|location=Vancouver, B.C.|isbn=978-1573831017}}</ref>

In the medieval era, theologians and philosophers held a view known as "constituent ontology" wherein natures were constituents of things. According to Aquinas, an individual nature was more like a [[Abstract and concrete|concrete object]] than an abstract object. One person's humanity was not the same as another person's humanity; each had human nature, individuated by the matter (''materia signata'') from which each person was composed. For entities which are immaterial (such as angels), there is no matter to individuate their nature; each one is its nature. Each angel is one of a kind, although this claim was [[Condemnations of 1210–1277|controversial]].<ref name="Craig">{{cite web|last=Craig|first=William Lane|title=Divine Simplicity|url=http://www.reasonablefaith.org/divine-simplicity|access-date=22 April 2014}}</ref>

Theologians holding the doctrine of property simplicity distinguish modes of divine simplicity [[apophatic theology|by negating]] any notion of composition from the meaning of terms used to describe it. In quantitative or spatial terms, God is simple{{snd}}as opposed to being made up of pieces{{snd}}and present in entirety everywhere if, in fact, present anywhere. In terms of essence, God is simple as opposed to being made up of form and matter, body and soul, or mind and act. If distinctions are made between God's attributes, they are distinctions of the "modes" of God's being rather than real or essential divisions. In terms of subjects and accidents (as in the phrase "goodness of God"), divine simplicity allows for a conceptual distinction between the person of God and the personal attribute of goodness but disallows that God's identity (or "character") is dependent on goodness. According to the doctrine, it is impossible to consider the goodness in which God participates separately from the goodness which God is.<ref name="Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University-2019d">{{cite book | chapter-url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/divine-simplicity/#TrutDefe | title=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy | chapter=Divine Simplicity | year=2019 | publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University }}</ref>

Aquinas says that as creatures, our concepts are drawn from the creation (the assumption of [[empiricism]]); according to divine simplicity, God's attributes can only be spoken of by [[analogy]] since the properties of any created thing differ from its being.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=White |first1=Thomas Joseph |title=Divine Simplicity |url=https://www.saet.ac.uk/Christianity/DivineSimplicity#section4.2.1 |journal=St Andrews Encyclopaedia of Theology |date=2022}}</ref> Divine simplicity was affirmed at the [[Fourth Lateran Council]] and [[First Vatican Council]] and is accepted in some form by most Christians.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://iep.utm.edu/div-simp/|title = Divine Simplicity &#124; Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy}}</ref>

The simplicity of God is affirmed by the [[First Vatican Council]]'s apostolic constitution ''[[Dei Filius]]'':
{{quote|The holy Catholic Apostolic Roman Church believes and confesses that there is one true and living God, Creator and Lord of [[heaven]] and earth, almighty, eternal, immense, incomprehensible, infinite in intelligence, in will, and in all perfection, who, as being one, sole, ''absolutely simple' ' and immutable spiritual [[Ousia|substance]], is to be declared as really and essentially distinct from the world, of supreme beatitude in and from Himself, and ineffably exalted above all things which exist, or are conceivable, except Himself.|[https://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/creeds2.v.ii.i.html Dei Filius], Chapter I}}


===Criticism===
The concept of divine simplicity as espoused by Thomas Aquinas was condemned, alongside [[Thomism]] in general, in a Patriarchal [[Synod]] of 1368 organised by the [[Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople|Patriarch of Constantinople]] [[Philotheus I of Constantinople|Philotheos I]], which also [[Canonization|canonized]] [[Gregory Palamas]] & re-affirmed the decision of the [[Fifth Council of Constantinople|ninth ecumenical council]] on [[Palamism|Palamas' teachings]] of the [[Essence–energies distinction|distinction between God's essence & energies]] being the dogma for the [[Eastern Orthodox Church]].<ref>{{Cite book |last=Russell |first=Norman |title=Gregory Palamas: The Hesychast Controversy and the Debate with Islam |date=September 1, 2022 |publisher=Liverpool University Press |isbn=978-1802077476 |pages=413-415}}</ref> 

