Editing Electronic voting (section)

==Types of system==

===Electronic voting machines{{anchor|Machines}}===
{{main|Electronic voting machine}}
[[File:2018 Ballots being counted in Santa Clara County.webm|thumb|Counting ballots by an optical scanner, San Jose, California, 2018]]
Electronic voting systems for electorates have been in use since the 1960s when [[Voting machine#Punched card voting|punched card]] systems debuted. Their first widespread use was in the US where 7 counties switched to this method for the 1964 presidential election.<ref>Saltman, Roy (NBS), [http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/NBS_SP_500-30.pdf EFFECTIVE USE OF COMPUTING TECHNOLOGY IN VOTE-TALLYING] {{webarchive|url=http://archive.wikiwix.com/cache/20160211104652/http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/NBS_SP_500-30.pdf|date=11 February 2016}}. ''NIST''.</ref> The newer [[optical scan voting system]]s allow a computer to count a voter's mark on a ballot. [[DRE voting machine]]s which collect and tabulate votes in a single machine, are used by all voters in all elections in Brazil and [[Indian voting machines|India]], and also on a large scale in [[Venezuela]] and the United States. They have been used on a large scale in the [[Netherlands]] but have been decommissioned after public concerns.<ref>{{cite web |title=Re-evaluation of the Use of Electronic Voting in the Netherlands |url=https://www.ndi.org/e-voting-guide/examples/re-evaluation-of-e-voting-netherlands |website=National Democratic Institute |date=25 November 2013 |access-date=15 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210225193912/https://www.ndi.org/e-voting-guide/examples/re-evaluation-of-e-voting-netherlands |archive-date=25 February 2021 |url-status=live}}</ref> In Brazil, the use of DRE voting machines has been associated with a decrease in error-ridden and uncounted votes, promoting a larger enfranchisement of mainly less educated people in the electoral process, shifting government spending toward public healthcare, particularly beneficial to the poor.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Fujiwara|first=Thomas|date=2015|title=Voting Technology, Political Responsiveness, and Infant Health: Evidence From Brazil|journal=Econometrica|volume=83|issue=2|pages=423–464|doi=10.3982/ecta11520|issn=0012-9682|doi-access=free}}</ref>

====Paper-based electronic voting system====
{{Further|Vote counting#Optical scan counting|Voting machine#Optical scan (marksense)|Electronic voting in the United States#Optical scan counting}}

[[File:ES&S M100 Automark cart.jpg|thumb|A cart holding an [[ES&S]] M100 [[optical scan voting system|ballot scanner]] and an AutoMARK [[assistive device]], as used in [[Johnson County, Iowa]], United States in 2010]]
[[Voting#Paper-based methods|Paper-based voting systems]] originated as a system where votes are cast and [[Vote counting system#Manual counting|counted by hand]], using paper ballots. With the advent of [[Vote counting system#Optical scan counting|electronic tabulation]] came systems where paper cards or sheets could be marked by hand, but counted electronically. These systems included [[Voting machine#Punched card voting|punched card voting]], [[optical scan voting system#Marksense systems|marksense]] and later [[optical scan voting system#Digital pen voting systems|digital pen voting systems]].<ref>{{cite book |author1=Douglas W. Jones |author2=Lorrie Faith Cranor |author3=Rebecca T. Mercuri |author4=Peter G. Neumann |editor1-last=A. Gritzalis |editor1-first=Dimitris |title=Secure Electronic Voting |date=2003 |series=Advances in Information Security |volume=7 |doi=10.1007/978-1-4615-0239-5 |url=https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-1-4615-0239-5 |publisher=Springer New York, NY |isbn=978-1-4613-4981-5 |s2cid=1866859 |url-access=subscription |access-date=16 August 2022 |archive-date=16 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220816131750/https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-1-4615-0239-5 |url-status=live }}</ref>

These systems can include a [[ballot marking device]] or electronic ballot marker that allows voters to make their selections using an [[Voting machine#Direct-recording electronic (DRE)|electronic input device]], usually a [[touch screen]] system similar to a DRE. Systems including a ballot marking device can incorporate different forms of [[assistive technology]]. In 2004, Open Voting Consortium demonstrated the 'Dechert Design', a [[General Public License]] [[Open-source license|open source]] paper ballot printing system with open source [[bar codes]] on each ballot.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Gage |first1=Deborah |title=Voting machine gets LinuxWorld tryout |url=https://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Voting-machine-gets-LinuxWorld-tryout-3202455.php |website=SFGATE |access-date=16 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210702171419/https://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Voting-machine-gets-LinuxWorld-tryout-3202455.php |archive-date=2 July 2021 |date=2 August 2008 |url-status=live}}</ref>

