Editing Europe first (section)

==Analysis==

Three U.S. Army divisions were deployed to Australia and New Zealand in February and March 1942 at the request of Churchill so that divisions from those countries could remain on operations in the Middle East. Through this sizeable deployment to the Pacific, the U.S. aided the Europe First strategy by defending Australia and New Zealand and thus enabling experienced troops from those countries to remain deployed against German forces.<ref name=Gray/> Nonetheless, the inability of the two allies to mount an invasion of German-controlled northern Europe in 1943 permitted the U.S. to maintain more military forces arrayed against Japan than Germany during the first two years the U.S. was in the war. As late as December 1943, the balance was nearly even. Against Japan, the U.S. had deployed 1,873,023 men, 7,857 aircraft, and 713 warships. Against Germany the totals were 1,810,367 men, 8,807 airplanes, and 515 warships.<ref>Matloff, Maurice, ''Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1943–1944'', Vol. 1, Part 4, ''The U.S. Army in World War II'' Washington: GPO, 1955, p. 398</ref> In early 1944, the military buildup of American forces for the invasion of France shifted the balance of American resources toward the European theater and made Europe First a reality. However, despite the majority of American resources going into Europe in 1944, the U.S. still had sufficient resources to mount several major military operations in the Pacific that year: [[Battle of Saipan|Saipan]] (June 1944); [[Battle of Guam (1944)|Guam]] (July 1944); [[Battle of Peleliu|Peleliu]] (September 1944); and the liberation of the Philippines at [[Battle of Leyte|Leyte]] in October 1944.

In 1944 and 1945, the balance of U.S. resources shifted heavily toward Europe as the Europe First strategy became a reality rather than just a stated objective. At war's end in Europe, the U.S. Army had 47 divisions in Europe and 21 divisions, plus 6 Marine Corps divisions, in the Pacific. 78% of Army and Army Air Force manpower was deployed against Germany versus 22% deployed in the Pacific. [[Operation Downfall|The plan to invade Japan]] envisioned that 15 of the European divisions (and the Eighth Air Force) would be transferred to the Pacific.<ref>Frank, Richard B. ''Downfall: The End of the Japanese Empire'' New York: Random House, 1999, p 123</ref123</ref>

The uncritical view that "Europe First" dictated the allocation of resources throughout the war has caused many scholars to underestimate the resources required to defeat Japan. For example, historian H. P. Willmott stated that the United States "allocated little more than one-quarter of her total war effort to the struggle against Japan."<ref>Willmott, H. P. ''Empires in the Balance.'' Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1982, p. xv</ref> That may be an underestimate which does not take into account that, according to official U.S. statistics, 70% of the U.S. Navy and all the Marine Corps were deployed in the Pacific as well as the 22% of the Army deployed to the Pacific at the time of Germany's surrender in May 1945.<ref>Leighton, Richard M. and Coakley, Robert W. ''Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943–1945'', of ''The U.S. Army in World War II'' Washington: GPO, 1995, p. 834</ref>