Editing Hundred Days' Reform (section)

==Differing interpretations==
Views of the Hundred Days' Reform have grown increasingly more complex and nuanced. The traditional view<ref>See, for instance, {{cite web|url=http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/276504/Hundred-Days-of-Reform|title=Hundred Days of Reform|publisher=Encyclopædia Britannica|access-date=12 November 2011}}</ref> portrayed the reformers as heroes and the conservative elites, particularly the [[Empress Dowager Cixi]], as villains unwilling to reform because of their selfish interests.

===Failure as Kang's responsibility===
However, some historians in the late 20th century have taken views that are more favorable to the conservatives and less favorable to the reformers. In this view, [[Kang Youwei]] and his allies were hopeless dreamers unaware of the political realities in which they operated. This view argues that the conservative elites were not opposed to change and that practically all of the reforms that were proposed were eventually implemented.

For example, [[Sterling Seagrave]], in his book "The Dragon Lady", argues that there were several reasons why the reforms failed. Chinese political power at the time was firmly in the hands of the ruling Manchu nobility. The highly xenophobic [[iron hats]] faction dominated the [[Grand Council (Qing dynasty)|Grand Council]] and were seeking ways to expel all Western influence from China. When implementing reform, the [[Guangxu Emperor]] by-passed the Grand Council and appointed four reformers to advise him. These reformers were chosen after a series of interviews, including the interview of [[Kang Youwei]], who was rejected by the Emperor and had far less influence than Kang's later boasting would indicate. At the suggestion of the reform advisors, the [[Guangxu Emperor]] also held secret talks with former Japanese Prime Minister [[Itō Hirobumi]] with the aim of using his experience in the [[Meiji Restoration]] to lead China through similar reforms.

It has also been suggested, controversially, that [[Kang Youwei]] actually did a great deal of harm to the cause by his perceived arrogance in the eyes of the conservatives. Numerous rumors regarding potential repercussions, many of them false, had made their way to the Grand Council; this was one of the factors in their decision to stage a coup against the Emperor. Kang, like many of the reformers, grossly underestimated the reactionary nature of the vested interests involved.

The Emperor set about to enact his reforms by largely bypassing the powerful Grand Council; said councilors, irritated at the Emperor's actions and fearful of losing the political power they had, then turned to the [[Empress Dowager Cixi]] to remove the emperor from power. Many, though not all, of the reforms came to naught. The council, now confident in their power, pushed for the execution of the reformers, an action that was carried out ruthlessly.

===Richard's federation theory===
According to Professor Lei Chia-sheng (雷家聖),<ref>Lei Chia-sheng雷家聖, ''Liwan kuanglan: Wuxu zhengbian xintan'' 力挽狂瀾：戊戌政變新探 [Containing the furious waves: a new view of the 1898 coup], Taipei: Wanjuan Lou 萬卷樓, 2004.</ref> Japanese former prime minister [[Itō Hirobumi]] (伊藤博文) arrived in China on September 11, 1898, about the same time that Kang Youwei invited British missionary [[Timothy Richard]] to Beijing. Richard suggested that China appoint Itō as one of many foreign advisors in order to further push China's reform efforts.<ref name="Richard1916">Richard, Timothy, [https://archive.org/details/fourtyfiveyears00richuoft ''Forty-five Years in China: Reminiscences''] publ. [[Frederick A. Stokes]] (1916)</ref> On September 18, Richard successfully convinced Kang to adopt his plan in which China would join a federation (合邦) of ten nations.

Kang nonetheless asked fellow reformers Yang Shenxiu (楊深秀) and Song Bolu (宋伯魯) to report this plan to the Guangxu Emperor.<ref>Kang Youwei 康有為, ''Kang Nanhai ziding nianpu'' 康南海自訂年譜 [Chronicle of Kang Youwei's Life, by Kang Youwei], Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe 文海出版社, p. 67.</ref> On September 20, Yang sent a [[Official Communications of the Chinese Empire#Memorials|memorial]] to the emperor to that effect.<ref>Yang Shenxiu, "Shandong dao jiancha yushi Yang Shenxiu zhe" 山東道監察御史楊深秀摺 [Palace memorial by Yang Shenxiu, Investigating Censor of Shandong Circuit], in ''Wuxu bianfa dang'an shiliao'' 戊戌變法檔案史料 [Archival sources on the history of the 1898 reforms], Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1959, p. 15.「臣尤伏願我皇上早定大計，固結英、美、日本三國，勿嫌『合邦』之名之不美。」</ref> In another memorial to the Emperor written the next day, Song advocated the formation of a federation and the sharing of the diplomatic, fiscal, and military powers of the four countries<!--Which countries? Please name them in the text of the article.--> under a hundred-man committee.<ref>Song Bolu, "Zhang Shandong dao jiancha yushi Song Bolu zhe" 掌山東道監察御史宋伯魯摺 [Palace memorial by Song Bolu, Investigating Censor in charge of the Shandong Circuit], in ''Wuxu bianfa dang'an shiliao'', p. 170.「渠(李提摩太)之來也，擬聯合中國、日本、美國及英國為合邦，共選通達時務、曉暢各國掌故者百人，專理四國兵政稅則及一切外交等事。」</ref> Lei Chia-sheng argues that this idea was the reason why Cixi, who had just returned from the Summer Palace on September 19, decided to put an end to the reforms with the September 21 coup.

On October 13, following the coup, British ambassador [[Claude Maxwell MacDonald|Claude MacDonald]] reported to his government that Chinese reforms had been "much injured" by Kang and his friends' actions.<ref>''Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of China, Presented to Both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty'' (London, 1899.3), No. 401, p. 303.</ref> However, the British and American governments had been largely unaware of the "federation" plot, which appears to have been Richard's own personal idea. The Japanese government might have been aware of Richard's plan, since his accomplice was the former Japanese prime minister, but there is no evidence to this effect yet.