====Direct-recording electronic (DRE) voting system====
{{main|DRE voting machine}}
{{further|Voting machine#Direct-recording electronic (DRE)|Vote counting#Direct-recording electronic counting|Electronic voting in the United States#Direct-recording electronic counting|Electronic voting in India}}

A direct-recording electronic (DRE) [[voting machine]] records votes by means of a [[ballot]] display provided with mechanical or electro-optical components that can be activated by the voter (typically buttons or a [[touchscreen]]); that processes data with computer software; and that records voting data and ballot images in [[computer memory|memory components]]. After the election it produces a tabulation of the voting data stored in a removable memory component and as a printed copy. The system may also provide a means for transmitting individual ballots or vote totals to a central location for consolidating and reporting results from precincts at the central location. These systems use a precinct count method that tabulates ballots at the polling place. They typically tabulate ballots as they are cast and print the results after the close of polling.<ref>{{cite web|author=U.S. Election Assistance Commission |author-link=Election Assistance Commission |url=http://www.eac.gov/voting%20systems/docs/vvsgvolumei.pdf/attachment_download/file |title=2005 Voluntary Voting System Guidelines |format=PDF |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080207185930/http://www.eac.gov/voting%20systems/docs/vvsgvolumei.pdf/attachment_download/file |archive-date=7 February 2008 }}</ref>

In 2002, in the United States, the [[Help America Vote Act]] mandated that one handicapped accessible voting system be provided per polling place, which most jurisdictions have chosen to satisfy with the use of DRE voting machines, some switching entirely over to DRE. In 2004, 28.9% of the registered voters in the United States used some type of direct recording electronic voting system,<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.kidsvotingoh.org/insidefiles/activities/Voting%20Systems%20Handout-3copy.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20101223230616/http://www.kidsvotingoh.org/insidefiles/activities/Voting%20Systems%20Handout-3copy.pdf |url-status=dead |archive-date=23 December 2010 |title=A Short History of Voting in the United States |author=Kids Voting Central Ohio }}</ref> up from 7.7% in 1996.<ref>{{cite web | author = U.S. Federal Election Commission | author-link = Federal Election Commission | url = http://www.fec.gov/pages/dre.htm | title = Direct Recording Electronic information page | url-status = live | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20071114022451/http://www.fec.gov/pages/dre.htm | archive-date = 14 November 2007 }}</ref>

[[File:EVM VVPAT.jpg|thumb|right|VVPAT used with Indian [[Indian voting machines|electronic voting machine]]s in Indian Elections]]
In 2004, India adopted [[Indian voting machines|Electronic Voting Machines]] (EVM) for its elections to its parliament with 380 million voters casting their ballots using more than one million voting machines.<ref name="pib.nic.in">{{cite web |url=http://pib.nic.in/elections2009/volume1/Chap-39.pdf |title=Know Your Electronic Voting Machine |access-date=1 September 2010 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110605194131/http://pib.nic.in/elections2009/volume1/Chap-39.pdf |archive-date=5 June 2011 }}</ref> The Indian EVMs are designed and developed by two government-owned defence equipment manufacturing units, [[Bharat Electronics Limited]] (BEL) and [[Electronics Corporation of India|Electronics Corporation of India Limited]] (ECIL). Both systems are identical, and are developed to the specifications of [[Election Commission of India]]. The system is a set of two devices running on 7.5 volt batteries. One device, the voting Unit is used by the voter, and another device called the control unit is operated by the electoral officer. Both units are connected by a five-metre cable. The voting unit has a blue button for each candidate. The unit can hold 16 candidates, but up to four units can be chained, to accommodate 64 candidates. The control unit has three buttons on the surface – one button to release a single vote, one button to see the total number of votes cast till now, and one button to close the election process. The result button is hidden and sealed. It cannot be pressed unless the close button has already been pressed. A controversy was raised when the voting machine malfunctioned which was shown in Delhi assembly.<ref>{{Cite news|url=http://www.manoramaonline.com/news/just-in/2017/05/09/aam-aadmi-party-live-applause-in-delhi-assembly-as-aap-mla-proves-evm-tampering.html|title=Aam Aadmi Party "proved" in voting machines in the assembly|work=ManoramaOnline|access-date=19 December 2017|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171222052215/http://www.manoramaonline.com/news/just-in/2017/05/09/aam-aadmi-party-live-applause-in-delhi-assembly-as-aap-mla-proves-evm-tampering.html|archive-date=22 December 2017}}</ref> On 9 April 2019, the Supreme Court ordered the ECI to increase [[voter-verified paper audit trail]] (VVPAT) slips vote count to five randomly selected EVMs per assembly constituency, which means ECI has to count VVPAT slips of 20,625 EVMs before it certifies the final election results.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/count-vvpat-slips-of-5-booths-in-each-assembly-seat-sc/articleshow/68786810.cms|title=Supreme Court: Count VVPAT slips of 5 booths in each assembly seat &#124; India News |website=The Times of India|date=9 April 2019|access-date=28 May 2019|archive-date=9 April 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190409064533/https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/count-vvpat-slips-of-5-booths-in-each-assembly-seat-sc/articleshow/68786810.cms|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/vvpat-sc-elections-144122|title=SC Directs ECI To Increase VVPAT Verification From One EVM To Five EVMs Per Constituency|date=8 April 2019|access-date=28 May 2019|archive-date=10 April 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190410141454/https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/vvpat-sc-elections-144122|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.moneylife.in/article/when-the-sc-says-no-for-software-audit-review-of-evms-and-vvpat-at-present/56828.html|title=When the SC Says No for Software Audit Review of EVMs & VVPAT at Present|website=Moneylife NEWS & VIEWS|access-date=28 May 2019|archive-date=29 May 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190529074108/https://www.moneylife.in/article/when-the-sc-says-no-for-software-audit-review-of-evms-and-vvpat-at-present/56828.html|url-status=live}}</ref>

