Editing Holodomor (section)

=== Causes ===
{| class="wikitable floatright" style="margin:1em auto 1em 2em; text-align:right;"
 |+ Soviet grain collections and exports<br />''(in thousand tons)''{{sfn|Davies|Tauger|Wheatcroft|1995|p=645}}
!Year ending
!Collections
!Exports
|-
!June 1930
|16081
|1343
|-
!June 1931
|22139
|5832
|-
!June 1932
|22839
|4786
|-
!June 1933
|18513
|1607
|}
{{main|Causes of the Holodomor}}

Olga Andriewsky writes that scholars are in consensus that the [[Causes of the Holodomor|cause of the famine]] was man-made.<ref>{{harvnb|Andriewsky|2015|p=37}}: "Historians of Ukraine are no longer debating whether the Famine was the result of natural causes (and even then not exclusively by them). The academic debate appears to come down to the issue of intentions, to whether the special measures undertaken in Ukraine in the winter of 1932–33 that intensified starvation were aimed at Ukrainians as such."</ref> The term "man-made" is, however, questioned by historians such as [[R. W. Davies]] and [[Stephen Wheatcroft]], according to whom those who use this term "underestimate the role of{{nbsp}}... natural causes",<ref>{{cite book|last1=Davies |first1=Robert |author1-link=R. W. Davies |last2=Wheatcroft |first2=Stephen |author2-link=Stephen G. Wheatcroft |date=2016|title=The Years of Hunger: Soviet Agriculture, 1931–1933|publisher=[[Palgrave Macmillan]] |isbn=9780230273979|quote=Western commentators and historians long debated whether the famine was man-made{{nbsp}}... Russian historians sometimes call the famine "rukotvornyi" – man-made {{nbsp}}... But in our opinion they and Conquest underestimate the role of climate and other natural causes.|page=xvi, xvii}}</ref> though they agree that the Holodomor was largely a result of Stalin's economic policies. Among contemporary historians it is debated whether the famine was an intended result of such policies,<ref>{{cite journal|journal=American Political Science Review|doi=10.1017/S0003055419000066|page=571 |title=Mass Repression and Political Loyalty: Evidence from Stalin's 'Terror by Hunger' |date=2019 |last1=Rozenas |first1=Arturas |last2=Zhukov |first2=Yuri M. |volume=113 |issue=2 |s2cid=143428346 |quote=Similar to famines in Ireland in 1846–1851 (Ó Gráda 2007) and China in 1959–1961 (Meng, Qian and Yared 2015), the politics behind Holodomor have been a focus of historiographic debate. The most common interpretation is that Holodomor was 'terror by hunger' (Conquest 1987, 224), 'state aggression' (Applebaum 2017) and 'clearly premeditated mass murder' (Snyder 2010, 42). Others view it as an unintended by-product of Stalin's economic policies (Kotkin 2017; Naumenko 2017), precipitated by natural factors like adverse weather and crop infestation (Davies and Wheatcroft 1996; Tauger 2001).}}</ref> whether the Holodomor was directed at Ukrainians, and whether it constitutes a [[genocide]], the point of contention being the absence of attested documents explicitly ordering the starvation of any area in the Soviet Union.{{Sfnm|1a1=Ellman|1y=2005|1p=824|2a1=Davies|2a2=Wheatcroft|2y=2006|2pp=628, 631}} Some historians conclude that the famine was deliberately engineered by [[Joseph Stalin]] to eliminate a [[Ukrainian independence]] movement.{{efn|name=Britannica "Holodomor"}} Others suggest that the famine was primarily the consequence of rapid [[History of the Soviet Union (1927–53)#Industrialization in practice|Soviet industrialisation]] and [[Collectivization in the Soviet Union|collectivization]] of agriculture. A middle position, held for example by historian Andrea Graziosi, is that the initial causes of the famine were an unintentional byproduct of the process of collectivization but once it set in, starvation was selectively weaponized and the famine was "instrumentalized" and amplified against Ukrainians as a means to punish Ukrainians for resisting Soviet policies and to suppress their [[Ukrainian nationalism|nationalist sentiments]].{{sfn|Werth|2008}}

