Editing Ethical intuitionism (section)

===Intuitionism in analytic philosophy===

Ethical intuitionism was popular in the early twentieth century, particularly among British [[analytic philosophers]]. [[H. A. Prichard]] gave a defense of the view in his "[[Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?]]" (1912), wherein he contended that moral philosophy rested chiefly on the desire to provide arguments starting from non-normative premises for the principles of obligation that we pre-philosophically accept, such as the principle that one ought to keep one's promises or that one ought not to steal.{{sfn|Prichard|1912}} This is a mistake, Prichard argued, both because it is impossible to derive any statement about what one ought to do from statements not concerning obligation (even statements about what is ''good''), and because there is no need to do so since common sense principles of moral obligation are self-evident.

Prichard was influenced by [[G. E. Moore]], whose ''[[Principia Ethica]]'' (1903) argued famously that ''goodness'' was an indefinable, non-natural property of which we had intuitive awareness. Moore originated the term "[[naturalistic fallacy|the naturalistic fallacy]]" to refer to the (alleged) error of confusing goodness with some natural property, and he deployed the Open Question Argument to show why this was an error. Unlike Prichard, Moore thought that one could derive principles of obligation from propositions about what is good.

[[W. D. Ross]]'s intuitionism was influenced both by Prichard and Moore. He holds that we can know moral truths through intuition, for example, that it is wrong to lie or that knowledge is intrinsically good.{{sfn|Skelton|2012}} Intuitions involve a direct apprehension that is not mediated by inferences or deductions: they are self-evident and therefore not in need of any additional proof.{{sfn|Simpson}} This ability is not inborn but has to be developed on the way to reaching mental maturity.{{sfn|Ross|1930|p=29}} But in its fully developed form, we can know moral truths just as well as we can know mathematical truths like the axioms of geometry or arithmetic.{{sfn|Ross|1930|p=30}}{{sfn|Craig|1996}} This self-evident knowledge is limited to general principles: we can come to know the [[prima facie duties]] this way, e.g. that, generally speaking, one should keep one's promises and refrain from harming others.{{sfn|Simpson}} But intuition is unable to reveal one's ''absolute'' duty in a particular situation: what one should do all things considered.{{sfn|Ross|1930|pp=19–20,30}} All we can do is consult perception to determine which prima facie duty has the highest normative weight in this particular case, even though this usually does not amount to knowledge proper due to the complexity involved in most specific cases.{{sfn|Skelton|2012}}

Ethical intuitionism suffered a dramatic fall from favor by the middle of the century, due in part to the influence of [[logical positivism]], in part to the rising popularity of [[Naturalism (philosophy)|naturalism]] in philosophy, and in part to philosophical objections based on the phenomenon of widespread moral disagreement. [[Charles Stevenson (philosopher)|C. L. Stevenson]]'s [[emotivism]] would prove especially attractive to Moorean intuitionists seeking to avoid [[ethical naturalism]].{{sfn|Deigh|2013|p=601}} In the later parts of the 20th century, intuitionism would have few adherents to speak of; in [[Bernard Williams]]' words: "This model of intuition in ethics has been demolished by a succession of critics, and the ruins of it that remain above ground are not impressive enough to invite much history of what happened to it."{{sfn|Williams|2011|p=104}}