=====Public network DRE voting system=====
A public network DRE voting system is an election system that uses electronic ballots and transmits vote data from the polling place to another location over a public network.<ref name="Voting Systems Standards 2002 p. 12">{{cite book | title=Voting Systems Standards | publisher=Federal Election Commission, U.S. of America | issue=v. 1-2 | year=2002 | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=hlR-0sGHrc0C&pg=PA12 | access-date=13 November 2022 | page=12}}</ref> Vote data may be transmitted as individual ballots as they are cast, periodically as batches of ballots throughout the election day, or as one batch at the close of voting. 
Public network DRE voting system can utilize either precinct count or central count method. The central count method tabulates ballots from multiple precincts at a central location.

===Online voting===
{{Distinguish|open-access poll}}
[[File:Electronic voting.jpg|thumb|Smartphones are the mainstream for online voting used by the Japanese private sector, but e-voting is not possible due to the law in public office elections in Japan.]]

Internet voting systems have gained popularity and have been used for government and membership organization elections and referendums in [[Estonia]], and Switzerland<ref name="Serdült">{{cite book|last=Serdült|first=U.|title=Fifteen Years of Internet Voting in Switzerland: History, Governance and Use|date=April 2015|pages=126–132|doi=10.1109/ICEDEG.2015.7114487|isbn=978-3-9075-8910-6|s2cid=10195543}}</ref> as well as municipal elections in Canada and party primary elections in the United States and France.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.vote.caltech.edu/events/2007/VendorWkshp/Backert-Handout.pdf |title=Event List |work=caltech.edu |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304050731/http://www.vote.caltech.edu/events/2007/VendorWkshp/Backert-Handout.pdf |archive-date=4 March 2016 }}</ref>{{Failed verification|date=March 2024}}{{citation needed|date=March 2024}} Internet voting has also been widely used in sub-national [[participatory budgeting]] processes, including in Brazil, France, United States, Portugal and Spain.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Spada|first1=Paolo|last2=Mellon|first2=Jonathan|last3=Peixoto|first3=Tiago|last4=Sjoberg|first4=Fredrik M.|date=26 February 2015|title=Effects of the Internet on Participation: Study of a Public Policy Referendum in Brazil|url=https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2571083|language=en|location=Rochester, NY|ssrn=2571083|access-date=20 November 2020|archive-date=12 March 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210312141312/https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2571083|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Peixoto|first=Tiago|date=25 September 2008|title=e-Participatory Budgeting: e-Democracy from Theory to Success?|url=https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1273554|language=en|location=Rochester, NY|doi=10.2139/ssrn.1273554|ssrn=1273554|s2cid=153840747|access-date=20 November 2020|archive-date=12 March 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210312141305/https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1273554|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title=Participatory Budgeting in Paris, France – Participedia|url=https://participedia.net/case/5008|access-date=20 November 2020|website=participedia.net|date=3 January 2014|language=en|archive-date=12 January 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210112222410/https://participedia.net/case/5008|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite thesis|last=Saad|first=Rodrigo|date=June 2020|title=Internet Voting and the Equity of Participatory Budgeting Outcomes: A Study of New York City's Participatory Budgeting Initiative|url=https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/3810|type=MA thesis|publisher=City University of New York|access-date=20 November 2020|archive-date=7 December 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201207233353/https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/3810/|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title=Participatory Budgeting in Lisbon, Portugal – Participedia|url=https://participedia.net/case/4967|access-date=20 November 2020|website=participedia.net|date=8 July 2008|language=en|archive-date=12 March 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210312141307/https://participedia.net/case/4967|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title=Decide.Madrid.es Online Participatory Budgeting – Participedia|url=https://participedia.net/case/4365|access-date=20 November 2020|website=participedia.net|date=23 February 2016|language=en|archive-date=12 March 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210312141329/https://participedia.net/case/4365|url-status=live}}</ref>