Some scholars suggest that the famine was a consequence of human-made and natural factors.{{sfn|Graziosi|2004}} The most prevalent man-made factor was changes made to agriculture because of rapid [[History of the Soviet Union (1927–53)#Industrialization in practice|industrialisation]] during the [[First five-year plan (Soviet Union)|First Five Year Plan]].{{sfn|Kulchytsky2007- Evidential Gaps}}{{sfn|Fawkes|2006}}{{sfn| Marples|2005}} There are also those who blame a systematic set of policies perpetrated by the Soviet government under [[Joseph Stalin|Stalin]] designed to exterminate the Ukrainians.{{efn|name=Britannica "Holodomor"}}{{sfn|Ellman|2005}}{{sfn|Davies|Wheatcroft|2002|p=77|loc= "[T]he drought of 1931 was particularly severe, and drought conditions continued in 1932. This certainly helped to worsen the conditions for obtaining the harvest in 1932"}}{{sfn|Engerman|2009|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=UkFlO7hoxOMC&pg=PA194 194]}}

==== Low harvest ====
According to historian [[Stephen G. Wheatcroft]], the grain yield for the Soviet Union preceding the famine was a low harvest of between 55 and 60 million tons,{{sfn|Davies|Wheatcroft|2004|pp=xix–xxi}} likely in part caused by damp weather and low traction power,{{sfn|Wheatcroft|2018}} yet official statistics mistakenly reported a yield of 68.9 million tons.{{sfn| Marples|2002}} (A single ton of grain is enough to provide a good bread ration containing {{circa|2350}} kCal per person for three people for one year.){{sfn|Davies|Tauger|Wheatcroft|1995|p=643}} Historian Mark Tauger has suggested that drought and damp weather were causes of the low harvest.{{sfn|Tauger|2001|p=45}} Mark Tauger suggested that heavy rains would help the harvest while Stephen Wheatcroft suggested it would hurt it which Natalya Naumenko notes as a disagreement in scholarship.{{sfn|Naumenko|2021}} Another factor which reduced the harvest suggested by Tauger included endemic plant rust.{{sfn|Tauger|2001|p=39}} However, in regard to plant disease Stephen Wheatcroft notes that the Soviet extension of sown area combined with lack of crop rotation may have exacerbated the problem,{{efn|name=Davies 2004, p. 437}} which Tauger also acknowledges in regard to the latter.<ref name="TaugerQianCritique" />

==== Collectivization, procurements, and the export of grain ====
{{see also|Collectivization in the Soviet Union|Five-year plans of the Soviet Union#First plan, 1928–1932|Causes of the Holodomor#Consequence of collectivization}}
[[File:15th anniversary of Holodomor - postcard.jpg|thumb|upright=0.85|Postcard commemorating the 15th anniversary of the Holodomor, which shows Stalin looking at his kolkhoz built on a pile of starved Ukrainians. Published in 1948 by the [[Ukrainian Youth Association]].]]

Due to factional struggles with [[Bukharin]] wing of the party, peasant resistance to the [[New Economic Policy|NEP]] under [[Lenin]], and the need for industrialization, [[Joseph Stalin]] declared a need to extract a "tribute" or "tax" from the peasantry.<ref name="collectivizationstruggle">{{cite book |last1=Viola |first1=Lynne |title=The Collectivization of Agriculture in Communist Eastern Europe:Comparison and Entanglements |date=2014 |publisher=[[Central European University Press]] |isbn=978-963-386-048-9 |chapter=Collectivization in the Soviet Union: Specificities and Modalities |pages=49–69}}</ref> This idea was supported by most of the party in the 1920s.<ref name="collectivizationstruggle" /> The tribute collected by the party took on the form of a virtual war against the peasantry that would lead to its [[cultural genocide|cultural destruction]] and the relegating of the countryside to essentially a [[colony]] homogenized to the urban culture of the Soviet elite.<ref name="collectivizationstruggle" /> [[Leon Trotsky]], however, opposed the policy of forced collectivisation under Stalin and would have favoured a [[volunteering|voluntary]], gradual approach towards [[collective farming]]<ref>{{cite book |last1=Beilharz |first1=Peter |title=Trotsky, Trotskyism and the Transition to Socialism |date=19 November 2019 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-000-70651-2 |pages=1–206 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Lfe-DwAAQBAJ&dq=trotsky+widely+acknowledged+collectivisation&pg=PT196 |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Rubenstein |first1=Joshua |title=Leon Trotsky : a revolutionary's life |date=2011 |location=New Haven |publisher=[[Yale University Press]] |isbn=978-0-300-13724-8 |page=161 |url=https://archive.org/details/leontrotskyrevol0000rube/page/160/mode/2up?q=forced+collectivization}}</ref> with greater tolerance for the rights of Soviet Ukrainians.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Deutscher |first1=Isaac |author1-link=Isaac Deutscher |title=The Prophet: The Life of Leon Trotsky |date=5 January 2015 |publisher=[[Verso Books]] |isbn=978-1-78168-721-5 |page=637 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=YGznDwAAQBAJ&q=isaac+deutscher+trotsky |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |first=Leon |last=Trotsky |author-link=Leon Trotsky |title=Problem of the Ukraine |date=April 1939 |url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1939/04/ukraine.html |via=[[Marxists Internet Archive]]}}</ref> This campaign of "colonizing" the peasantry had its roots both in old [[Russian Imperialism]] and modern [[Social engineering (political science)|social engineering]] of the [[nation state]] yet with key differences to the latter such as Soviet repression reflecting more the weakness of said state rather than its strength.<ref name="collectivizationstruggle" />

