Editing Evolutionary game theory (section)

===Adapting game theory to evolutionary games===

Maynard Smith realised that an evolutionary version of game theory does not require players to act rationally—only that they have a strategy. The results of a game show how good that strategy was, just as [[evolution]] tests alternative strategies for the ability to survive and reproduce. In biology, strategies are genetically inherited traits that control an individual's action, analogous with computer programs.  The success of a strategy is determined by how good the strategy is in the presence of competing strategies (including itself), and of the frequency with which those strategies are used.<ref>{{cite book |author=Vincent, Thomas |title=Evolutionary Game Theory, Natural Selection, and Darwinian Dynamics |url=https://archive.org/details/evolutionarygame00tlvi |url-access=limited |date=2005 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |pages=[https://archive.org/details/evolutionarygame00tlvi/page/n90 72]–87 |isbn=978-0-521-84170-2}}</ref> Maynard Smith described his work in his book ''[[Evolution and the Theory of Games]]''.<ref name=JMSbook>{{cite book |author-link=John Maynard Smith |last=Maynard Smith |first=John |date=1982 |title=Evolution and the Theory of Games |isbn=978-0-521-28884-2|title-link=Evolution and the Theory of Games |publisher=Cambridge University Press }}</ref>

Participants aim to produce as many replicas of themselves as they can, and the payoff is in units of fitness (relative worth in being able to reproduce). It is always a multi-player game with many competitors.  Rules include replicator dynamics, in other words how the fitter players will spawn more replicas of themselves into the population and how the less fit will be [[Culling|culled]], in a [[replicator equation]]. The replicator dynamics models heredity but not mutation, and assumes asexual reproduction for the sake of simplicity. Games are run repetitively with no terminating conditions. Results include the dynamics of changes in the population, the success of strategies, and any equilibrium states reached. Unlike in classical game theory, players do not choose their strategy and cannot change it: they are born with a strategy and their offspring inherit that same strategy.<ref>{{cite book |author=Dugatkin, Lee |title=Game Theory and Animal Behavior |date=1998  |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-509692-7 |pages=2–20}}</ref>