Security experts have found security problems in every attempt at online voting,<ref name="appel-dem">{{Cite web |last=Appel |first=Andrew |date=8 June 2020 |title=Democracy Live internet voting: unsurprisingly insecure, and surprisingly insecure |url=https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2020/06/08/democracy-live-internet-voting-unsurprisingly-insecure-and-surprisingly-insecure/ |access-date=23 June 2020 |website=Princeton University |archive-date=19 January 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210119052854/https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2020/06/08/democracy-live-internet-voting-unsurprisingly-insecure-and-surprisingly-insecure/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="vv-int">{{Cite web |title=Internet Voting |url=https://www.verifiedvoting.org/resources/internet-voting/ |access-date=20 June 2020 |website=Verified Voting |language=en-US |archive-date=23 July 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200723080825/https://www.verifiedvoting.org/resources/internet-voting/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="nas-sec">"Secure Internet voting will likely not be feasible in the near future... At the present time, the Internet (or any network connected to the Internet) should not be used for the return of marked ballots" {{Cite book |last=National Academies of Sciences |date=6 September 2018 |title=Securing the Vote: Protecting American Democracy |doi=10.17226/25120 |isbn=978-0-309-47647-8 |s2cid=158434942 |url=https://www.nap.edu/catalog/25120/securing-the-vote-protecting-american-democracy |access-date=23 June 2020 |language=en |archive-date=9 March 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210309004452/https://www.nap.edu/catalog/25120/securing-the-vote-protecting-american-democracy |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="eac-nist">"Electronic ballot return faces significant security risks to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of voted ballots. These risks can ultimately affect the tabulation and results and, can occur at scale... Even with ... technical security considerations, electronic ballot return remains a high-risk activity." {{Cite web |last=Election Assistance Commission, National Institute of Standards and Technology, FBI, Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency |date=11 May 2020 |title=RISK MANAGEMENT FOR ELECTRONIC BALLOT DELIVERY, MARKING, AND RETURN |url=http://s3.amazonaws.com/ftt-uploads/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/07210015/Final_-Risk_Management_for_Electronic-Ballot_05082020-1.pdf |access-date=23 June 2020 |archive-date=10 July 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200710215909/http://s3.amazonaws.com/ftt-uploads/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/07210015/Final_-Risk_Management_for_Electronic-Ballot_05082020-1.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref> including systems in Australia,<ref name="aust">{{Cite conference |last=Halderman |first=J. Alex, and Vanessa Teague |title=E-Voting and Identity |date=13 August 2015 |chapter=The New South Wales iVote System: Security Failures and Verification Flaws in a Live Online Election |series=Lecture Notes in Computer Science |volume=9269 |pages=35–53 |doi=10.1007/978-3-319-22270-7_3 |conference=International Conference on E-Voting and Identity |arxiv=1504.05646 |isbn=978-3-319-22269-1 }}</ref><ref name="teague">{{Cite web |last=Teague |first=Vanessa |date=28 June 2022 |title=How NOT to Assess an E-voting System |url=https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2022/06/28/how-not-to-assess-an-e-voting-system/ |access-date=1 July 2022 |website=Princeton University |archive-date=8 July 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220708192401/https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2022/06/28/how-not-to-assess-an-e-voting-system/ |url-status=live }}</ref> Estonia,<ref name="estan">{{citation|last1=Springall|first1=Drew|last2=Finkenauer|first2=Travis|last3=Durumeric|first3=Zakir|last4=Kitcat|first4=Jason|last5=Hursti|first5=Harri|last6=MacAlpine|first6=Margaret|last7=Halderman|first7=Alex|title=Proceedings of the 2014 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security|chapter=Security Analysis of the Estonian Internet Voting System|year=2014|pages=703–715|doi=10.1145/2660267.2660315|isbn=9781450329576|s2cid=1985090|access-date=3 December 2017|chapter-url=https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2660315|url=https://jhalderm.com/pub/papers/ivoting-ccs14.pdf|archive-date=12 August 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170812232217/https://jhalderm.com/pub/papers/ivoting-ccs14.