Absolute (Thomistic) divine simplicity has been criticized by a number of Christian theologians, including John S. Feinberg, Thomas Morris, [[William Lane Craig]], and [[Alvin Plantinga]]; in his essay "Does God Have a Nature?", Plantinga calls it "a dark saying indeed".<ref>Plantinga, Alvin. "Does God Have a Nature?" in Plantinga, Alvin, and James F. Sennett. 1998. ''The analytic theist: an Alvin Plantinga reader''. Grand Rapids, Michigan: W. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 228. {{ISBN|978-0802842299}}</ref> Plantinga presents three arguments against Thomistic divine simplicity. Concepts can apply [[Univocity of being|univocally]] to God, even if language to describe God is limited, fragmentary, halting, and inchoate.<ref>{{cite book|last=Plantinga|first=Alvin|title=Does God have a nature?|year=2000|publisher=Marquette Univ. Press|location=Milwaukee|isbn=978-0874621457|edition=Reprinted|page=18}}</ref> In the concept of something like being a horse, for something to be a horse is known; the concept applies to an object if the object is a horse. If no concepts apply to God, it is confusing to say that there is such a person as God; God does not have properties such as wisdom, creation and omnipotence, and would not have any properties for which there are concepts. God would not have properties such as existence or self-identification. If God transcends human experience, nothing can be said univocally about God; such a claim presupposes knowledge, transcending human experience, which applies to God. One reply to this objection is to distinguish equivocal language and analogical language; the former lacks a univocal element, but the latter has an element of univocal language.<ref name="iep.utm.edu">{{cite web | url=https://iep.utm.edu/divine-simplicity/#SH5d | title=Divine Simplicity &#124; Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy }}</ref>

The claim that God can only be described analogically is, according to Plantinga, a double-edged sword. If univocal language cannot be used to describe God and argue against simplicity, it cannot be used in arguments for Thomistic divine simplicity. If the usual modes of inference in reasoning about God cannot be used, it cannot be argued that God is not distinct from his properties. Plantinga concludes, "This way of thinking begins in a pious and commendable concern for God's greatness and majesty and augustness, but it ends in agnosticism and in incoherence."<ref>{{cite book|last=Plantinga|first=Alvin|title=Does God have a nature?|year=2000|publisher=Marquette Univ. Press|location=Milwaukee|isbn=978-0874621457|edition=Reprinted|page=26}}</ref> [[Edward Feser]] has responded to Plantinga.<ref name="Edward Feser">Edward Feser. Five Proofs of the Existence of God. San Francisco, California:Ignatius Press, 2017</ref> Feser says that Plantinga is attacking a strawman when he says that proponents of analogical (religious) language are committed to the view that the language of God is metaphorical and not literal; metaphorical language differs from analogical language, so Plantinga is conflating analogy with metaphor.<ref name="Edward Feser"/>

Plantinga presents three criticisms of metaphysical simplicity, saying that it is difficult to grasp the doctrine and difficult to see why anyone would accept it. According to the Thomist doctrine of simplicity states, all abstract objects are identical with God's essence and, hence, God himself. Plantinga says that this clashes with the fact that the property of being a horse is distinct from the property of being a turkey, and both are distinct from God and his essence.<ref>{{cite book|last=Plantinga|first=Alvin|title=Does God have a nature?|year=2000|publisher=Marquette Univ. Press|location=Milwaukee|isbn=978-0874621457|edition=Reprinted|page=37}}</ref> One response to this objection is to note a distinction between properties and predicates.<ref name="iep.utm.edu"/> A second response notes that supporters of divine simplicity do not think of God's nature as exemplifying abstract objects that are independent of God.<ref name="Edward Feser"/>