In this vein by the summer of 1930, the government instituted a program of food requisitioning, ostensibly to increase grain exports. According to Natalya Naumenko, [[collectivization in the Soviet Union]] and lack of favored industries were primary contributors to famine mortality (52% of excess deaths), and some evidence shows there was discrimination against ethnic Ukrainians and Germans. In Ukraine [[Collectivization in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic|collectivisation policy]] was enforced, entailing extreme crisis and contributing to the famine. In 1929–1930, peasants were induced to transfer land and livestock to state-owned farms, on which they would work as day-labourers for payment in kind.{{sfn|Reid|2017}}

Food exports continued during the famine, albeit at a reduced rate.{{sfn|Applebaum|2017|pp=189–220; 221ff}} In regard to exports, [[Michael Ellman]] states that the 1932–1933 grain exports amounted to 1.8 million tonnes, which would have been enough to feed 5 million people for one year.{{sfn|Ellman|2007}} The collectivization and high procurement quota explanation for the famine is somewhat called into question by the fact that the oblasts of Ukraine with the highest losses were [[Kyiv]] and [[Kharkiv]], which produced far lower amounts of grain than other sections of the country.{{sfn|Selden|1982}}{{sfn|Chamberlin|1933}} Historian [[Stephen G. Wheatcroft]] lists four problems Soviet authorities ignored during collectivization that would hinder the advancement of agricultural technology and ultimately contributed to the famine:{{sfn|Davies|Wheatcroft|2004|pp=436–441}}

* "Over-extension of the sown area" — Crops yields were reduced and likely some plant disease caused by the planting of future harvests across a wider area of land without rejuvenating soil leading to the reduction of fallow land.
* "Decline in draught power" — the over extraction of grain led to the loss of food for farm animals, which in turn reduced the effectiveness of agricultural operations.
* "Quality of cultivation" — the planting and extracting of the harvest, along with ploughing was done in a poor manner due to inexperienced and demoralized workers and the aforementioned lack of draught power.
* "The poor weather" — drought and other poor weather conditions were largely ignored by Soviet authorities who gambled on good weather and believed agricultural difficulties would be overcome.

Mark Tauger notes that Soviet and Western specialist at the time noted draught power shortages and lack of crop rotation contributed to intense weed infestations,<ref name="TaugerQianCritique" /> with these both being also factors Stephen Wheatcroft lists as contributing to the famine. Natalya Naumenko calculated that reduced agriculture production in "collectivized" collective farms is responsible for up to 52% of Holodomor [[Excess mortality|excess deaths]].<ref>{{Cite web |title=The Wikipedia Library |url=https://wikipedialibrary.wmflabs.org/ |access-date=2024-07-17 |website=wikipedialibrary.wmflabs.org |language=en |archive-date=9 September 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230909192849/https://wikipedialibrary.wmflabs.org/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

