Editing Economic sanctions (section)

== Politics of sanctions ==
Economic sanctions are used as a tool of [[foreign policy]] by many governments. Economic sanctions are usually imposed by a larger country upon a smaller country for one of two reasons: either the latter is a perceived threat to the security of the former nation or that country treats its citizens unfairly. They can be used as a coercive measure for achieving particular policy goals related to trade or for humanitarian violations. Economic sanctions are used as an alternative weapon instead of going to war to achieve desired outcomes.

The Global Sanctions Data Base categorizes nine objectives of sanctions: "changing policy, destabilizing regimes, resolving territorial conflicts, fighting terrorism, preventing war, ending war, restoring and promoting human rights, restoring and promoting democracy, and other objectives."<ref name=":11" />

===Effectiveness of economic sanctions===
According to a study by Neuenkirch and Neumeier, UN economic sanctions had a [[Statistical significance|statistically significant]] impact on targeted states by reducing their GDP growth by an average of 2.3–3.5% per year—and more than 5% per year in the case of comprehensive UN embargoes—with the negative effects typically persisting for a period of ten years. By contrast, unilateral US sanctions had a considerably smaller impact on GDP growth, restricting it by 0.5–0.9% per year, with an average duration of seven years.<ref name=":0">{{Cite journal |last1=Neuenkirch |first1=Matthias |last2=Neumeier |first2=Florian |date=2015-12-01 |title=The impact of UN and US economic sanctions on GDP growth |journal=European Journal of Political Economy |volume=40 |pages=110–125 |doi=10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2015.09.001 |issn=0176-2680 |url=http://www.fiw.ac.at/fileadmin/Documents/Publikationen/Working_Paper/N_138_NeuenkirchNeumeier.pdf}}</ref>

Oryoie, A. R. demonstrates that economic sanctions result in welfare losses across all income groups in Iran, with wealthier groups suffering greater losses compared to poorer groups.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Oryoie |first=Ali Reza |date=2024-06-06 |title=The impact of international sanctions on income mobility: Evidence from Iran |url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/rode.13123 |journal=Review of Development Economics |language=en |volume=28 |issue=4 |pages=1695–1717 |doi=10.1111/rode.13123 |issn=1363-6669|url-access=subscription }}</ref>

Imposing sanctions on an opponent also affects the economy of the imposing country to a degree. If import restrictions are promulgated, consumers in the imposing country may have restricted choices of goods. If export restrictions are imposed or if sanctions prohibit companies in the imposing country from trading with the target country, the imposing country may lose markets and investment opportunities to competing countries.<ref>{{cite web |last= Griswold |first= Daniel |url= http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=10888 |title= Going Alone on Economic Sanctions Hurts U.S. More than Foes |publisher= Cato.org |date= 2000-11-27 |access-date= 2015-03-30 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20110923164257/http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=10888 |archive-date= 2011-09-23 |url-status= dead }}</ref>

Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot (2008) argue that [[regime change]] is the most frequent foreign-policy objective of economic sanctions, accounting for just over 39 percent of cases of their imposition.<ref>
{{cite book |last1 = Hufbauer |first1 = Gary Clyde |last2 = Schott |first2 = Jeffrey J. |last3 = Elliott |first3 = Kimberly Ann |last4 = Oegg |first4 = Barbara |title = Economic Sanctions Reconsidered |url = https://books.google.com/books?id=crSxDQAAQBAJ |edition = 3 |location = Washington, DC |publisher = Columbia University Press |date = 2008 |page = 67 |isbn = 9780881324822 |access-date = 2018-05-10 |quote = By far, regime change is the most frequent foreign policy objective of economic sanctions, accounting for 80 out of the 204 observations.}}</ref> Hufbauer et al. found that 34 percent of the cases studied were successful.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Hufbauer |first1=Gary Clyde |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=g-uzlJDD7DwC |title=Economic Sanctions Reconsidered |last2=Schott |first2=Jeffrey J. |last3=Elliott |first3=Kimberly Ann |last4=Oegg |first4=Barbara |publisher=Peterson Institute |year=2007 |isbn=978-0-88132-536-2 |pages=158 |language=en}}</ref> However, when [[Robert A.&nbsp;Pape]] examined their study, he found that only 5 of their reported 40 successes were actually effective,<ref>
{{cite journal |last1 = Pape |first1 = Robert A. |title = Why Economic Sanctions Still Do Not Work |jstor = 2539263 |journal = International Security |date = Summer 1998 |volume = 23 |issue = 1 |pages = 66–77 |doi = 10.1162/isec.23.1.66 |s2cid = 57565095 |quote = I examined the 40 claimed successes and found that only 5 stand up. Eighteen were actually settled by either direct or indirect use of force; in 8 cases there is no evidence that the target state made the demanded concessions; 6 do not qualify as instances of economic sanctions, and 3 are indeterminate. If I am right, then sanctions have succeeded in only 5 of 115 attempts, and thus there is no sound basis for even qualified optimism about the effects of sanctions.}}</ref> reducing the success rate to 4%. In either case, the difficulty and unexpected nuances of measuring the actual success of sanctions in relation to their goals are both increasingly apparent and still under debate. In other words, it is difficult to determine ''why'' a regime or country changes (i.e., whether it was the sanction or inherent instability) and doubly so to measure the full political effect of a given action.<ref>''A Strategic Understanding of UN Economic Sanctions: International Relations, Law, and Development'', Golnoosh Hakimdavar, p.&nbsp;105.</ref>