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="osce-est">"The OSCE/ODIHR EAM was made aware of a program that could, if it was running on a voter’s computer, change the vote without the possibility for the voter to detect it. The case was brought to the attention of the project manager who assessed this threat to be theoretically plausible but nearly impossible to implement in reality." {{Cite web |date=6 March 2011 |title=ESTONIA PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS OSCE/ODIHR Election Assessment Mission Report |url=https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/a/9/77557.pdf |access-date=20 June 2020 |website=OSCE |archive-date=16 January 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210116153304/https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/a/9/77557.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref> Switzerland,<ref name="appel-switz">{{Cite web |last=Appel |first=Andrew |date=27 June 2022 |title=How to Assess an E-voting System |url=https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2022/06/27/how-to-assess-an-e-voting-system/ |access-date=1 July 2022 |website=Princeton University, Center for Information Technology Policy |archive-date=8 July 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220708192300/https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2022/06/27/how-to-assess-an-e-voting-system/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="swiss-sctyl">{{Cite web |last=Zetter |first=Kim |date=12 March 2019 |title=Researchers Find Critical Backdoor in Swiss Online Voting System |url=https://www.vice.com/en/article/researchers-find-critical-backdoor-in-swiss-online-voting-system/ |access-date=20 June 2020 |website=Vice |language=en |archive-date=2 September 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200902043649/https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/zmakk3/researchers-find-critical-backdoor-in-swiss-online-voting-system |url-status=live }}</ref> Russia,<ref>{{Cite news|last=Gupta|first=Manhar|title=Russia's Blockchain Voting Turned Into A Fiasco|work=Cryptotrends|url=https://cryptotrends.in/russias-blockchain-voting-turned-into-a-fiasco/|access-date=25 June 2020|archive-date=19 October 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201019232828/https://cryptotrends.in/russias-blockchain-voting-turned-into-a-fiasco/|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="moscow">{{Cite conference |last=Gaudry |first=Pierrick, and Alexander Golovnev |date=10 February 2020 |title=Breaking the Encryption Scheme of the Moscow Internet Voting System |url=http://fc20.ifca.ai/preproceedings/178.pdf |conference=Financial Cryptography 2020 |via=International Financial Cryptography Association}}</ref><ref name="risks-moscow">{{Cite journal |title=Electronic voting systems |last=Anderson |first=Ross |date=21 February 2020 |url=http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/31/59#subj2.1 |journal=The RISKS Digest |volume=31 |issue=59 |language=en |via=Newcastle University |access-date=23 June 2020 |archive-date=19 October 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201019205036/http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/31/59#subj2.1 |url-status=live }}</ref> and the United States.<ref name="vice-mit">{{Cite news |last=Zetter |first=Kim |date=13 February 2020 |title='Sloppy' Mobile Voting App Used in Four States Has 'Elementary' Security Flaws |language=en |work=VICE |url=https://www.vice.com/en/article/sloppy-mobile-voting-app-used-in-four-states-has-elementary-security-flaws/ |access-date=23 June 2020 |archive-date=20 September 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200920040721/https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/akw7mp/sloppy-mobile-voting-app-used-in-four-states-has-elementary-security-flaws |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="appel-dem"/>