====Discrimination and persecution of Ukrainians ====
{{see also|Causes of the Holodomor#Soviet state policies that contributed to the Holodomor|Russification of Ukraine#Mid-1920s to early 1930s}}
{{quote box
| width = 30em
| author = — [[Arthur Koestler]], [[Hungarians in the United Kingdom|Hungarian-British]] journalist
| quote = At every [train] station there was a crowd of peasants in rags, offering icons and linen in exchange for a loaf of bread. The women were lifting up their infants to the compartment windows—infants pitiful and terrifying with limbs like sticks, puffed bellies, big cadaverous heads lolling on thin necks.
}}
It has been proposed that the Soviet leadership used the human-made famine to attack [[Ukrainian nationalism]], and thus it could fall under the legal definition of genocide.<ref>{{bulleted list|
| {{harvnb|Margolis|2003}}
| {{harvnb|Kulchytsky2007- Evidential Gaps}}
| {{harvnb|Finn|2008}}
| {{harvnb|Marples|2005}}
| {{harvnb|Bilinsky|1999}}
| {{harvnb|Kulchytsky|2006}}
}}</ref> For example, special and particularly lethal policies were adopted in and largely limited to Soviet Ukraine at the end of 1932 and 1933. According to [[Timothy D. Snyder|Timothy Snyder]], "each of them may seem like an [[anodyne]] administrative measure, and each of them was certainly presented as such at the time, and yet each had to kill."{{efn|name=note-anodyne}}{{sfn|Snyder|2010|pp=42–46}} Other sources discuss the famine in relation to a project of imperialism or colonialism of Ukraine by the Soviet state.<ref>{{bulleted list|
| {{cite journal |last1=Irvin-Erickson |first1=Douglas |title=Raphaël Lemkin, Genocide, Colonialism, Famine, and Ukraine |journal=Empire, Colonialism, and Famine in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries |date=12 May 2021 |volume=8 |pages=193–215 |doi=10.21226/ewjus645 |s2cid=235586856 |doi-access=free}}
| {{cite journal |last1=Hechter |first1=Michael |title=Internal Colonialism, Alien Rule, and Famine in Ireland and Ukraine |journal=Empire, Colonialism, and Famine in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries |date=12 May 2021 |volume=8 |pages=145–157 |doi=10.21226/ewjus642 |s2cid=235579661 |doi-access=free}}
| {{cite journal |last1=Hrynevych |first1=Liudmyla |title=Stalin's Faminogenic Policies in Ukraine: The Imperial Discourse |journal=Empire, Colonialism, and Famine in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries |date=12 May 2021 |volume=8 |pages=99–143 |doi=10.21226/ewjus641 |s2cid=235570495 |doi-access=free}}
}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Klid |first1=Bohdan |title=Empire-Building, Imperial Policies, and Famine in Occupied Territories and Colonies |journal=Empire, Colonialism, and Famine in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries |date=12 May 2021 |volume=8 |pages=11–32 |doi=10.21226/ewjus634 |s2cid=235578437 |doi-access=free}}</ref>

[[File:Famine en URSS 1933.jpg|thumb|upright=0.85|A map of the [[Soviet famine of 1932–1933]] with the areas of most disastrous famine shaded black]]
According to a [[Centre for Economic Policy Research]] paper published in 2021 by Andrei Markevich, Natalya Naumenko, and Nancy Qian, regions with higher Ukrainian population shares were struck harder with centrally planned policies corresponding to famine such as increased procurement rate,{{sfn|Qian|2021}} and Ukrainian populated areas were given lower numbers of tractors which the paper argues demonstrates that ethnic discrimination across the board was centrally planned, ultimately concluding that 92% of famine deaths in Ukraine alone along with 77% of famine deaths in Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus combined can be explained by systematic bias against Ukrainians.{{sfn|Markevich|Naumenko|Qian|2021|loc=Abstract}} The paper found from its analysis that "the regime intended to take more grain from Ukrainian areas after conditioning for factors such as production capacity"{{sfn|Markevich|Naumenko|Qian|2021|p=27}} and noting that "in areas that the Bolshevik regime marked as important for grain production, ethnic Russians replaced ethnic Ukrainians as the largest ethnic group".{{sfn|Markevich|Naumenko|Qian|2021|p=31}}

