Editing George Lakoff (section)

===Embodied mind===
{{further|Embodied philosophy}}
When Lakoff claims the mind is "embodied", he is arguing that almost all of human cognition, up through the most [[abstract reasoning]], depends on and makes use of such concrete and "low-level" facilities as the sensorimotor system and the emotions. Therefore, embodiment is a rejection not only of dualism vis-a-vis mind and matter, but also of claims that human reason can be basically understood without reference to the underlying "implementation details". Lakoff offers three complementary but distinct sorts of arguments in favor of embodiment:
* First, using evidence<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.neurohumanitiestudies.eu/archivio/SSRN-id1437794The_Neural_Theory_of_Metaphor.pdf | title=The Neural Theory of Metaphor, George Lakoff, published in R. Gibbs. 2008 ''The Metaphor Handbook'', Cambridge University Press. | website=www.neurohumanitiestudies.eu/ |access-date=2024-03-02}}</ref> from [[neuroscience]] and [[neural network (biology)|neural-network]] simulations, he argues that certain concepts - such as color and [[spatial relation]] concepts (e.g. "red" or "over"; see also ''[[qualia]]'') - can be almost entirely understood through the examination of how processes of perception or motor control work.
* Second, based on [[cognitive linguistics]]' analysis of [[figurative language]], he argues that the reasoning we use for such abstract topics as warfare, economics, or morality is somehow rooted in the reasoning we use for such mundane topics as spatial relationships (see [[conceptual metaphor]]).
* Finally, based on research in [[cognitive psychology]] and some investigations in the [[philosophy of language]], he argues that very few of the categories used by humans are actually of the black-and-white type amenable to analysis in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. On the contrary, most categories are supposed to be much more complicated and messy, just like our bodies. "We are neural beings", Lakoff states, "Our brains take their input from the rest of our bodies. What our bodies are like and how they function in the world thus structures the very concepts we can use to think. We cannot think just anything — only what our embodied brains permit."<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/lakoff/lakoff_p1.html | title=EDGE 3rd Culture: A Talk with George Lakoff | publisher=Edge.org |access-date=2013-09-29}}</ref>

Lakoff envisages consciousness as neurally embodied, however he explicitly states that the mechanism is not just neural computation alone. Using the concept of {{linktext|disembodiment}}, Lakoff supports the [[physicalist]] approach to the afterlife. If the [[soul]] can not have any of the properties of the body, then Lakoff claims it can not feel, perceive, think, be conscious, or have a personality. If this is true, then Lakoff asks what would be the point of the afterlife?{{Citation needed|date=March 2013}} Many scientists share the belief that there are problems with [[falsifiability]] and [[foundation ontology|foundation ontologies]] purporting to describe "what exists", to a sufficient degree of rigor to establish a reasonable method of [[empirical validation]]. But Lakoff takes this further to explain why hypotheses built with complex metaphors cannot be directly falsified. Instead, they can only be rejected based on interpretations of empirical observations guided by other complex metaphors. This is what he means when he says<ref>Lakoff, G., and M. Johnson, 1999, ''Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought'', New York: Basic Books</ref> that falsifiability itself can never be established by any reasonable method that would not rely ultimately on a shared human bias. The bias he's referring to is the set of conceptual metaphors governing how people interpret observations.

Lakoff is, with coauthors [[Mark Johnson (professor)|Mark Johnson]] and [[Rafael E. Núñez]], one of the primary proponents of the [[embodied mind]] thesis. Lakoff discussed these themes in his 2001 [[Gifford Lectures]] at the [[University of Glasgow]], published as ''The Nature and Limits of Human Understanding''.<ref>ed. Anthony Sanford, T & T Clark, 2003. [http://www.giffordlectures.org/Browse.asp?PubID=TPNLHU&Volume=0&Issue=0&Summary=True Summary] at giffordlectures.org {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110614093320/http://www.giffordlectures.org/Browse.asp?PubID=TPNLHU&Volume=0&Issue=0&Summary=True | date=2011-06-14 }} by Brannon Hancock.</ref> Others who have written about the embodied mind include philosopher [[Andy Clark]] (See his ''Being There''), philosophers and neurobiologists [[Humberto Maturana]] and [[Francisco Varela]] and Varela's student [[Evan Thompson]],<ref>Varela, Thompson & [[Eleanor Rosch|Rosch]]: ''The Embodied Mind''</ref> roboticists such as [[Rodney Brooks]], [[Rolf Pfeifer]] and [[Tom Ziemke]], the physicist [[David Bohm]] (see his ''Thought As A System''), [[Ray Gibbs]] (see his ''Embodiment and Cognitive Science''), [[John Grinder]] and [[Richard Bandler]] in their [[neuro-linguistic programming]], and [[Julian Jaynes]]. The work of these writers can be traced back to earlier philosophical writings, most notably in the [[Phenomenology (philosophy)|phenomenological]] tradition, such as [[Maurice Merleau-Ponty]] (1908–1961) and [[Martin Heidegger|Heidegger]] (1889–1976). The basic thesis of "embodied mind" is also traceable to the American contextualist or pragmatist tradition, notably to [[John Dewey]] in such works as ''[[Art as Experience]]'' (1934).