It has been argued political parties that have more support from less-wealthy voters—who tend to have less access to and familiarity with the Internet—may suffer in the elections due to e-voting, which tends to increase participation among wealthier voters.{{Citation needed|date=July 2024}} It is unsure as to whether narrowing the [[digital divide]] would promote equal voting opportunities for people across various social, economic, and ethnic backgrounds.<ref name=":0" />

The effects of internet voting on overall voter turnout are unclear. A 2017 study of online voting in two Swiss cantons found that it had no effect on turnout,<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Germann|first1=Micha|last2=Serdült|first2=Uwe|date=1 June 2017|title=Internet voting and turnout: Evidence from Switzerland|url=https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/136119/1/1-s2.0-S026137941630453X-main.pdf|journal=Electoral Studies|volume=47|pages=1–12|doi=10.1016/j.electstud.2017.03.001|s2cid=157177069|access-date=24 August 2020|archive-date=18 October 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201018221258/https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/136119/1/1-s2.0-S026137941630453X-main.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref> and a 2009 study of Estonia's national election found similar results.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Alvarez|first1=R. Michael|last2=Hall|first2=Thad E.|last3=Trechsel|first3=Alexander H.|date=July 2009|title=Internet Voting in Comparative Perspective: The Case of Estonia|url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/ps-political-science-and-politics/article/abs/internet-voting-in-comparative-perspective-the-case-of-estonia/8A8BCDACE0F361D1623D6F013025E624|journal=PS: Political Science & Politics|language=en|volume=42|issue=3|pages=497–505|doi=10.1017/S1049096509090787|s2cid=155061911|issn=1537-5935|access-date=7 January 2021|archive-date=12 March 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210312141309/https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/ps-political-science-and-politics/article/abs/internet-voting-in-comparative-perspective-the-case-of-estonia/8A8BCDACE0F361D1623D6F013025E624|url-status=live}}</ref> To the contrary, however, the introduction of online voting in municipal elections in the Canadian province of [[Ontario]] resulted in an average increase in turnout of around 3.5 percentage points.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Goodman|first1=Nicole|last2=Stokes|first2=Leah C.|date=July 2020|title=Reducing the Cost of Voting: An Evaluation of Internet Voting's Effect on Turnout|journal=British Journal of Political Science|language=en|volume=50|issue=3|pages=1155–1167|doi=10.1017/S0007123417000849|issn=0007-1234|doi-access=free}}</ref> Similarly, a further study of the Swiss case found that while online voting did not increase overall turnout, it did induce some occasional voters to participate who would have abstained were online voting not an option.<ref>{{Cite journal|date=12 November 2020|title=Does E-Voting matter for turnout, and to whom?|journal=Electoral Studies|language=en|pages=102245|doi=10.1016/j.electstud.2020.102245|issn=0261-3794|doi-access=free|last1=Petitpas|first1=Adrien|last2=Jaquet|first2=Julien M.|last3=Sciarini|first3=Pascal|volume=71}}</ref>

A paper on “remote electronic voting and turnout in the Estonian 2007 parliamentary elections” showed that rather than eliminating inequalities, e-voting might have enhanced the [[digital divide]] between higher and lower socioeconomic classes. People who lived greater distances from polling areas voted at higher levels with this service now available. The 2007 Estonian elections yielded a higher voter turnout from those who lived in higher income regions and who received formal education.<ref name=":0">{{Cite journal|last=Bochsler|first=Daniel|date=26 May 2010|title=Can Internet voting increase political participation?|url=http://www.eui.eu/Projects/EUDO-PublicOpinion/Documents/bochslere-voteeui2010.pdf|journal=Centre for the Study of Imperfection in Democracies|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160918221247/http://www.eui.eu/Projects/EUDO-PublicOpinion/Documents/bochslere-voteeui2010.pdf|archive-date=18 September 2016}}</ref> Still regarding the Estonian Internet voting system, it was proved to be more cost-efficient than the rest of the voting systems offered in 2017 local elections.<ref>Krimmer R., Duenas-Cid D., Krivonosova I., Vinkel P., Koitmae A. (2018) How Much Does an e-Vote Cost? Cost Comparison per Vote in Multichannel Elections in Estonia. In: Krimmer R. et al. (eds) Electronic Voting. E-Vote-ID 2018. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 11143. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00419-4_8</ref><ref name="Kramer 2020">{{cite journal |first1=Robert |last1=Krimmer |first2=David |last2=Duenas-Cid |first3=Iuliia |last3=Krivonosova |year=2020 |title=New methodology for calculating cost-efficiency of different ways of voting: is internet voting cheaper? |journal=Public Money & Management |volume=41 |issue=1 |pages=17–26 |doi=10.1080/09540962.2020.1732027|doi-access=free }}</ref>
{| class="wikitable sortable"
|+ Cost range per ballot (in euro) for the 2017 local elections<ref name="Kramer 2020"/>
|-
! Voting system !! Minimum !! Maximum
|-
| Advance voting in county centres            ||   5.48 || 5.92
|-
| Advance voting in ordinary polling stations || 16.24 || 17.36
|-
| Early voting in county centres              ||   5.83 || 6.30
|-
| Election day voting in county centres       ||   4.97	|| 5.58
|-
| Election day voting in ordinary polling stations ||   2.83 || 3.01
|-
| Internet voting                             ||   2.17 || 2.26
|}