Mark Tauger criticized Natalya Naumenko's work as being based on: "major historical inaccuracies and falsehoods, omissions of essential evidence contained in her sources or easily available, and substantial misunderstandings of certain key topics".<ref name="TaugerQianCritique">{{cite journal |last1=Tauger |first1=Mark B. |title=The Environmental Economy of the Soviet Famine in Ukraine in 1933: A Critique of Several Papers by Natalya Naumenko |journal=Econ Journal Watch |url=https://econjwatch.org/File+download/1286/TaugerSept2023.pdf?mimetype=pdf |access-date=16 October 2023 |archive-date=18 October 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231018075413/https://econjwatch.org/File+download/1286/TaugerSept2023.pdf?mimetype=pdf |url-status=live}}</ref> For example, Naumenko ignored Tauger's findings of 8.94 million tons of the harvest that had been lost to crop "rust and smut",<ref name="TaugerQianCritique" /> four reductions in grain procurement to Ukraine including a 39.5 million puds reduction in grain procurements ordered by Stalin,<ref name="TaugerQianCritique" /> and that from Tauger's findings which are contrary to Naumenko's paper's claims the "per-capita grain procurements in Ukraine were less, often significantly less, than the per-capita procurements from the five other main grain-producing regions in the USSR in 1932".<ref name="TaugerQianCritique" />

Other scholars argue that in other years preceding the famine this was not the case. For example, Stanislav Kulchytsky claims Ukraine produced more grain in 1930 than the [[Central Black Earth Oblast]], [[Middle Volga|Middle]] and [[Lower Volga]] and [[North Caucasus]] regions all together, which had never been done before, and on average gave 4.7 quintals of grain from every sown hectare to the state{{emdash}}a record-breaking index of marketability{{emdash}}but was unable to fulfill the grain quota for 1930 until May 1931. Ukraine produced a similar amount of grain in 1931; however, by the late spring of 1932 "many districts were left with no reserves of produce or fodder at all".<ref name="Kulchytskystalinslave" /> Despite this, according to statistics gathered by Nataliia Levchuk, Ukraine and North Caucasus Krai delivered almost 100% of their grain procurement in 1931 versus 67% in two Russian Oblasts during the same period versus 1932 where three Russian regions delivered almost all of their procurements and Ukraine and North Caucasus did not.{{sfn|Wolowyna|2021}} This can partially be explained by Ukrainian regions losing a third of their harvests and Russian regions losing by comparison only 15% of their harvest.{{sfn|Wolowyna|2021}}

Ultimately, Tauger states: "if the regime had not taken even that smaller amount grain from Ukrainian villages, the famine could have been greatly reduced or even eliminated" however (in his words) "if the regime had left that grain in Ukraine, then other parts of the USSR would have been even more deprived of food than they were, including Ukrainian cities and industrial sites, and the overall effect would still have been a major famine, even worse in "non-Ukrainian" regions."<ref name="TaugerQianCritique" /> In fact in contrast to Naumenko's paper's claims the higher Ukrainian collectivization rates in Tauger's opinion actually indicate a pro-Ukrainian bias in Soviet policies rather than an anti-Ukrainian one: "[Soviet authorities] did not see collectivization as "discrimination" against Ukrainians; they saw it as a reflection of—in the leaders' view—Ukraine's relatively more advanced farming skills that made Ukraine better prepared for collectivization (Davies 1980a, 166, 187–188; Tauger 2006a)."<ref name="TaugerQianCritique" />

Naumenko responded to some of Tauger's criticisms in another paper.<ref name="naumenkoresponse">{{cite journal |last1=Naumenko |first1=Natalya |title=Response to Professor Tauger's Comments |journal=Econ Journal Watch |date=September 2023 |page=313}}</ref> Naumenko criticizes Tauger's view of the efficacy of collective farms arguing Tauger's view goes against the consensus,<ref name="naumenkoresponse" /> she also states that the tenfold difference in death toll between the 1932-1933 Soviet famine and the [[Russian famine of 1891–1892]] can only be explained by government policies,<ref name="naumenkoresponse" /> and that the infestations of pests and plant disease suggested by Tauger as a cause of the famine must also correspond such infestations to rates of collectivization due to deaths by area corresponding to this<ref name="naumenkoresponse" /> due Naumenko's findings that: "on average, if you compare two regions with similar pre-famine characteristics, one with zero collectivization rate and another with a 100 percent collectivization rate, the more collectivized region's 1933 mortality rate increases by 58 per thousand relative to its 1927–1928 mortality rate".<ref name="naumenkoresponse" /> Naumenko believes the disagreement between her and Tauger is due to a "gulf in training and methods between quantitative fields like political science and economics and qualitative fields like history" noting that Tauger makes no comments on one of her paper's results section.<ref name="naumenkoresponse" />