Plantinga says that if abstract objects that are identical with God are restricted to the properties God exemplifies, the doctrine remains problematic. Metaphysical simplicity states that God has no accidental (contingent) properties, it seems that God has accidental properties such as having created Adam and knowing that Adam sinned. Some of God's characteristics characterize him in every possible world, and others do not.<ref>{{cite book|last=Plantinga|first=Alvin|title=Does God have a nature?|year=2000|publisher=Marquette Univ. Press|location=Milwaukee|isbn=978-0874621457|edition=Reprinted|page=43}}</ref> Plantinga also says that the conflation of God's actuality with his potentiality is problematic. As it seems that there are characteristics God has but could have lacked, it also seems that God lacks characteristics he could have had. God has not created all the persons he will create; there is at least one individual essence that God does not now have, but will have. If so, God has potentiality with respect to that characteristic.<ref>{{cite book|last=Plantinga|first=Alvin|title=Does God have a nature?|year=2000|publisher=Marquette Univ. Press|location=Milwaukee|isbn=978-0874621457|edition=Reprinted|page=46}}</ref> Feser notes that someone who holds to divine simplicity does not have to hold to this view; one can think that God has "Cambridge" properties, which are properties in a loose sense (such as the "property" of being a husband or creating a universe).<ref name="Edward Feser"/>

Plantinga's third critique challenges the heart of simplicity. Metaphysical simplicity claims that there is no divine composition; there is no complexity of properties in God, and he is identical with his nature and each of his properties. According to Plantinga, this view has two difficulties. If God is identical with each of his properties, each of his properties is identical with each of his other properties; God has only one property. This flies in the face of the idea that God has power and mercy, neither of which is identical with the other. If God is identical with his properties and each of God's properties is a property, God is a property and has one property: himself. However, properties do not cause anything; no property could have created the world, and no property could know anything. If God is a property, he is an abstract object with no power, life, love, or awareness.<ref>{{cite book|last=Plantinga|first=Alvin|title=Does God have a nature?|year=2000|publisher=Marquette Univ. Press|location=Milwaukee|isbn=978-0874621457|edition=Reprinted|page=47}}</ref> Feser notes that this objection assumes a Platonist metaphysics about abstract objects. Supporters of divine simplicity do not think of God as a Platonic-abstract property or impersonal; God is personal, personhood, and intelligent.<ref name="Divine Simplicity | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy-3"/> God does not only have the concrete property of divine simplicity; for God, God is God's essential "properties" (attributes). A distinction exists between properties and predicates, so humans distinguish power from mercy; in divine simplicity, power and mercy are the same things in God.<ref name="Edward Feser"/><ref>{{cite book | chapter-url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/divine-simplicity/#PropOneSamePredNoGuarSameProp | title=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy | chapter=Divine Simplicity | year=2019 | publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University }}</ref> Vallicella responds to Plantinga by arguing that Plantinga's objections assume a non-constituent [[ontology]] and are unconvincing.<ref name="Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University-2019c"/> In his 1983 review of "Does God Have a Nature?", [[Alfred J. Freddoso]] wrote that Plantinga's critique lacks the depth of analysis to propose jettisoning the theological basis of divine simplicity laid in Christian thought by Augustine, Anselm, Bonaventure, Aquinas, Scotus, Ockham, and others.<ref name="Review of Does God Have a Nature?">{{cite journal | vauthors = Freddoso A | title = Review of Does God Have a Nature? | journal = Christian Scholar's Review | pages = 78–83 | date = 1983 | volume = 12 | issue = 2 | publisher = University of Notre Dame | url = https://www3.nd.edu/~afreddos/papers/dghn.htm }}</ref>

[[William Lane Craig]] calls the Thomistic view of property simplicity "philosophically and theologically unacceptable", also objecting to divine simplicity. According to the doctrine, God is similar in all [[possible world]]s. Since the statement "God knows x" is equivalent to "x is true", it is inexplicable why those worlds vary if, in every one, God knows, loves, and wills the same things.<ref name="Craig"/> Feser responded to Craig's objections to divine simplicity.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.firstthings.com/article/2020/04/keep-it-simple | title=Keep It Simple &#124; Edward Feser | date=April 2020 }}</ref><ref>{{cite web | url=http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2009/11/william-lane-craig-on-divine-simplicity.html | title=Edward Feser: William Lane Craig on divine simplicity | date=November 2009 }}</ref><ref>{{cite web | url=http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2016/04/craig-on-divine-simplicity-and-theistic.html | title=Edward Feser: Craig on divine simplicity and theistic personalism | date=15 April 2016 }}</ref> Morris calls it is an idea whose implications are difficult to defend, and whose advantages can be had in other ways. It is an idea whose motivation, under close scrutiny, unconvincing.<ref>{{cite book|last=Morris|first=Thomas V.|title=Our idea of God : an introduction to philosophical theology|year=1997|publisher=Regent College Pub. |page=115|location=Vancouver, B.C.|isbn=978-1573831017}}</ref> John S. Feinberg writes, "These philosophical problems plus the biblical considerations raised earlier lead me to conclude that simplicity is not one of the divine attributes. This doesn't mean that God has physical parts, but that the implications of the doctrine of metaphysical simplicity are too problematic to maintain the doctrine."<ref>{{cite book | author = John S. Feinberg | title = No One Like Him: the doctrine of God|year=2006|publisher=Crossway Books|location=Wheaton. Ill.|isbn=978-1581348118|page=335|edition=Revised}}</ref> Jordan Barrett responded to the claim that divine simplicity is not biblical.<ref>Barrett, J. P. (2017). Divine Simplicity: A Biblical and Trinitarian Account. United Kingdom: Fortress Press.</ref>