Electronic voting is perceived to be favored moreover by a certain demographic, namely the younger generation such as Generation X and Y voters. However, in recent elections about a quarter of e-votes were cast by the older demographic, such as individuals over the age of 55. Including this, about 20% of e-votes came from voters between the ages of 45 and 54. This goes to show that e-voting is not supported exclusively by the younger generations, but finding some popularity amongst Gen X and Baby Boomers as well.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.forbes.com/sites/kalevleetaru/2017/06/07/how-estonias-e-voting-system-could-be-the-future/|title=How Estonia's E-Voting System Could Be The Future|last=Leetaru|first=Kalev|website=Forbes|language=en|access-date=25 September 2019|archive-date=19 November 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201119035242/https://www.forbes.com/sites/kalevleetaru/2017/06/07/how-estonias-e-voting-system-could-be-the-future/|url-status=live}}</ref> In terms of electoral results as well, the expectation that online voting would favor younger candidates has not been borne out in the data, with mayors in Ontario, Canada who were elected in online elections actually being slightly older on average than those elected by pencil and paper.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Wigginton |first1=Michael J |last2=Stockemer |first2=Daniel |date=31 December 2021 |title=Does the Introduction of Online Voting Create Diversity in Representation? |journal=Political Studies Review |volume=21 |language=en |pages=172–182 |doi=10.1177/14789299211064450 |s2cid=245625982 |issn=1478-9299|doi-access=free }}</ref>

Online voting is widely used privately for shareholder votes,<ref name="penobscot">{{Cite news |last=Weil |first=Gordon |date=4 July 2020 |title=Maine system combined with shareholder-style voting could overcome false fraud fears, boost turnout |language=en |work=Penobscot Bay Pilot |url=https://www.penbaypilot.com/node/135568 |access-date=29 July 2020 |archive-date=31 October 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201031023134/https://www.penbaypilot.com/node/135568 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="fisch">{{Cite web |last=Fisch |first=Jill |date=2017 |title=Standing Voting Instructions: Empowering the Excluded Retail Investor |url=https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2759&context=faculty_scholarship |access-date=29 July 2020 |website=Minnesota Law Review |archive-date=18 October 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201018192753/https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2759&context=faculty_scholarship |url-status=live }}</ref> 
and other private organizations.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Election Management Software Market Impressive Gains |url=https://www.designerwomen.co.uk/election-management-software-market-impressive-gains-including-key-players-eballot-election-runner-avante-election-management-system-ems/ |access-date=25 June 2022 |website=Designer Women |language=en-US |archive-date=29 June 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220629142532/https://www.designerwomen.co.uk/election-management-software-market-impressive-gains-including-key-players-eballot-election-runner-avante-election-management-system-ems/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=17 December 2021 |title=NAACP Statement on the NAACP NC State Conference Election |url=https://naacp.org/articles/naacp-statement-naacp-nc-state-conference-election |access-date=25 June 2022 |website=naacp.org |language=en |archive-date=29 January 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220129135433/https://naacp.org/articles/naacp-statement-naacp-nc-state-conference-election |url-status=live }}</ref>
The election management companies do not promise accuracy or privacy.<ref name="esc">Election Services Co. {{Cite web |title=Terms of Use & Privacy Policy |url=http://www.electionservicesco.com/pages/terms-privacy.php |access-date=29 July 2020 |website=www.electionservicesco.com |archive-date=15 June 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200615040858/http://www.electionservicesco.com/pages/terms-privacy.php |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="broad-terms">ProxyVote {{Cite web |title=Terms of Use & Linking Policy |url=https://www.broadridge.com/legal/terms-of-use |access-date=29 July 2020 |website=www.broadridge.com |language=en |archive-date=9 March 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210309150624/https://www.broadridge.com/legal/terms-of-use |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="cshare">Proxydirect {{Cite web |title=Online Service Terms & Conditions |url=https://www.computershare.com/us/online-service-terms-conditions |access-date=29 July 2020 |website=www.computershare.com |archive-date=18 October 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201018053213/https://www.computershare.com/us/online-service-terms-conditions |url-status=live }}</ref>
In fact one company uses an individual's past votes for research,<ref name="brav">{{Cite web |last=Brav |first=Alon, Matthew D. Cain, Jonathon Zytnick |date=November 2019 |title=Retail Shareholder Participation in the Proxy Process: Monitoring, Engagement, and Voting |url=http://higherlogicdownload.s3.amazonaws.com/GOVERNANCEPROFESSIONALS/a8892c7c-6297-4149-b9fc-378577d0b150/UploadedImages/Retail.pdf |access-date=29 July 2020 |website=European Corporate Governance Institute |archive-date=18 October 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201018042104/http://higherlogicdownload.s3.amazonaws.com/GOVERNANCEPROFESSIONALS/a8892c7c-6297-4149-b9fc-378577d0b150/UploadedImages/Retail.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref> and to target ads.<ref name="broad-target">{{Cite web |title=Proxy Services for Mutual Funds and ETF Providers |url=https://www.broadridge.com/financial-services/asset-management/mutual-funds-etf/drive-a-successful-proxy-outcome/proxy-services |access-date=29 July 2020 |website=www.broadridge.com |language=en |archive-date=31 January 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210131141900/https://www.broadridge.com/financial-services/asset-management/mutual-funds-etf/drive-a-successful-proxy-outcome/proxy-services |url-status=live }}</ref>