Offering an explanation as to why sanctions are still imposed even when they may be marginally effective, British diplomat [[Jeremy Greenstock]] suggests sanctions are popular not because they are known to be effective, but because "there is nothing else [to do] between words and military action if you want to bring pressure upon a government".<ref name="greenstock">{{cite news |last=Marcus |first=Jonathan |url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-10742109 |title=Analysis: Do economic sanctions work? |work=BBC News |date=26 July 2010 |access-date=2015-03-30}}</ref> Critics of sanctions like Belgian jurist [[Marc Bossuyt]] argue that in nondemocratic regimes, the extent to which this affects political outcomes is contested, because by definition such regimes do not respond as strongly to the popular will.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Capdevila |first1=Gustavo |title=United Nations: US Riled by Economic Sanctions Report |url=https://www.iatp.org/news/united-nations-us-riled-by-economic-sanctions-report |publisher=Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy |access-date=20 June 2020 |date=18 August 2000}}</ref>

A strong connection has been found between the effectiveness of sanctions and the size of veto players in a government. Veto players represent individual or collective actors whose agreement is required for a change of the status quo, for example, parties in a coalition, or the legislature's check on presidential powers. When sanctions are imposed on a country, it can try to mitigate them by adjusting its economic policy. The size of the veto players determines how many constraints the government will face when trying to change status quo policies, and the larger the size of the veto players, the more difficult it is to find support for new policies, thus making the sanctions more effective.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Peksen |first1=Dursun |last2=Jeong |first2=Jin Mun |date=30 August 2017 |title=Domestic Institutional Constraints, Veto Players, and Sanction Effectiveness |journal=Journal of Conflict Resolution |volume=63 |pages=194–217 |doi=10.1177/0022002717728105 |s2cid=158050636 |via=Sage Journals}}</ref>

Francesco Giumelli writes that the "set of sanctions&nbsp;... that many observers would be likely to consider the most persuasive (and effective)", namely, UN sanctions against "[[central bank]] assets and [[sovereign wealth fund]]s", are "of all the types of measures applied&nbsp;... the one least frequently used".<ref name="Giumelli 2015"/> Giumelli also distinguishes between sanctions against international terrorists, in which "the nature of the request is not as important as the constraining aspect", and sanctions imposed in connection with "post-conflict scenarios", which should "include flexible demands and the potential for adaptation if the situation changes".<ref name="Giumelli 2015"/>

Economic sanctions can be used for achieving domestic and international purposes.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Whang |first1=Taehee |date=2011-09-01 |title=Playing to the Home Crowd? Symbolic Use of Economic Sanctions in the United States |url=https://academic.oup.com/isq/article/55/3/787/1834344  |journal=International Studies Quarterly |publisher=Ingentaconnect.com |volume=55 |issue=3 |pages=787–801 |doi=10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00668.x |access-date=2015-03-30|url-access=subscription }}</ref>

Foreign [[aid]] suspensions are typically considered as a type of economic sanctions. Previously mentioned work by Hufbauer, Schott, Elliot, and Oegg is a prominent example.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Hufbauer |last2=Schott |last3=Elliott |last4=Oegg |title=Economic Sanctions Reconsidered  |date=2007 |publisher=Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE) |isbn=978-0-88132-408-2 |edition=3rd |location=Washington, DC}}</ref> [[Claas Mertens]] finds that "suspending aid is more effective than adopting economic sanctions because (1) aid suspensions are economically beneficial for the adopting state, while sanctions are costly, (2) aid suspensions directly affect the targeted government's budget, (3) market forces undermine sanctions but not aid suspensions, and (4) aid suspensions are less likely to spark adverse behavioral reactions. [...] The findings suggest that economic sanctions are less effective than previously thought and that large donor states have a higher chance of achieving political goals through economic coercion."<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Mertens |first=Claas |date=28 March 2024 |title=Carrots as Sticks: How Effective Are Foreign Aid Suspensions and Economic Sanctions? |journal=International Studies Quarterly |volume=68 |issue=2|doi=10.1093/isq/sqae016 |doi-access=free }}</ref>