Tauger made a counter-reply to this reply by Naumenko.<ref name="taugerresponseresponse">{{cite journal |title=Counter-Reply to Naumenko on the Soviet Famine in Ukraine in 1933 |first=Mark B. |last=Tauger |journal=Econ Journal Watch |date=March 2024 |volume=21 |number=1 |pages=79–91 |url=https://econjwatch.org/articles/counter-reply-to-naumenko-on-the-soviet-famine-in-ukraine-in-1933}}</ref> Tauger argues in his counter reply that Naumenko's attempt to correspond collectivization rates to famine mortality fails because "there was no single level of collectivization anywhere in the USSR in 1930, especially in the Ukrainian Republic" and that "since collectivization changed significantly by 1932–1933, any connection between 1930 and 1933 omits those changes and is therefore invalid".<ref name="taugerresponseresponse" /> Tauger also criticizes Naumenko's ignoring of statistics Tauger's presented where "in her reply she completely ignored the quantitative data [Tauger] presented in [his] article" in which she against the evidence "denied that any famines took place in the later 1920s".<ref name="taugerresponseresponse" /> To counter Naumenko's claim that collectivization explains the famine Tauger argues ( in his words) how agro-environmental disasters better explain the regional discrepancies: "[Naumenko's] calculations again omit any consideration of the agro-environmental disasters that harmed farm production in 1932. In her appendices, Table C3, she does the same calculation with collectivization data from 1932, which she argues shows a closer correlation between collectivization and famine mortality (Naumenko 2021b, 33). Yet, as I showed, those agroenvironmental disasters were much worse in the regions with higher collectivization—especially Ukraine, the North Caucasus, and the Volga River basin (and also in Kazakhstan)—than elsewhere in the USSR. As I documented in my article and other publications, these were regions that had a history of environmental disasters that caused crop failures and famines repeatedly in Russian history."<ref name="taugerresponseresponse" /> Tauger notes: "[Naumenko's] assumption that collectivization subjected peasants to higher procurements, but in 1932 in Ukraine this was clearly not the case" as "grain procurements both total and per-capita were much lower in Ukraine than anywhere else in the USSR in 1932".<ref name="taugerresponseresponse" />

==== Peasant resistance ====
{{Holodomor}}{{genocide}}
{{history of Ukraine}}
[[Collectivization in the Soviet Union]], including the Ukrainian SSR, was not popular among the peasantry, and forced collectivisation led to numerous [[List of peasant revolts|peasant revolts]]. The [[Joint State Political Directorate|OGPU]] recorded 932 disturbances in Ukraine, 173 in the North Caucasus, and only 43 in the Central Black Earth Oblast (out of 1,630 total). Reports two years prior recorded over 4,000 unrests in Ukraine, while in other agricultural regions - Central Black Earth, Middle Volga, Lower Volga, and North Caucasus - the numbers were sightly above 1,000. OGPU's summaries also cited public proclamations of Ukrainian insurgents to restore the [[Ukrainian People's Republic|independence of Ukraine]], while reports by the Ukrainian officials included information about the declining popularity and authority of the party among peasants.<ref name="Kulchytskystalinslave">{{harvnb|Kulchytsky|2017}}; {{harvnb|Kulchytsky|2020}}; {{harvnb|Kulchytsky|2008}}</ref> Oleh Wolowyna comments that peasant resistance and the ensuing repression of said resistance was a critical factor for the famine in Ukraine and parts of Russia populated by national minorities like Germans and Ukrainians allegedly tainted by "fascism and bourgeois nationalism" according to Soviet authorities.{{sfn|Wolowyna|2021}}