Corporations and organizations routinely use Internet voting to elect officers and board members and for other proxy elections. Internet voting systems have been used privately in many modern nations and publicly in the United States, the UK, Switzerland and Estonia. In Switzerland, where it is already an established part of local referendums, voters get their passwords to access the ballot through the postal service. Most voters in Estonia can cast their vote in local and parliamentary elections, if they want to, via the Internet, as most of those on the electoral roll have access to an e-voting system, the largest run by any [[European Union]] country. It has been made possible because most Estonians carry a national identity card equipped with a computer-readable microchip and it is these cards which they use to get access to the online ballot. All a voter needs is a computer, an electronic card reader, their ID card and its PIN, and they can vote from anywhere in the world. [[Electronic voting in Estonia|Estonian e-votes]] can only be cast during the days of [[Advance poll|advance voting]]. On election day itself people have to go to polling stations and fill in a paper ballot.

==== Sybil attacks ====
{{Main|Sybil attack}}
One of the biggest weaknesses of online voting is the difficulty of dealing with fake identities, especially when voting is implemented using software without the cooperation of some kind of government agency.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Nebulas |date=2018-09-21 |title=Liberal Radicalism: Can Quadratic Voting Be the Perfect Voting System? |url=https://medium.com/nebulasio/liberal-radicalism-can-quadratic-voting-be-the-perfect-voting-system-e958408567b2 |access-date=2020-11-03 |website=Medium |language=en}}</ref> These attacks use sybils—fake or duplicate identities—to influence community decisions. Since a single vote has the potential to tilt a group decision, prevention of sybil attacks is an important priority in ensuring the security of voting.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Shahaf |first1=Gal |title=Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence |last2=Shapiro |first2=Ehud |last3=Talmon |first3=Nimrod |date=August 2019 |publisher=International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization |isbn=978-0-9992411-4-1 |location=California |pages=572–579 |chapter=Sybil-Resilient Reality-Aware Social Choice |doi=10.24963/ijcai.2019/81 |doi-access=free}}</ref> Sybil attacks are a common issue with implementations on open, peer-to-peer networks, as the system must have a way to prevent fake identities to prevent gaming of the vote.<ref name="Lalley2017-1">{{Cite SSRN |title=Quadratic Voting: How Mechanism Design Can Radicalize Democracy |last1=Lalley |first1=Steven |last2=Weyl |first2=E. Glen |date=24 December 2017 |language=en |ssrn=2003531}}</ref>

Some future possible avenues of inquiries include to investigate more intersectional [[proof of personhood]] systems that aren't directly blockchain-based.<ref name=":6">{{cite arXiv |eprint=2008.05300 |class=cs.CR |first1=Divya |last1=Siddarth |first2=Sergey |last2=Ivliev |title=Who Watches the Watchmen? A Review of Subjective Approaches for Sybil-resistance in Proof of Personhood Protocols |date=2020-10-13 |last3=Siri |first3=Santiago |last4=Berman |first4=Paula}}</ref> For example, extending the [[web of trust]] by having a protocol that verifies proof of identities using social interactions would allow a community of users to assign corresponding levels of trusts to different candidates in relation with others. However, this would require a fully decentralized system.<ref name=":6" /> This web-of-trust protocol could even expand to allowing candidates to provide proof of personhood by physical attendance, which could lead to trusted clusters that grow into communities.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Howitt |first=Aleeza |date=2019-03-05 |title=Proposal for a Decentralized Unique Identity Seeding Protocol |url=https://ubiresearch.org/proposal-for-a-decentralized-unique-identity-seeding-protocol |access-date=2020-11-10 |website=UBI Research |language=en-US}}</ref>

===Hybrid systems===
There are also hybrid systems that include an electronic ballot marking device (usually a touch screen system similar to a DRE) or other [[assistive technology]] to print a [[voter verified paper audit trail]], then use a separate machine for electronic tabulation. Hybrid voting often includes both e-voting and mail-in paper ballots.<ref>Poulos, John, et al. "System, method and computer program for vote tabulation with an electronic audit trail." U.S. Patent No. 8,195,505. 5 June 2012. https://patents.google.com/patent/US8195505B2/en {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191008174418/https://patents.google.com/patent/US8195505B2/en |date=8 October 2019 }}</ref>

Internet voting can use remote locations (voting from any Internet capable computer) or can use traditional polling locations with voting booths consisting of Internet connected voting systems.