===Criticism===
Sanctions have been criticized on humanitarian grounds, as they negatively impact a nation's economy and can also cause collateral damage on ordinary citizens. Peksen implies that sanctions can degenerate human rights in the target country.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Peksen |first=Dursen |date=2009 |title="Better or Worse?": The Effect of Economic Sanctions on Human Rights |journal=Journal of Peace Research |volume=46 |pages=59–77 |doi=10.1177/0022343308098404 |s2cid=110505923}}</ref> Some [[Policy analysis|policy analysts]] believe that imposing trade restrictions only serves to hurt ordinary people as opposed to government elites,<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Habibzadeh |first1=Farrokh |title=Economic sanction: a weapon of mass destruction |journal=The Lancet |date=September 2018 |volume=392 |issue=10150 |pages=816–817 |doi=10.1016/S0140-6736(18)31944-5 |pmid=30139528 |doi-access=free }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal | url=https://philpapers.org/rec/MUESOM | title=Sanctions of Mass Destruction| journal=Foreign Affairs| year=1999| volume=78| issue=3| pages=43–53| last1=Mueller| first1=John| last2=Mueller| first2=Karl| doi=10.2307/20049279| jstor=20049279| url-access=subscription}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://the-libertarian.co.uk/video-economic-sanctions-dont-work/ |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140227102536/http://the-libertarian.co.uk/video-economic-sanctions-dont-work/ |archive-date=February 27, 2014 |title=Video: Why Economic Sanctions Don't Work |author=Emile Yusupoff |website=The Libertarian |year=2013}}</ref><ref>[[Hans Köchler]] (ed.), [https://books.google.com/books?id=7lJbn-Lh1vIC Economic Sanctions and Development]. Vienna: International Progress Organization, 1997. {{ISBN|3-900704-17-1}}.</ref> and others have likened the practice to [[siege]] warfare.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Gordon |first1=Joy |title=Sanctions as siege warfare |journal=The Nation |date=1999-04-04 |volume=268 |issue=11 |pages=18–22 |issn=0027-8378 |url=https://www.thenation.com/article/sanctions-siege-warfare/ |access-date=2019-10-16 |archive-date=2019-12-25 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191225145737/https://www.thenation.com/article/sanctions-siege-warfare/ |url-status=dead }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Vengeyi |first1=Obvious |title=Sanctions against Zimbabwe: A Comparison with Ancient Near Eastern Sieges |journal=Journal of Gleanings from Academic Outliers |date=2015 |volume=4 |issue=1 |pages=69–87 |url=https://www.academia.edu/28310267}}</ref> The [[United Nations Security Council]] (UNSC) has generally refrained from imposing comprehensive sanctions since the mid-1990s, in part due to the controversy over the efficacy and civilian harms attributed to the [[sanctions against Iraq]].<ref name="Giumelli 2015"/>

Sanctions can have [[unintended consequences]].<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Lee |first1=Yong Suk |year=2018 |title=International isolation and regional inequality: Evidence from sanctions on North Korea |url=https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/juecon/v103y2018icp34-51.html |journal=Journal of Urban Economics |volume=103 |issue=C |pages=34–51 |doi=10.1016/j.jue.2017.11.002 |s2cid=158561662|url-access=subscription }}</ref>

=== Smart Sanctions ===
One of the most popular suggestions to combat the humanitarian issues that arise from sanctions is the concept of "smart sanctions", and a lot of research has been done on this concept also known as targeted sanctions.<ref name=":13">Gordon, Joy. “Smart Sanctions Revisited.” ''Ethics & International Affairs'', vol. 25, no. 3, 2011, pp. 315–335., {{doi|10.1017/S0892679411000323}}</ref> The term "smart sanctions" refers to measures like asset freezes, travel bans, and arms embargoes that aim to target responsible parties like political leaders and elites with the goal of avoiding causing widespread collateral damage to innocent civilians and neighboring nations.<ref name=":13"/>

Though there has been enthusiasm about the concept, as of 2016, the Targeted Sanctions Consortium (TSC) found that targeted sanctions only result in policy goals being met 22% of the time.<ref>Kanji, Laura. "Moving Targets: The Evolution and Future of Smart Sanctions." ''Harvard International Review'' 37.4 (2016): 39–42. ProQuest. Web. 30 Nov. 2023</ref>

Smart Sanctions have also not been totally successful in avoiding civilian harm or unintended consequences.<ref name=":13" /> For example, arms embargoes can impact the self-defense efforts of those under attack, aviation bans can affect a nation's transportation sector and the jobs of civilians associated with them, and financial sanctions targeting individuals raise due process issues.<ref name=":13" /> One example of smart sanctions in practice can be seen with sanctions imposed by the United States on the Russian Federation following the latter's 2014 [[Annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation|annexation of Crimea]], which were intended to exert pressure on Russia's financial sector.<ref name=":14">Ashford, Emma. “Not-So-Smart Sanctions: The Failure of Western Restrictions Against Russia.” ''Foreign Affairs'', vol. 95, no. 1, 2016, pp. 114–123.  {{JSTOR|43946631}}. Accessed 6 Dec. 2023.</ref> The sanctions resulted in American credit card companies [[Visa Inc.|Visa]] and [[Mastercard|MasterCard]] suspending all transactions of sanctioned Russian banks, effectively canceling the credit cards of ordinary Russian consumers.<ref name=":14" />