Editing Hawthorn Ridge Redoubt (section)

==Prelude==

===German preparations===

[[File:Map commune FR insee code 80753.png|thumb|{{centre|Map of Beaumont-Hamel}}]]
The headwaters of the [[Ancre]] river flow west to Hamel through the Ancre valley, past Miraumont, Grandcourt, Beaucourt and St. Pierre Divion. On the north bank, pointing south-east, lie the Auchonvillers spur, with a lower area known as Hawthorn Ridge, Beaucourt spur descending from Colincamps and Grandcourt spur crowned with the village of [[Serre-lès-Puisieux|Serre]]. Shallow valleys link the spurs, the village of Beaumont-Hamel lies in the valley between Auchonvillers and Beaucourt spurs. A branch in the valley known as Y Ravine lies on the side of Hawthorn Ridge. In 1916, the front of VIII Corps lay opposite the line from Beaucourt to Serre, facing the series of ridges and valleys, beyond the German positions to the east. The German front line ran along the eastern slope of Auchonvillers spur, round the west end of Y Ravine to Hawthorn Ridge, across the valley of Beaumont-Hamel to the part of Beaucourt spur known as Redan Ridge, to the top of the Beaucourt valley to Serre. An intermediate line known to the British as Munich Trench began at Beaucourt Redoubt and ran north to Serre. The second position ran from Grandcourt to Puisieux and the third position was {{cvt|3|mi}} further back.{{sfn|Edmonds|1993|pp=424–425}}

[[File:Hawthorn Ridge (1 July 1916).png|thumb|{{centre|Map of the Hawthorn Ridge sector on 1 July 1916, British line in red, German blue; German barbed wire: dotted blue}}]]
No man's land was about {{cvt|500|yd}} wide from the Ancre northwards and narrowed to about {{cvt|200|yd}} beyond the redoubt on Hawthorn Ridge. The ground was flat and unobstructed, except for a sunken road from the Auchonvillers–Beaumont-Hamel road and a low bank near the German front trench. The German front had several shallow salients, flanks, a [[bastion]] at the west end of Y Ravine and cover in the valleys to the east. Beaumont-Hamel commanded the valley, which the VIII Corps divisions were to cross and had been fortified. Beaucourt Ridge further back, gave a commanding view to German artillery observers, who could see the gun flashes of British field artillery, despite the guns being dug in. British observers could not see beyond the German support trenches and the convex slope on the British side of no man's land, making it difficult for heavy artillery to hit the front position, parts of which were untouched by the preliminary bombardment.{{sfn|Edmonds|1993|pp=424–425}}

As signs of an Allied offensive increased during 1916, the lessons of the [[Second Battle of Artois]] and the [[Battle of Hébuterne]] in 1915, were incorporated into the defences of the Somme front.{{sfn|Humphries|Maker|2010|p=199}}{{efn|From {{nowrap|7 to 13 June}} 1915, the Second Army attacked a German salient on a {{cvt|1.2|mi}} front at Toutvent Farm near Serre, against the [[52nd Infantry Division (German Empire)|52nd Division]] and gained {{cvt|900|m|order=flip}} on a {{cvt|2|km|order=flip}} front, leaving a salient known as the {{lang|de|Heidenkopf}} north of the Auchonvillers–Beaumont-Hamel road, at a cost of {{nowrap|10,351 casualties,}} {{nowrap|1,760 being}} killed; German casualties were {{circa| 4,000 men.}}{{sfn|Humphries|Maker|2010|p=199}}}} Observation posts were built in each defence sector, more barbed wire was laid and more {{lang|de|Moritz}} telephone interception stations were installed, at the same time that more emphasis was laid on German telephone security. In early March and from {{nowrap|15 to 19 May,}} the chief engineer of the [[2nd Army (German Empire)|2nd Army]] inspected the first position in the area of the 26th Reserve Division; only in the area of RIR 119 at Beaumont-Hamel and the trenches to the west around Hawthorn Ridge Redoubt, were there enough shell-proof concrete posts. German infantry made a great effort to gather intelligence, patrol and raid the British lines to snatch prisoners; the British became more experienced in responding to local attacks and began to use the same tactics. In May, Soden wrote that at least {{nowrap|10,000 rounds}} of artillery ammunition were necessary, to ensure the success of a raid. On the night of {{nowrap|10/11 June,}} a raiding party of RIR 119 failed to get forward when the German artillery fired short.{{sfn|Sheldon|2006|pp=112–115}}

