Editing Hermann Hoth (section)

== World War II==
===Invasions of Poland and France===
Hoth was given command of the [[XV Army Corps (Wehrmacht)|XV Motorised Corps]] in 1938, leading it in the [[invasion of Poland]] the following year.{{sfn|Heiber|2004|p=938}} At the time, this corps included two "light" divisions which were mixed formations of tanks, infantry, and artillery.{{sfn|Zetterling|2017|loc=Chapter 4}} Convinced of Hitler's capability as leader, Hoth believed the new war served a higher purpose and would decide the fate of the German people.{{sfn|Hürter|2007|pp=160-161}} Under Hoth's command, the XV Motorised Corps initially encountered only light resistance and quickly advanced.{{sfn|Forczyk|2019|p=209}} By 4 September 1939, Hoth's corps had routed three [[Polish Land Forces|Polish]] [[Division (military)|divisions]] belonging to [[Operational Group Kielce]] and broke through towards the important industrial center of [[Kielce]].{{sfn|Forczyk|2019|pp=256–258}} Afterwards, Hoth's XV Motorised Corps "relentlessly hound[ed] [[Antoni Szylling|Szylling]]'s [[Kraków Army|Army Kraków]] to extinction".{{sfn|Forczyk|2019|p=330}} Historian Robert Forczyk described Hoth as a "hard-charging" commander during the invasion of [[Second Polish Republic|Poland]],{{sfn|Forczyk|2019|p=268}} and he received the [[Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross]] for his military achievements during this campaign.{{sfn|LeMO|2016}}{{sfn|Miller|2006|p=9}} Hoth believed that the XV Motorised Corps, including its "light" divisions, had "exceeded high expectations" during the invasion of Poland. Despite this, his corps' light divisions were transformed into panzer divisions for the following Western campaign, possibly due to suffering "unnecessarily high losses".{{sfn|Zetterling|2017|loc=Chapter 4}}

Hoth continued to lead the XV Army Corps during the [[Battle of France|invasion of France]] from May 1940.{{sfn|Heiber|2004|p=938}} The initial German advance of ''Generaloberst'' [[Günther von Kluge]]'s [[4th Army (Wehrmacht)|4th Army]] through the Ardennes was spearheaded by ''General der Panzertruppe'' Guderian's XIX Motorised Corps on the left and Hoth's corps on the right. Hoth's corps consisted of the [[5th Panzer Division (Wehrmacht)|5th]] and [[7th Panzer Division (Wehrmacht)|7th Panzer Division]]s, the latter commanded by ''Generalmajor'' [[Erwin Rommel]].{{sfn|Heiber|2004|p=938}}{{sfn|Forczyk|2017a|p=158}}{{sfn|Zetterling|2017|loc=Chapter 4}} After moving through the Ardennes, Hoth was tasked with capturing crossings of the [[Meuse]] near [[Dinant]]. His forces quickly secured two bridgeheads across the river on 12/13 May, exploiting the disorganization and overextension of the local [[French Army]] units.{{sfn|Forczyk|2017a|pp=165–166}} Initially confined to the bridgeheads due to the resistance organized by the [[102nd Fortress Division (France)|102nd Fortress Division]],{{sfn|Forczyk|2017a|p=175}} the XV Motorised Corps broke through and was pushing into the French [[9th Army (France)|9th Army]]'s left flank by 14/15 May.{{sfn|Forczyk|2017a|pp=182, 185}} French counter-attacks near [[Maubeuge]] on 18 May temporarily threatened Hoth's advance, but ultimately failed to stop the XV Motorised Corps,{{sfn|Forczyk|2017a|pp=199–200}} allowing it to capture [[Cambrai]]. Amid continuing Allied counter-attacks Hoth subsequently moved toward [[Arras]] which the Germans [[Battle of Arras (1940)|captured on 21 May]].{{sfn|Forczyk|2017a|pp=201, 208–210}} In the [[Battle of Dunkirk]], Hoth's corps broke through the [[British Expeditionary Force (World War II)|British Expeditionary Force]]'s defensive line at La Bassée Canal on 27 May,{{sfn|Forczyk|2017a|p=220}} thus assisting in encircling the French [[1st Army (France)|1st Army]] under [[René Prioux]] at [[Lille]].{{sfn|Dildy|2014|p=87}}{{sfn|Forczyk|2017a|p=220}}

