Editing Geneva Protocol (section)

==Subsequent interpretation of the protocol==
In 1966, [[United Nations General Assembly resolution]] 2162B called for, without any dissent, all states to strictly observe the protocol. In 1969, United Nations General Assembly resolution 2603 (XXIV) declared that the prohibition on use of chemical and biological weapons in international armed conflicts, as embodied in the protocol (though restated in a more general form), were generally recognized rules of international law.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.worldlii.org/int/other/UNGARsn/1969/110.pdf |title=2603 (XXIV). Question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons |publisher=United Nations General Assembly |date=16 December 1969 |access-date=24 August 2013 |quote=use in international armed conflicts of: (a) Any chemical agents of warfare - chemical substances, whether gaseous, liquid or solid - which might be employed because of their direct toxic effects on man, animals or plants; (b) Any biological agents of warfare - living organisms, whatever their nature, or infective material derived from them - which are intended to cause disease or death in man, animals or plants, and which depend for their effects on their ability to multiply in the person, animal or plant attacked.}}</ref> Following this, there was discussion of whether the main elements of the protocol now form part of [[customary international law]], and now this is widely accepted to be the case.<ref name=bunn-1969/><ref name=vertic-20120517>{{cite web |url=http://www.vertic.org/pages/posts/the-1925-geneva-protocol-goes-digital-298.php |title=The 1925 Geneva Protocol goes digital |author=Angela Woodward |publisher=[[VERTIC]] |date=17 May 2012 |access-date=26 August 2013}}</ref>

There have been differing interpretations over whether the protocol covers the use of harassing agents, such as [[adamsite]] and [[tear gas]], and [[defoliants]] and [[herbicides]], such as [[Agent Orange]], in warfare.<ref name=bunn-1969/><ref name=state-2002>{{cite web |url=https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/isn/4784.htm |title=Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (Geneva Protocol) |publisher=U.S. Department of State |date=25 September 2002 |access-date=24 August 2013}}</ref> The 1977 [[Environmental Modification Convention]] prohibits the military use of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects. Many states do not regard this as a complete ban on the use of herbicides in warfare, but it does require case-by-case consideration.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule76 |title=Practice Relating to Rule 76. Herbicides |publisher=International Committee of the Red Cross |year=2013 |access-date=24 August 2013}}</ref> The 1993 [[Chemical Weapons Convention]] effectively banned riot control agents from being used as a method of warfare, though still permitting it for [[riot control]].<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_cha_chapter24_rule75 |title=Practice Relating to Rule 75. Riot Control Agents |publisher=International Committee of the Red Cross |year=2013 |access-date=24 August 2013}}</ref>

In recent times, the protocol had been interpreted to cover non-international armed conflicts as well international ones. In 1995, an appellate chamber in the [[International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia]] stated that "there had undisputedly emerged a general consensus in the international community on the principle that the use of chemical weapons is also prohibited in internal armed conflicts." In 2005, the [[International Committee of the Red Cross]] concluded that customary international law includes a ban on the use of chemical weapons in internal as well as international conflicts.<ref name=vertic-20120808>{{cite web |url=http://www.vertic.org/pages/posts/syria-international-law-and-the-use-of-chemical-weapons-345.php |title=Syria: international law and the use of chemical weapons |author=Scott Spence and Meghan Brown |publisher=[[VERTIC]] |date=8 August 2012 |access-date=26 August 2013 |archive-date=26 September 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130926173659/http://www.vertic.org/pages/posts/syria-international-law-and-the-use-of-chemical-weapons-345.php |url-status=dead }}</ref>

However, such views drew general criticism from legal authors. They noted that much of the [[List of chemical arms control agreements|chemical arms control agreements]] stems from the context of ''international'' conflicts. Furthermore, the application of customary international law to banning chemical warfare in non-international conflicts fails to meet two requirements: state practice and [[Opinio juris sive necessitatis|''opinio juris'']].  Jillian Blake & Aqsa Mahmud cited the periodic use of chemical weapons in non-international conflicts since the end of WWI (as [[Geneva Protocol#Historical assessment|stated above]]) as well as the lack of existing [[international humanitarian law]] (such as the [[Geneva Conventions]]) and national legislation and manuals prohibiting using them in such conflicts.<ref>{{cite web|title=A Legal "Red Line"? Syria and the Use of Chemical Weapons in Civil Conflict|url=https://www.uclalawreview.org/a-legal-red-line-syria-and-the-use-of-chemical-weapons-in-civil-conflict/|author= Jillian Blake & Aqsa Mahmud|date=October 15, 2013|website=UCLA Law Review}}</ref> Anne Lorenzat stated the 2005 ICRC study was rooted in "'political and operational issues rather than legal ones".<ref>{{cite web|title=The Current State of Customary International Law with regard to the Use of Chemical Weapons in Non-International Armed Conflicts|url=http://www.ismllw.org/REVIEW/2017-2018%20ART%20Lorenzat.php|author=Anne Lorenzat|date=2017–2018|website=The Military Law and the Law of War Review}}</ref>