===British preparations===

[[File:Battle of the Somme 1916 - H3 (Hawthorn Ridge Redoubt) mine, Beaumont-Hamel.jpg|thumb|{{centre|Plan of the ''H3'' mine placed beneath the Hawthorn Ridge Redoubt}}]]
Special arrangements were made by the 29th Division to capture Hawthorn Ridge Redoubt. Three tunnels were dug under no man's land by [[Tunnelling companies of the Royal Engineers|tunnellers of the Royal Engineers]]. The first tunnel was to be a communication link to the [[sunken lane|Sunken Lane]] (shown in the film [[The Battle of the Somme (film)|The Battle of the Somme]], released in August 1916). British units had just moved into the Sunken Lane and the tunnel constructed by [[252nd Tunnelling Company]] served to link it with the old British front line. In the early hours of 1 July, the 1st Battalion, [[The Lancashire Fusiliers]] were to use it to reach the Sunken Lane, ready to attack Beaumont-Hamel. Two other tunnels, First Avenue and Mary, named after the communications trenches leading into them, were [[Sapping|Russian saps]] dug to within {{cvt|30|yd|m}} of the German front line, ready to be opened at {{nowrap|2:00 a.m.}} on 1 July, as emplacements for batteries of [[Stokes mortar]]s.{{sfn|Edmonds|1993|pp=429–431}}{{sfn|Gliddon|2016|p=78}}

The 252nd Tunnelling Company placed mine H3 north of First Avenue and Mary, beneath the German stronghold on the ridge. The miners had dug a gallery for about {{cvt|1000|yd}} from the British lines about {{cvt|57|ft}} underground beneath Hawthorn Ridge Redoubt on the crest of the ridge and charged it with {{cvt|40000|lb|LT+t}} of [[Ammonal]]. The [[VIII Corps (United Kingdom)|VIII Corps]] commander, Lieutenant-General [[Aylmer Hunter-Weston]], wanted the mine to be sprung four hours before the offensive began so that the crater could be captured and consolidated in time for the alarm on the German side to have died down.{{efn|The plan was quashed at the headquarters of the [[British Expeditionary Force (World War I)|British Expeditionary Force]] (GHQ) after the Inspector of Mines pointed out that the British had never managed to reach a mine crater before the Germans and that the mine should be detonated at zero hour.{{sfn|Edmonds|1993|p=430}}}} On 15 June, the [[Fourth Army (United Kingdom)|Fourth Army]] headquarters, ruled that [[Mines on the first day of the Somme|all the mines]] on 1 July should be blown no later than eight minutes before zero; an unsatisfactory compromise was reached with Hunter-Weston to detonate the Hawthorn Redoubt mine ten minutes before zero hour.{{sfn|Edmonds|1993|pp=429–430}}

An earlier detonation of the H3 mine in the VIII Corps sector was expected to divert German attention to the north bank of the Ancre, which would help the attacks of [[X Corps (United Kingdom)|X Corps]] and [[XV Corps (United Kingdom)|XV Corps]] further south, where success was more important. Opinion in the 29th Division was that time was needed for the débris from the ''great mine'' to fall to earth, although it was demonstrated that all but dust had returned to the ground within twenty seconds. Firing the mine early conformed to the plan to occupy the crater quickly but it required the heavy artillery bombardment of the redoubt and adjacent trenches to lift during the assault. All of the VIII Corps heavy artillery was ordered to lift at {{nowrap|7:20 a.m.}} and the field artillery to lift at {{nowrap|7:25 a.m.}} A light [[Shrapnel shell|shrapnel]] barrage fired by the divisional field artillery was to continue on the front trench until zero hour; in the 29th Division sector, half of the guns were to lift three minutes early.{{sfn|Edmonds|1993|pp=430–431}}

===British plan===
The 29th and [[4th Division (United Kingdom)|4th divisions]] were to advance east across the valley of Beaumont-Hamel to an intermediate line on Beaucourt spur and then advance to the second position in {{frac|3|1|2}} hours. British artillery fire would lift off the German front trench at zero hour and the field artillery was to move eastwards in six lifts, from the first objective {{nowrap|15–20 minutes}} after zero and then lift in succession after about twenty minutes on each of the further objectives, the heavy artillery lifting five minutes earlier each time. The divisional field artillery was to lift for {{cvt|100|yd}} as each infantry advance began and then move east at {{cvt|50|yd}} per minute. Each division was to reserve two 18-pounder batteries ready to advance at short notice; visual signalling, runners, flares, signals to contact patrol aircraft and wide-angle signalling lamps were provided. Bombers (hand-grenade specialists in the infantry) carried flags to mark the front line.{{sfn|Edmonds|1993|pp=426–429}}