On 6–7 June, Hoth's divisions achieved a major breakthrough at [[Airaines]] and then [[Forges-les-Eaux]], effectively splitting the French [[10th Army (France)|10th Army]] into two parts.{{sfn|Forczyk|2017a|pp=280, 292, 297–299}} After capturing Airaines, soldiers of the XV Corps murdered French prisoners of war, mainly black [[French colonial empire|colonial soldiers]] such as [[Charles N'Tchoréré]].{{sfn|Forczyk|2017a|p=298}}{{sfn|Scheck|2005|pp=330–331}} The German units, including XV Motorised Corps, exploited the breakthrough to occupy [[Rouen]]{{sfn|Forczyk|2017a|pp=310–312}} and encircle a large Allied force at [[Saint-Valery-en-Caux]], capturing about 10,000 British soldiers.{{sfn|Forczyk|2017a|pp=314–315}} Afterwards, Hoth's corps broke through Allied defensive lines at the [[Seine]]. He then split his forces in order to capture important locations in [[Brittany]] and [[Normandy]], before advancing south to [[La Rochelle]].{{sfn|Forczyk|2017a|pp=366, 390–391}} His successes in France made Hoth one of the Wehrmacht's most popular generals.{{sfn|Hürter|2007|p=171}} He was promoted to ''[[Generaloberst]]'' in July 1940,{{sfn|Heiber|2004|p=938}} as part of an "orgy of promotions" by Hitler.{{sfn|NMT|1951|pp=102}}

===Operation Barbarossa===
==== Leading the 3rd Panzer Group ====
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 101I-265-0024-21A, Russland, Generäle Guderian und Hoth.jpg|thumb|Hoth (right) with [[Heinz Guderian]], commander of [[Panzer Group 2]], 21 June 1941]]
Hoth commanded the [[3rd Panzer Group]] during [[Operation Barbarossa]] in 1941.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2015|p=88}}{{sfn|Hürter|2007|p=4}} This unit included the [[XXXIX Panzer Corps]], [[LVII Panzer Corps]], [[V Army Corps (Wehrmacht)|V Army Corps]], and [[VI Army Corps (Wehrmacht)|VI Army Corps]]{{sfn|Kirchubel|2007|p=30}} which consisted of four Panzer divisions (7th, [[12th Panzer Division (Wehrmacht)|12th]], [[19th Panzer Division (Wehrmacht)|19th]], and [[20th Panzer Division (Wehrmacht)|20th]]),{{sfn|Zetterling|2017|loc=Chapter 6, Section 'Stary Bychóv'}}{{sfn|Kirchubel|2007|p=30}} three motorized divisions ([[14th Infantry Division (Wehrmacht)|14th]], [[20th Infantry Division (Wehrmacht)|20th]], 18th), and four infantry divisions ([[5th Jäger Division (Wehrmacht)|5th]], [[6th Infantry Division (Wehrmacht)|6th]], [[26th Infantry Division (Wehrmacht)|26th]], [[35th Infantry Division (Wehrmacht)|35th]]).{{sfn|Kirchubel|2007|p=30}} The 3rd Panzer Group fielded 626 tanks at the offensive's start.{{sfn|Stahel|2013|p=42}} In his diaries, Hoth expressed no doubts about or opposition to the invasion, mirroring the opinion of most high-ranking German commanders.{{sfn|Hürter|2007|p=10}} From a moral and ideological standpoint, Hoth believed that Russia had been overtaken by "[[Jewish Bolshevism]]", causing the country to turn away from its European heritage, transforming it into an expansionist, Asiatic, and despotic state as well as setting it on an unavoidable collision course with Germany. Hürter argued that Hoth's beliefs showcased remarkable similarities with Hitler's. Even after the war, Hoth continued to maintain that the invasion had been just based on these arguments.{{sfn|Hürter|2007|p=214}} Despite his belief in the necessity of the invasion, Hoth had misgivings about its strategic planning and execution. He tried to convince his superior, ''Generalfeldmarschall'' [[Fedor von Bock]], commander of [[Army Group Center]], that the 3rd Panzer Group had to operate with greater flexibility and prepare to strike deeper into the Soviet Union than intended by the [[Oberkommando des Heeres|high command]] (OKH). Bock rebuffed these requests.{{sfn|Hürter|2007|p=227}} Regardless of his misgivings, Hoth generally adhered to the decided-upon plans and Bock's commands during the invasion. Researcher Robert Kirchubel described him as a "team player" and reliable in crisis situations during Operation Barbarossa.{{sfn|Kirchubel|2007|p=16}}

In course of the early stages of Operation Barbarossa, Hoth's 3rd Panzer Group broke through the Soviet border defenses with relative ease. Bock consequently released Hoth from the [[9th Army (Wehrmacht)|9th Army]], allowing him to operate more freely.{{sfn|Kirchubel|2007|pp=33, 35}} Guderian's [[2nd Panzer Group]]{{sfn|Zetterling|2017|loc=Chapter 6, Section 'Stary Bychóv'}} and Hoth's 3rd Panzer Group proceeded to encircle [[Minsk]] as part of Army Group Center's operations,{{sfn|Glantz|House|2015|p=88}}{{sfn|Hürter|2007|p=283}}{{sfn|Beevor|1999|p=21}} trapping 300,000 [[Red Army]] soldiers and capturing or destroying 2,500 tanks.{{sfn|Beevor|1999|p=21}} At this point, Hoth again argued that the 3rd Panzer Group should move deeper into the Soviet territory and encircle more enemy troops before closing the pocket. This time he was supported by Bock, but they were overruled by the OKH.{{sfn|Hürter|2007|p=284}} Alongside Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group, Hoth then pushed further to [[Battle of Smolensk (1941)|attack Smolensk]], believing that they had to continue their advance to not allow the Red Army to reorganize.{{sfn|Kirchubel|2007|p=47}} Before reaching the city, the panzer groups of Guderian and Hoth had almost outrun their supply lines, but were able to keep moving thanks to captured Soviet fuel depots. Hoth split his force into two, and secured vital crossings of the [[Daugava]] river on 3–4 July.{{sfn|Zetterling|2017|loc=Chapter 6, Section 'Stary Bychóv'}} His panzer group then kept advancing between the Daugava and [[Dnieper]], capturing [[Vitebsk]].{{sfn|Zetterling|2017|loc=Chapter 6, Section 'Peremerka'}} The breakthrough of Hoth's 3rd Panzer Group at the Daugava-Dnieper line allowed for the encirclement of three Soviet armies.{{sfn|Kirchubel|2007|p=54}}{{sfn|Stahel|2009|p=220}}

