Editing Federal Intelligence Service (section)

=== 1960s ===
During the first years of oversight by the State Secretary in the federal chancellery of [[Konrad Adenauer]] of the operation in [[Pullach]], [[Munich (district)|Munich District]], [[Bavaria]], the BND continued the ways of its forebear, the Gehlen Organization.

The BND racked up its initial east–west cold war successes by concentrating on [[East Germany]]. The BND's reach encompassed the highest political and military levels of the GDR regime. They knew the carrying capacity of every bridge, the bed count of every hospital, the length of every airfield, the width and level of maintenance of the roads that Soviet armor and infantry divisions would have to traverse in a potential attack on the West. Almost every sphere of eastern life was known to the BND.<ref>Höhne & Zolling, p. 115</ref>

Unsung analysts at Pullach, with their contacts in the East, figuratively functioned as flies on the wall in ministries and military conferences. When the Soviet KGB suspected an East German army intelligence officer, a lieutenant colonel and BND agent, of spying, the Soviets investigated and shadowed him. The BND was positioned and able to inject forged reports implying that the loose spy was actually the KGB investigator, who was then arrested by the Soviets and shipped off to Moscow.<ref>Höhne & Zolling, p. 212</ref> Not knowing how long the caper would stay under wraps, the real spy was told to be ready for recall; he made his move to the West at the appropriate time.

The East German regime, however, fought back.  With still unhindered flight to the west a possibility, infiltration started on a grand scale and a reversal of sorts took hold.  During the early 1960s as many as 90% of the BND's lower-level informants in East Germany worked as [[double agent]]s for the East German security service, later known as [[Stasi]].<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.netzeitung.de/deutschland/751973.html|title=BND hatte Tausende Spione in der DDR|access-date=16 July 2008|date=24 September 2007|publisher=Netzeitung.de|language=de|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070521213717/http://www.netzeitung.de/deutschland/751973.html|archive-date=21 May 2007}}</ref> Several informants in East Berlin reported in June and July 1961 of street closures, clearing of fields, accumulation of building materials and police and army deployments in specific parts of the eastern sector, as well as other measures that BND determined could lead to a division of the city. However, the agency was reluctant to report communist initiatives and had no knowledge of the scope and timing because of conflicting inputs. The erection of the Berlin Wall on 13 August 1961 thus came as a surprise, and the BND's performance in the political field was thereafter often wrong and remained spotty and unimpressive.<ref name="Höhne & Zolling, p. 266">Höhne & Zolling, p. 266</ref>

There was a great success for the Federal Intelligence Service during the [[Cuban Missile Crisis]]. In 1962, the BND was the first Western [[Intelligence agency|intelligence service]] to have information about the stationing of [[Soviet Union|Soviet]] [[Medium-range ballistic missile|medium-range missiles]] on the [[Cuba|caribbean island]] and passed it on to the [[United States]].<ref>{{Cite news |title=968-Seiten-Gutachten über den BND: Das Geheimnis um das geschwärzte Land aus Kapitel 6 |language=de-DE |work=Der Tagesspiegel Online |url=https://www.tagesspiegel.de/gesellschaft/bnd-sperrt-sich-gegen-enthuellungen-wie-der-geheimdienst-eine-historische-studie-zensierte-141665.html |access-date=2022-10-12 |issn=1865-2263}}</ref> Between 1959 and 1961, [[Reinhard Gehlen]] called on [[Federal government of the United States|Washington]] several times in vain to "insert the dangerous [[Communism|communist]] bastion, which at the same time represents an excellent starting point for the communist infiltration of [[Latin America]], into the [USA] sphere of power by rapid access." Gehlen's influence on the US government should not be underestimated, because the BND was able to regularly provide the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] with detailed information about Soviet arms deliveries through its very good sources in Cuba. There are indications that the secret service was also informed about military actions against Cuba. Ten days before the [[Bay of Pigs Invasion|Bay of Pigs invasion]], [[Reinhard Gehlen|Gehlen]] reported to [[Cabinet of Germany|Bonn]]: "Within a relatively short period of time, large-scale military operations to defeat [[Fidel Castro]] will begin." In 1962, the BND also found out from its sources, the Cuban exiles living in Miami, that Cuba was also trying to get hold of weapons through German dealers. According to a BND report, Cuba was also able to recruit four former [[Waffen-SS]] officers as instructors for the Cuban armed forces. However, the identity of the men was blacked out in the report.<ref>{{Cite web |title=BND empfahl Militärschlag gegen Kuba |url=https://www.fr.de/politik/empfahl-militaerschlag-gegen-kuba-11290761.html |access-date=2022-10-12 |website=www.fr.de |date=17 January 2019 |language=de}}</ref>

"This negative view of BND was certainly not justified during ... [1967 and] 1968." The BND's military work "had been outstanding",<ref name="Höhne & Zolling, p. 266" /> and in certain sectors of the intelligence field the BND still showed brilliance: in Latin America and in the Middle East it was regarded{{by whom|date=January 2014}} as the best-informed secret service.<ref name="Höhne & Zolling, p. 244">Höhne & Zolling, p. 244</ref>

The BND offered a fair and reliable amount of intelligence on [[Soviet Union|Soviet]] and [[Soviet-bloc]] forces in Eastern Europe, regarding the elaboration of a [[NATO]] warning system against any Soviet operations against NATO territory, in close cooperation with the [[Bundeswehr]] (German Armed Forces).