Jeffrey Brower and [[Michael Bergmann (philosopher)|Michael Bergmann]] present a [[truthmaker]] defense of divine simplicity.<ref name="Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University-2019d"/> Saying "God is omnibenevolent" means that "God is his omnibenevolence"; God is not identical to a property of omnibenevolence; he is identical to God's goodness, and identical to himself.<ref>Bergmann, Michael, and Jeffrey Brower. “A Theistic Argument against Platonism (and in Support of Truthmakers and Divine Simplicity)” In Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 2, edited by Dean Zimmerman, 357–386. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.</ref><ref name="Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University-2019d"/> Vallicella says, "Accordingly, to say that God is identical to his omniscience is just to say that God is identical to the truthmaker of 'God is omniscient'. And that amounts to saying that God is identical to God. In this way, one avoids the absurdity of saying that God is identical to a property. What God is identical to is not the property of omniscience but the referent of 'God's omniscience,' which turns out to be God himself. And similarly for the rest of God's intrinsic and essential attributes."<ref>Vallicella, William F., "Divine Simplicity", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/divine-simplicity/></ref> Another truthmaker theory posits a moderate version of divine simplicity between absolute divine simplicity (God is not composed of metaphysical parts) and minimal divine simplicity (God is not composed of spatial, temporal or material parts).<ref name="Schmitt" /> The deadlock of absolute divine simplicity. According to this view, God would not be composed but would be complex. Yann says, "The minimal truthmaker requirement can then be assumed without any contradiction with divine simplicity. <God is good> is true in virtue of the perfection of God, that is God's goodness. <God is omniscient> is true in virtue of another perfection of God, God's omniscience. We do not have to say that God is identical with His goodness or His omniscience."<ref name="Schmitt">Schmitt, Yann (2013). The deadlock of absolute divine simplicity. ''International Journal for Philosophy of Religion'' 74 (1):117–130.</ref>

===Scriptural arguments===
Writers such as [[Herman Bavinck]] and [[Louis Berkhof]] have argued that the doctrine of divine simplicity is affirmed by the [[First Epistle of John|Epistle of John]], since its author seems to identify God with love<ref>1 John 4:8</ref> and light.<ref>1 John 1:5</ref> Advocates of the doctrine have also argued that it is affirmed by Old Testament passages such as Exodus 3:14 (identifying God as "being"), Deuteronomy 6:4 (seen as affirming the oneness of God) and Jeremiah 23:6, identifying God with righteousness. Critics of the doctrine say that it is unlikely that the biblical authors had metaphysics in mind in the verses used, and the lack of explicit verses on the doctrine argues against it.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Dolezal |first=James E. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=kgcSswEACAAJ |title=God Without Parts |date=2011-11-09 |publisher=Wipf & Stock Publishers |isbn=978-1-4982-6155-5 |language=en}}</ref> Theologians such as [[Charles Caldwell Ryrie]] have argued that divine simplicity underscores the scriptural view of God's self-existence.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Ryrie |first=Charles C. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=F55Dx_kFcZIC |title=Basic Theology: A Popular Systematic Guide to Understanding Biblical Truth |date=1999-01-11 |publisher=Moody Publishers |isbn=978-1-57567-498-8 |language=en}}</ref>