As the Wehrmacht advanced, questions arose about the treatment of suspected Red Army soldiers or deserters in civilian clothing. Hoth ordered the 3rd Panzer Group's officers to subject such individuals to a limited examination; if the officers concluded that the prisoners were Red Army soldiers, they were to be shot.{{sfn|Hürter|2007|pp=367–368}} Like all German armies on the Eastern Front, Hoth's Panzer Group also implemented the [[Commissar Order]].{{sfn|Stahel|2015|p=28}} Following the war, Hoth was the only German general who admitted that he had agreed with the order, believing that the Soviet [[political commissar]]s could not be regarded as regular soldiers.{{sfn|Hürter|2007|pp=259, 395}} According to reports from subordinate units, the order was carried out on a widespread basis.{{sfn|Hebert|2010|p=259}}

In mid-July 1941, the 3rd Panzer Group was subordinated to [[Army Group North]] to shore up the flanks and attempted to seize [[Velikie Luki]].{{sfn|Glantz|House|2015|p=88}}{{sfn|Zetterling|2017|loc=Chapter 6, Section 'The Kiev Pocket'}} This was part of a larger operation aimed at seizing [[Leningrad]].{{sfn|Beevor|1999|p=33}} Hoth's forces were driven back on 20 July when Red Army forces broke through the German lines, prompting criticism from Bock for unnecessarily striking out too far to the north east.{{sfn|Stahel|2009}} In early August, Hitler ordered a southward diversion of the German advance at [[Bryansk]] to the objection of many leading German officers, including Hoth, who advocated for a continued direct drive to [[Moscow]].{{sfn|Jukes|2011|loc=Chapter 2}} In mid to late August, Hoth's forces faced another setback owing to heavy losses and dispersal of efforts: facing the heavily reinforced Soviet [[19th Army (Soviet Union)|19th Army]], he committed the 7th Panzer Division without infantry support, which resulted in what the historian [[David Stahel]] describes as a "debacle". The division's attack ran into fortified Soviet lines and was repulsed with the loss of 30 tanks.{{sfn|Stahel|2009|p=408}} By September, the constant fighting had heavily depleted Hoth's force, as the 3rd Panzer Group had only about 250 tanks remaining.{{sfn|Stahel|2013|p=42}} Hoth's panzer group subsequently assisted in [[Battle of Moscow|Operation Typhoon]], the offensive to capture Moscow.{{sfn|Beevor|1999|p=33}} Stationed on the left flank, his force and the 9th Army were supposed to attack from [[Dukhovshchina, Smolensk Oblast|Dukhovshchina]] toward [[Vyazma]].{{sfn|Stahel|2013|p=49}} As the plans for Operation Typhoon were discussed by the OKH and frontline commanders, Hoth argued for a delay of one day regarding the offensive, but was overruled.{{sfn|Stahel|2013|p=49}}

At the start of Operation Typhoon, the 3rd Panzer Group made good progress,{{sfn|Stahel|2013|p=56}} though was slowed down by Soviet air attacks and the worn-down state of some of its units.{{sfn|Stahel|2013|p=60}} Hoth's force and the 9th Army successfully captured two bridges across the Dnieper east of [[Kholm-Zhirkovsky (urban locality)|Kholm-Zhirkovsky]] and were just {{Convert|60|km|mi|abbr=}} from Vyazma, close to achieving another encirclement, when they were stopped by counter-attacks ordered by General [[Ivan Konev]] on 3 October.{{sfn|Stahel|2013|p=62}} The resulting fighting and the exhaustion of its fuel supplies pinned down the 3rd Panzer Group until 6 October,{{sfn|Stahel|2013|p=65}} when Hoth was able to restart the advance and sealed the [[Battle of Moscow#Battles of Vyazma and Bryansk|Vyazma-Bryansk pockets]].{{sfn|Stahel|2013|p=77}} He was then redirected north to capture [[Rzhev]] and [[Tver|Kalinin]], even though this effectively removed the 3rd Panzer Group from the Battle of Moscow. Hitler and the OKH believed that the "fatal blow" to the Red Army had been already delivered at Vyazma-Bryansk, and hoped for more great encirclements.{{sfn|Stahel|2013|p=81}}