One high point of BND intelligence work culminated in its early June 1967 forecast – almost to the hour{{Dubious|date=May 2015}} – of the outbreak of the [[Six-Day War]] in the Middle East on 5 June 1967.{{Citation needed|date=May 2015}}<ref>{{Cite book|last=Ro'i, Yaacov, and Boris Morozov.|title=he Soviet Union and the June 1967 Six Day War|publisher=Stanford University Press}}</ref>

According to declassified transcripts of a [[United States National Security Council]] meeting on 2 June 1967, CIA Director [[Richard Helms]] interrupted Secretary of State [[Dean Rusk]] with "reliable information" – contrary to Rusk's presentation – that the Israelis would attack on a certain day and time. Rusk shot back: "That is quite out of the question. Our ambassador in Tel Aviv assured me only yesterday that everything was normal." Helms replied: "I am sorry, but I adhere to my opinion. The Israelis will strike and their object will be to end the war in their favor with extreme rapidity." President Lyndon Johnson then asked Helms for the source of his information. Helms said: "Mr. President, I have it from an allied secret service. The report is absolutely reliable."  Helms' information came from the BND.<ref name="Höhne & Zolling, p. 244" />

A further laudable success involved the BND's activity during the [[Prague Spring|Czech crisis]] in 1968; by then, the agency was led by the second president, Gerhard Wessel.  With Pullach cryptography{{clarify|date=May 2015}} fully functioning, the BND predicted an invasion of Soviet and other Warsaw Pact troops into Czechoslovakia.{{dubious|date=May 2015}} CIA analysts on the other hand did not support the notion of "fraternal assistance" by the satellite states of Moscow; and US ambassador to the Soviet Union, [[Llewellyn Thompson]], quite irritated, called the secret BND report he was given "a German fabrication".<ref name="Höhne & Zolling, p. 266" /> At 23:11 on 20 August 1968, BND radar operators first observed abnormal activity over Czech airspace. An agent on the ground in Prague called a BND out-station in Bavaria: "The Russians are coming." Warsaw Pact forces had moved as forecast.<ref>Höhne & Zolling, p. 267</ref>

However, the slowly sinking efficiency of BND in the last years of Reinhard Gehlen became evident. By 1961, it was clear that the BND employed some men who were Soviet "moles"; they had come from the earlier Gehlen Organization.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Breitman |first1=Richard |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=GnkBYN8ipYcC&dq=soviet+moles+in+the+BND&pg=PA405 |title=U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis |last2=Goda |first2=Norman J. W. |last3=Naftali |first3=Timothy |last4=Wolfe |first4=Robert |date=2005-04-04 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-0-521-85268-5 |pages=405 |language=en}}</ref> One mole, Heinz Felfe, was convicted of treason in 1963.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Childs |first1=David |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=k-O-DAAAQBAJ&dq=erwin+tiebel+convicted&pg=PA153 |title=The Stasi: The East German Intelligence and Security Service |last2=Popplewell |first2=Richard |date=2016-07-27 |publisher=Springer |isbn=978-1-349-15054-0 |pages=153 |language=en}}</ref> Others were not uncovered during Gehlen's term in office.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Johnson |first=Loch K. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=X7i_I_np11IC&dq=BND+moles++Soviet&pg=PA797 |title=The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence |date=2010-03-12 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-970469-9 |pages=797 |language=en}}</ref>

Gehlen's refusal to correct reports with questionable content strained the organization's credibility, and dazzling achievements became an infrequent commodity. A veteran agent remarked at the time that the BND pond then contained some sardines, though a few years earlier the pond had been alive with sharks.<ref>Höhne & Zolling, p. 213</ref>

The fact that the BND could score certain successes despite East German communist Stasi interference, internal malpractice, inefficiencies and infighting, was primarily due to select members of the staff who took it upon themselves to step up and overcome then existing maladies.  Abdication of responsibility by Reinhard Gehlen was the malignancy; cronyism remained pervasive, even nepotism (at one time Gehlen had 16 members of his extended family on the BND payroll).<ref name="Höhne & Zolling, p. 245">Höhne & Zolling, p. 245</ref> Only slowly did the younger generation then advance to substitute new ideas for some of the bad habits caused mainly by Gehlen's semi-retired attitude and frequent holiday absences.<ref name="Höhne & Zolling, p. 245" />

Gehlen was forced out in April 1968 due to "political scandal within the ranks", according to one source.{{who|date=July 2022}}{{citation needed|date=July 2022}} His successor, [[Bundeswehr]] Brigadier General Gerhard Wessel, immediately called for a program of modernization and streamlining.<ref>Höhne & Zolling, p. 255</ref> With political changes in the West German government and a reflection that BND was at a low level of efficiency, the service began to rebuild. Years later, Wessel's obituary in the ''[[Los Angeles Times]]'', reported that he "is credited with modernizing the BND by hiring academic analysts and electronics specialists".<ref name="latimes.com">{{Cite web |last= |date=2002-08-03 |title=Gerhard Wessel, 88; Did Espionage Work for Hitler, West Germany |url=https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2002-aug-03-me-passings3-story.html |access-date=2022-08-07 |website=Los Angeles Times |language=en-US}}</ref>

Reinhard Gehlen's memoirs, ''The Service, The Memoirs of General Reinhard Gehlen'' (English title), were published in 1977, (World Publishers, New York). A Review of the book published by the CIA makes this comment about Gehlen's achievements and management style:<ref>[https://web.archive.org/web/20100327044932/https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol16no3/html/v16i3a06p_0001.htm CIA.gov] The Service: The Memoirs of General Reinhard Gehlen by Reinhard Gehlen. Book review by Anonymous</ref> <blockquote>"Gehlen's descriptions of most of his so-called successes in the political intelligence field are, in my opinion, either wishful thinking or self-delusion. ... Gehlen was never a good clandestine operator, nor was he a particularly good administrator. And therein lay his failures. The Gehlen Organization/BND always had a good record in the collection of military and economic intelligence on East Germany and the Soviet forces there. But this information, for the most part, came from observation and not from clandestine penetration".</blockquote>