==== Appointment as 17th Army commander ====
On 9 October, Hoth was appointed commander of the [[17th Army (Wehrmacht)|17th Army]] in [[Ukraine]].{{sfn|Hebert|2010|p=213}}{{sfn|Stahel|2013|p=85}} This army's previous commander, [[Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel]], had been criticized for his "timid leadership", and the OKH deemed Hoth to be the right individual to get the 17th Army to advance more aggressively. This decision was motivated by the assessment of Army Group North commander [[Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb]] who had lauded Hoth as "intelligent, deliberate, good mind for operational questions, leads very well", and "suitable as an army commander". Even though the appointment as 17th Army head was a promotion, Hoth unsuccessfully asked to remain with the 3rd Panzer Group; Fedor von Bock also expressed his opposition, not wanting to lose an "outstanding armoured commander".{{sfn|Stahel|2013|pp=84–85}} Upon moving to the 17th Army, Hoth ordered an advance against [[Lozova]], taking it after two days of fighting. He then split the army to attack both [[Izium]] as well as [[Donetsk|Stalino]]. However, the German operations in the region slowed down due to bad weather and the widespread destruction of infrastructure, causing Hitler to order a focus on [[Kharkov]]. The 17th Army was supposed to help in this operation as well, forcing it to attack in three directions.{{sfn|Kirchubel|2003|p=76}} Spread across a wide area, Hoth's force also encountered heavy resistance as the Red Army mobilized about 150,000 workers to assist the defense of the [[Donbas]]. Though the 17th Army ultimately captured most of the middle [[Don (river)|Don]], its advance was slow and costly.{{sfn|Kirchubel|2003|p=77}} Eventually, Hoth argued for a pause of offensive operations due to logistical issues and the exhaustion of his troops.{{sfn|Hürter|2007|p=308}}

[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 101I-031-2436-01A, Russland, Hinrichtung von Partisanen.jpg|thumb|left|Execution of [[Soviet partisans]] by German forces]]

Hoth was an active supporter of the [[Eastern Front (World War II)|war of annihilation]] (''{{interlanguage link|Vernichtungskrieg|de|Vernichtungskrieg}}'') against the Soviet Union, calling on his men to understand the need for "harsh punishment of Jewry". Under Hoth's command, units of the 17th Army took part in the hunt for and murder of Jews in its territory of control.{{sfn|Hebert|2010|p=273}}{{sfn|Mitcham|2008|p=537}} He had a good working relationship with the ''[[Einsatzgruppen]]'' [[death squad]]s, and provided them with even more support than Stülpnagel as they carried out mass murders in the 17th Army's rear areas.{{sfn|Pohl|2011|p=268}} In response to the issuance of the [[Severity Order]] by [[Walter von Reichenau]], Hoth issued an order of the day in November 1941. The document began with a relatively lengthy discussion of history, decrying Jewish influence on Europe, before extolling recent German victories as part of a mission to "save European culture from Asiatic barbarism" and promising the impending collapse and complete "annihilation" of the Soviet Union, an "enslaved and joyless country".{{sfn|Stein|2007|p=309}} Finally, he gave the following directive to troops under his command:{{sfn|Burleigh|1997|p=69}}

{{blockquote|Every sign of active or passive resistance or any sort of machinations on the part of Jewish-Bolshevik agitators are to be immediately and pitilessly exterminated ... These circles are the intellectual supports of Bolshevism, the bearers of its murderous organisation, the helpmates of the partisans. It is the same Jewish class of beings who have done so much damage to our own Fatherland by virtue of their activities against the nation and civilisation, and who promote anti-German tendencies throughout the world, and who will be the harbingers of revenge. Their extermination is a dictate of our own survival.}}

Hürter argued that this order reflected that Hoth was fully aware of the ongoing [[Holocaust]], and evidently urged his troops to kill Jews not just due to their alleged support for anti-German elements, but also to prevent them from taking revenge in the future.{{sfn|Hürter|2007|pp=575–576}} According to researcher Linden Lyons, the order reflected Hoth's "obsequiousness" to Hitler, a tendency to blame the German "national trauma" of World War I on Jewish Bolshevism, and an attempt to "outdo" the extremity of Reichenau's order.{{sfn|Lyons|2015|p=163}} Researcher and Manstein biographer Marcel Stein argued that the order as a whole "can cast doubt upon Hoth's sanity" and was "full of repetitive venom and hatred".{{sfn|Stein|2007|p=41}}

Based on his order's reasoning and claiming that the Red Army was also operating with extreme brutality, Hoth additionally ordered the 17th Army's soldiers to kill all suspected [[Soviet partisans|partisans]]. He advised subordinate officers to cultivate the growing hatred for Soviet troops among the common German soldiers.{{sfn|Hürter|2007|pp=372–373}} Hoth also ordered the shooting of any civilians encountered in the woods, as these could potentially support or be partisans.{{sfn|Hürter|2007|p=420}} He also agreed with and ordered the mass requisitioning of food, despite causing starvation in occupied cities.{{sfn|Hürter|2007|pp=452–453, 496}} In his diaries, Hoth expressed his belief that leniency was the main reason for resistance in the rear areas; accordingly the German security forces should exterminate any opposition without mercy.{{sfn|Hürter|2007|p=420}} In December 1941, the ''Einsatzgruppen'', namely [[List of Einsatzgruppen|''Sonderkommando 4b'' and ''Einsatzkommando 6'']], initiated a series of massacres in the 17th Army's rear areas in the Donbas, killing thousands of civilians.{{sfn|Pohl|2011|p=268}} At the same time, Hoth moderated some of the most extreme orders from the OKH; for instance, he ordered his troops to not treat Ukraine as a colony, and to show local civilians some respect. Hoth believed that the [[Ukrainians]] would become part of the new order in Europe.{{sfn|Hürter|2007|p=462}}

===Operations in 1942===
==== Soviet winter offensive and Case Blue ====
In early January 1942, Hoth became the acting commander of the entire [[Army Group South]], just before the start of the Soviet winter offensives.{{sfn|Ziemke|Bauer|1987|pp=155–156}} In the [[Barvenkovo–Lozovaya offensive]], the Red Army successfully drove the 17th Army back and created a bulge in the German frontline around Izium.{{sfn|Ziemke|Bauer|1987|pp=155–156}}{{sfn|Citino|2009}}{{sfn|Hürter|2007|p=343}} Hoth's requests to orderly retreat during this campaign were denied by Bock who had assumed control of Army Group South.{{sfn|Hürter|2007|p=343}} As the Soviet military had greatly enlarged the Izium bridgehead by 25 January, Hoth told Bock that the 17th Army should focus on defending [[Dnipro]]petrovsk and that only two options remained to the German defenders: a "desperate" counter-attack to stop the Red Army from reaching Dnipropetrovsk or the "quick" shifting of troops from other areas to shore up the defenses along the bulge. Bock interpreted these proposals as Hoth threatening to move his entire army westward, and ordered him to remain where he was until reserves arrived.{{sfn|Ziemke|Bauer|1987|pp=158–159}} Concluding that Hoth and his staff were "overtired", Bock also decided to temporarily transfer the 17th Army's leadership to [[Paul Ludwig Ewald von Kleist]].{{sfn|Hürter|2007|p=343}} "Less a [[prima donna]] than many German army commanders," Hoth did not oppose this change.{{sfn|Ziemke|Bauer|1987|p=159}} Despite having been temporarily replaced, he avoided being sacked, and helped to stabilize the southern frontline after the Germans [[Battle of Rostov (1941)|lost]] [[Rostov-on-Don]].{{sfn|Forczyk|2021|p=11}} In the [[Second Battle of Kharkov]] during May 1942, Hoth initially led the 17th Army,{{sfn|Jukes|2011|loc=Chapter 3}} but took over from General [[Richard Ruoff]] as commander of [[4th Panzer Army]] on 15 May 1942.{{sfn|Hürter|2007|p=635}}

[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 101I-216-0412-07, Russland, brennender russischer Panzer KW 1.jpg|thumb|Destroyed [[Red Army]] [[KV-1]] tank during the [[Battle of Voronezh (1942)|Battle of Voronezh]]. ]]

As part of [[Case Blue]], the German summer offensive in the southern Soviet Union, Hoth demonstrated "great operational command skill".{{sfn|Forczyk|2021|p=11}} Under his leadership, the 4th Panzer Army initially broke through the Soviet defensive lines of the [[Bryansk Front]] at the start of Case Blue on 28 June 1942,{{sfn|Forczyk|2021|pp=35–36}} making quick progress despite Soviet counter-attacks.{{sfn|Forczyk|2021|pp=36–39}}{{sfn|Beevor|1999|p=72}} The army reached the [[Don River (Russia)|Don River]] and [[Battle of Voronezh (1942)|assaulted]] [[Voronezh]] by 5 July; Hoth's force quickly secured most of the city.{{sfn|Forczyk|2021|pp=43–45}} Significant pockets of resistance remained in the city, but Hitler ordered Hoth to keep advancing.{{sfn|Beevor|1999|p=74}} The Soviet military responded by launching a counter-offensive led by [[Alexander Lizyukov]] to retake Voronezh.{{sfn|Forczyk|2021|pp=45–47}} The OKH initially did not recognize that the 4th Panzer Army faced an entire Soviet tank army and several tank corps,{{sfn|Forczyk|2021|pp=48–49}} and dismissed the counter-offensive as "insignificant".{{sfn|Glantz|House|2009|p=158}} The 4th Panzer Army was thus not properly reinforced, but Hoth was still able to organize an effective defense. By 15 July, the Soviet counter-offensive had been repulsed, and the 4th Panzer Army was advancing again.{{sfn|Forczyk|2021|pp=48–49}}

Hoth and his force were subsequently redirected by Hitler to support [[Army Group A]] in the Donbas,{{sfn|Forczyk|2021|p=50}}{{sfn|Beevor|1999|p=78}}{{sfn|Glantz|House|2009|p=192}} disregarding the original plans of Case Blue in which the 4th Panzer Army would have continued to support the direct advance toward Stalingrad.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2009|p=192}} Though the 4th Panzer Army and other German forces participating in this "gambit" were short on fuel at this time, the redirected attack initially met considerable success. Hoth's force and the [[1st Panzer Army]] encircled five Soviet armies west of [[Millerovo, Millerovsky District, Rostov Oblast|Millerovo]], but the pocket could not be contained and much of the Soviet force was able to retreat.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2009|pp=193, 197–200}} Regardless of the result, this diversion of forces to assist Army Group A had greatly slowed down the direct German advance toward [[Stalingrad]].{{sfn|Beevor|1999|p=78}} Frustrated at this development, Hitler transferred the majority of Hoth's force to help the [[6th Army (Wehrmacht)|6th Army]]'s attempt to capture [[Battle of Stalingrad|Stalingrad]], leaving 4th Panzer Army with just two corps and some support forces.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2009|pp=200, 208}} On 31 July, most of the remaining 4th Panzer Army was also reassigned to the 6th Army,{{sfn|Glantz|House|2009|p=271}}{{sfn|Forczyk|2021|p=60}}{{sfn|Beevor|1999|p=95}} though Hoth was ordered to leave one panzer corps behind in the south.{{sfn|Beevor|1999|p=113}} This reorganization was received poorly by the 4th Panzer Army, as its members had expected to be used in the pursuit of Soviet forces over open terrain into the [[Caucasus]] instead of having to take part in [[urban warfare]]. On his part, Hoth reacted to the change of plans by working out an operation of the 4th Panzer Army to encircle Stalingrad.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2009|p=277}}

[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 101I-218-0543-10, Russland-Süd, Erich v. Manstein, Hermann Hoth.jpg|left|thumb|Hoth (right) with [[Erich von Manstein]] during [[Case Blue]], June 1942 ]]

Hoth's tanks attempted to flank Stalingrad from the south-west through the [[Kalmyk Steppe]], forcing the Soviet [[Stalingrad Front]] commander [[Andrey Yeryomenko]] to concentrate most of his forces to slow down the 4th Panzer Army.{{sfn|Beevor|1999|pp=100, 108}} With his force being reduced to two corps and facing growing Soviet resistance, the advance of Hoth's troops slowed down.{{sfn|Beevor|1999|p=113}} The encirclement attempt had failed by 11 August, as Hoth had too few forces to overcome the increasingly effective Soviet defenses. Thus, the panzer army was redirected to take part in the direct attack on Stalingrad.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2009|pp=289–290, 481}} From 17 August to 2 September, it advanced northward, helping to take off pressure from the 6th Army and breaking through several Soviet armies despite being weakened in manpower and tank numbers.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2009|pp=364–365}} By the time it fully linked up with the 6th Army and had reached Stalingrad's outskirts, the 4th Panzer Army was a "panzer army in name" with just one weakened tank corps.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2009|pp=393–394}}

By mid-September, the 4th Panzer Army attacked Stalingrad's concrete [[grain elevator]]; despite greatly outnumbering the defenders, the Germans only captured the location after an extended battle on 21 September.{{sfn|Beevor|1999|pp=130, 139–140}} At this point, the Red Army was massing forces for large-scale counter-offensives. Most German generals believed the Soviet military to be close to exhaustion and only capable of one offensive, expected to target Army Group Centre. Hoth was one of the few German commanders who realized that a possible Soviet attack from south of Stalingrad could pose a grave threat to the 6th Army.{{sfn|Beevor|1999|pp=227–229}} His warnings regarding the 6th Army's southern flank were largely ignored.{{sfn|Beevor|1999|p=232}} In October, Hitler ordered Hoth to transfer his last full tank division to the 6th Army.{{sfn|Ziemke|Bauer|1987|p=458}}

==== Operations Uranus, Winter Storm, and Little Saturn ====
By 12 November, Hoth had noticed that the Red Army was massing forces opposite 4th Panzer Army and concluded that the Soviet military was evidently not just improving its defenses.{{sfn|Ziemke|Bauer|1987|p=467}} On 19 November 1942, the Soviet [[Operation Uranus]] began with a major attack on [[Third Army (Romania)|Romanian Third Army]] in the north. The Third Army was soon overrun, and the Germans responded by shifting forces from the south to reinforce their collapsing left flank. This left their southern flank even more exposed.{{sfn|Beevor|1999|p=239–248}} The Red Army subsequently attacked south of Stalingrad, breaking through Axis lines as Hoth attempted to muster a defense. Even his own headquarters came under threat, and 4th Panzer Army was forced to withdraw.{{sfn|Beevor|1999|pp=249–250}} As the Soviet troops advanced and threatened to encircle the 6th Army, Hitler ordered it to "stand firm" with Hoth being assigned to assist Paulus in keeping the railway lines open.{{sfn|Beevor|1999|p=267}} By late November, however, the 6th Army was trapped in Stalingrad,{{sfn|Beevor|1999|p=291}} as was half of Hoth's 4th Panzer Army.{{sfn|Ziemke|Bauer|1987|p=471}}

Outside the pocket, the remainder of the 4th Panzer Army and the Romanian VI and VII Corps were designated "Army Group Hoth"{{sfn|Ziemke|Bauer|1987|p=478}} and attempted to slow the Red Army's advance north of [[Kotelnikovo, Volgograd Oblast|Kotelnikovo]].{{sfn|Ziemke|2002|p=60}} Hoth subsequently worked out a plan for the 4th Panzer Army to relieve the 6th Army, called [[Operation Winter Storm]], and outlined it on 3 December. However, he did not receive the [[17th Panzer Division (Wehrmacht)|17th Panzer Division]] to complete his strike force on time;{{sfn|Beevor|1999|p=297}} his understrength force began its relief attempt under the overall command of ''Generalfeldmarschall'' [[Erich von Manstein]]'s [[Army Group Don]]{{sfn|Heiber|2004|p=938}}{{sfn|Jukes|2011|loc=Chapter 4}} on 12 December.{{sfn|Beevor|1999|p=297}} Hoth's army was stalled at [[Verkhnekumsky]] until 15 December, allowing the Soviet [[2nd Guards Army]] to reinforce its positions at the Myshkova River and prepare for [[Operation Little Saturn]].{{sfn|Jukes|2011|loc=Chapter 3}}{{sfn|Jukes|2011|loc=Chapter 4}} On 16 December, three Soviet armies began Operation Little Saturn, threatening Army Group Don's flank and stopping the 4th Panzer Army.{{sfn|Beevor|1999|pp=300–301}} By 25 December, Operation Winter Storm had failed, and Manstein ordered Hoth to abandon his breakthrough attempts.{{sfn|Heiber|2004|p=938}}{{sfn|Jukes|2011|loc=Chapter 4}} He was instead directed to help shore up the German defenses as the Soviet Operation Little Saturn threatened Army Group Don's rear.{{sfn|Jukes|2011|loc=Chapter 4}} However, the 4th Panzer Army was no longer in the position to cover a large section of the frontline.{{sfn|Ziemke|Bauer|1987|p=492}} Overall, Hoth's forces suffered heavy losses during these operations and were forced to retreat {{Convert|600|km|mi|abbr=}} into the eastern Ukraine.{{sfn|Forczyk|2017b|p=8}}

===Third Battle of Kharkov===
{{Main article|Third Battle of Kharkov}}
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 101III-Zschaeckel-189-13, Russland, Charkow, Waffen-SS mit Panzer IV.jpg|thumb|Troops of [[2nd SS Panzer Division Das Reich]], then part of [[4th Panzer Army|Hoth's army]], during the [[Third Battle of Kharkov]] ]]

On 18 February, Hoth passed the command of his troops, by then part of the [[Mius-Front]], to [[Karl-Adolf Hollidt]]. He then met with Manstein at Dnipropetrovsk where he was informed that the 4th Panzer Army was being refounded, consisting of two tank corps, two tank divisions, two infantry divisions, and [[Waffen-SS]] units, including the [[II SS Panzer Corps]], [[2nd SS Panzer Division Das Reich|''Das Reich'']] and [[3rd SS Panzer Division Totenkopf|''Totenkopf'']]. Under his command, this force was ordered to halt the Soviet [[1st Guards Army (Soviet Union)|1st Guards]] and [[6th Combined Arms Army|6th Army]] east of Dnipropetrovsk and push them back across the river [[Samara (Volga)|Samara]].{{sfn|Ziemke|2002|p=92}} This operation was part of the [[Third Battle of Kharkov]], a counteroffensive against the Soviet forces advancing in the Donbass region.{{sfn|Citino|2012|pp=66-67}}

The newly refounded 4th Panzer Army launched its attack on 21 February. The German forces cut off the Soviet mobile spearheads and continued the drive north,{{sfn|Citino|2012|pp=68-70}} with Hoth's force starting its attack on Kharkov on 28 February. By early March, however, an early thaw threatened the German advance; Hoth and Manstein decided that the 4th Panzer Army should press on regardless.{{sfn|Ziemke|2002|p=96}} Kharkov was retaken by the Germans on 15 March and [[Belgorod]] on 18 March.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=177}} Exhaustion of both the Wehrmacht and the Red Army coupled with the loss of mobility due to the onset of the spring [[rasputitsa]] resulted in the cessation of operations for both sides by mid-March.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=178}} The counteroffensive left a salient extending into the German area of control, centered around the city of Kursk, and leading up to [[Operation Citadel]].{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=178}}

===Battles of Kursk, the Dnieper, and last commands===
{{Main article|Battle of Kursk|Battle of the Dnieper}}
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 101I-022-2927-26, Russland, Generäle Hoth und v. Manstein.jpg|thumb|left|Hoth (first from left) and other German officers discuss the plans for [[Operation Citadel]]. ]]

In July 1943, Hoth commanded the 4th Panzer Army in the [[Battle of Kursk]] as part of Army Group South. Operation Citadel called for a [[Pincer movement|double envelopment]], directed at Kursk, to surround the Soviet defenders and seal off the salient. The Army Group South committed Hoth's 4th Panzer Army, alongside [[Army Detachment Kempf|Army Detachment ''Kempf'']].{{sfn|Clark|2012|pp=194, 196}} At this point, Hoth was considered one of the Wehrmacht's most experienced senior-level tank commanders, but his leadership was less effective compared to earlier periods of the war. Forczyk argued that Hoth showed signs of "approaching [[Occupational burnout|burnout]]". As the offensive at Kursk was repeatedly delayed, Hoth became increasingly pessimistic about Operation Citadel's chances of success due to the increasing Soviet defenses.{{sfn|Forczyk|2017b|p=8}} Despite this, both Hoth as well as [[Werner Kempf]], commander of the eponymous army detachment, decided not to prepare for obstacle breaching at Kursk, assuming that the German engineers would remove Soviet minefields without much difficulty. They also did not realize the depth and strength of [[Nikolai Vatutin]]'s defense lines.{{sfn|Forczyk|2017b|p=30}} As a result of German mistakes in planning, coordination between Hoth and Kempf would be poor during the offensive, with each fighting a separate battle.{{sfn|Forczyk|2017b|pp=30-31}}

When  Operation Citadel started, Hoth's divisions, reinforced by the II SS Panzer Corps under [[Paul Hausser]], penetrated several Soviet defensive lines, before being brought to a halt in the [[Battle of Prokhorovka]].{{sfn|Clark|2011|pp=187, 330}} This was partially the result of Hoth hesitating to keep advancing as his flanks were threatened by Soviet counter-attacks, while Kempf's force had been unable to keep up.{{sfn|Forczyk|2017b|p=65}} On the other side, Forczyk argued that Hoth "rightly" chose to ignore orders by Manstein to reinforce failing attacks by [[Hermann Breith]].{{sfn|Forczyk|2017b|p=67}} Overall, the Battle of Kursk was a major Soviet victory.{{sfn|Forczyk|2017b|pp=91-92}}

In the aftermath of Kursk, the Red Army mounted a [[Battle of the Dnieper|series of successful offensives]] that crossed the Dnieper.{{sfn|Heiber|2004|p=938}} Hoth was unable to destroy the Soviet bridgeheads across the river.{{sfn|Forczyk|2016|p=50}} In September 1943, Hoth's army was operationally penetrated by Red Army units and was unable to maintain a continuous front line even in retreat. The army crossed the Dnieper south and north of Kiev with heavy losses.{{sfn|Heiber|2004|p=938}} Despite this, he received the [[Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves and Swords]] for this strategic withdrawal and his defense at the Dnieper.{{sfn|Miller|2006|p=9}} In November, the Red Army broke through Hoth's defenses in a surprise offensive which [[Battle of Kiev (1943)|retook Kiev]]{{sfn|Forczyk|2016|pp=71, 74-75}} and ultimately pushed the Germans out of eastern Ukraine.{{sfn|Heiber|2004|p=938}} The rapid loss of Kiev "humiliated" Hoth{{sfn|Forczyk|2016|p=75}} who was blamed by Hitler for this defeat.{{sfn|Forczyk|2016|pp=14, 78}} Historian [[Earl F. Ziemke]] also contended that by this point Hitler "wanted generals who would hold without giving an inch", whereas Hoth was an expert in mobile defense.{{sfn|Ziemke|2002|p=212}} In November 1943, Hoth was put on leave,{{sfn|Hürter|2007|p=635}} officially "to unwind",{{sfn|Ziemke|2002|p=212}} and relieved of command on 10 December 1943.{{sfn|Heiber|2004|p=938}} Forczyk argued that the German failures in the battle of the Dnieper had resulted from both Hitler's interferences in tactical matters as well as the inability of the Wehrmacht commanders, including Hoth, to anticipate Soviet actions. According to him, they had not recognized the rapid improvement of the Red Army.{{sfn|Forczyk|2016|p=92}}

After being removed from his position, Hoth was denounced by Hitler as "a bird of ill-omen" and "an instigator of [[defeatism]] of the worst sort".{{sfn|Ziemke|2002|p=212}} Hoth spent the following time in the ''[[Führerreserve]]''.{{sfn|Hürter|2007|p=635}} Though he was named commander of the [[Ore Mountains]] in April 1944, this position was "completely meaningless".{{sfn|LeMO|2016}} Hoth was only properly recalled in April 1945.{{sfn|Heiber|2004|p=938}} He was appointed commander of the [[Saale]],{{sfn|Hürter|2007|p=635}} and ordered to defend the [[Halle (Saale)|Halle]]-[[Leipzig]] area until the [[12th Army (Wehrmacht)|12th Army]] was combat-ready again. He organized a defensive line at [[Mulde]] and [[Elbe]] and offered some resistance to the advancing [[United States Armed Forces]] before his forces broke.{{sfn|Könau|2015}} Afterwards, he served as commander of the Ore Mountains again before surrendering to [[Military history of the United States during World War II|U.S. American troops]] on 7 May 1945.{{sfn|Hürter|2007|p=635}}