Editing Infiltration tactics (section)

=== Russia ===

[[File:Fighting on the Russian Front, Where the Hardship of War are Aggravated by the Bitter Cold of Winter (LOC) (6331261973).jpg|thumb|Austrian detachments holding trenches in [[Galicia (Eastern Europe)|Galicia]], dug through the snow-covered soil]]
[[File:Brusilov offensive.jpg|thumb|The [[Brusilov Offensive]], with starting positions on 4 June 1916 (thick solid line), initial advances on 16 June (thinner jagged line), and final positions on 20 September (dotted line)<!-- . Arrows show the direction of attacks of the 3rd, 8th, 11th, 7th and 9th armies (the last unlabeled). The original objective, Lemburg, would be near the left edge of the map in the center.-->]]
The vast [[Eastern Front (World War I)|Eastern Front]] of World War I, much less confined than the Western Front, was much less affected by trench warfare,<ref name=Dowling>{{cite web|last1=Dowling|first1=Timothy C.|title=Eastern Front|url=https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/eastern_front|website=1914-1918 Online|access-date=20 November 2017|date=8 October 2014}}</ref> but trench lines still tended to take hold whenever the front became static. Still, about a third of all Russian divisions remained cavalry, including [[Cossack]] divisions.<ref>{{Cite book | edition = First Winged Hussar Publishing | publisher = Winged Hussar Publishing LLC | isbn = 978-0988953215 | last = Ėmmanuelʹ | first = V. A. | title = The Russian Imperial Cavalry in 1914 | location = Point Pleasant, NJ | date = 2013 }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=Simkin |first1=John |title=Russian Army and the First World War |url=http://spartacus-educational.com/FWWrussiaA.htm |website=Spartacus Educational |access-date=20 November 2017 |date=May 2015}}</ref><ref name="Timothy C. Dowling pp 43-44">{{cite book |first=Timothy C. |last=Dowling |title=The Brusilov Offensive |location=Bloomington |publisher=Indiana University Press |year=2008 |pages=43–44 |isbn=978-0-253-35130-2 }}</ref>

General [[Aleksei Brusilov]], commanding the [[Southwestern Front (Russian Empire)|Russian Southwestern Front]], promoted large-scale simultaneous attacks along a wide front in order to limit defenders' ability to respond to any one point, thus allowing the collapse of the entire defending line and returning to maneuver warfare. For the [[Brusilov Offensive]] of 1916, he meticulously prepared a massive surprise attack on a very wide {{cvt|250|mi|order=flip}} front stretching from the [[Pripet Marshes]] to the [[Carpathian Mountains]], with the objective of [[Lemburg]], [[Galicia (Eastern Europe)|Galicia]] (now Lviv, Ukraine), {{cvt|60|mi|order=flip|-1}} behind the well-fortified [[Austro-Hungarian]] line. The Austro-German military command was confident that these deep and extensive entrenchments, equal to those of the Germans on Western Front, could not be broken without significant Russian reinforcements.<ref name="Austria-Hungary and the Brusilov Offensive">{{cite journal |last1=Tunstall |first1=Graydon A. |title=Austria-Hungary and the Brusilov Offensive of 1916| journal=The Historian |date=26 February 2008 |volume=70 |issue=1 |pages=30–53 |doi=10.1111/j.1540-6563.2008.00202.x |doi-access= }}</ref>{{rp|33–36}}

After a thorough [[reconnaissance]], Brusilov directed preparations for several months. Forward trenches were dug as bridgeheads for the attack, which approached the Austro-Hungarian trench lines as closely as {{cvt|70|m|-1}}.<ref name="Timothy C. Dowling pp 43-44" /> Select forces were trained and tasked with breaking through the defending lines, creating gaps to be widened by 8 total successive waves of infantry, allowing deep penetration. Brusilov committed all his reserves into the initial assault.<ref name="Austria-Hungary and the Brusilov Offensive" />{{rp|51}}

Although Brusilov favoured shorter bombardments, the bombardment preparation for this offensive was more than two days long, from 3am on June 4 (May 22 [[old style]]) to 9am on June 6 (May 24).<ref>{{cite book |last1=Brusilov |first1=A. A. |title=My Memories |date=1983 |publisher=Military Publishing House |pages=194–197 }}</ref> This bombardment disrupted the first defense zone and partially neutralized the defending artillery. The first infantry attacks made breakthroughs at 13 points, which were soon increased in width and depth. Austro-Hungarian response to the unexpected offensive was slow and limited, believing that their existing forces and defenses would prove sufficient; instead, reserve units sent forward to counterattack often found their routes already overrun by the Russians.<ref name="Austria-Hungary and the Brusilov Offensive" />{{rp|40}} The [[8th Army (Russian Empire)|Russian 8th Army]], commanded by Brusilov himself just a few months before his promotion to command the Southwestern Front, achieved the greatest success, advancing {{cvt|30|mi|order=flip}} in less than a week. The [[7th Army (Russian Empire)|7th]] and [[9th Army (Russian Empire)|9th Army]] achieved lesser gains, though the remaining [[11th Army (Russian Empire)|11th Army]] in the center made no initial breakthroughs. The performance of individual Austro-Hungarian units during the campaign, each raised from separate [[Austro-Hungarian Army#Size and ethnic and religious composition|diverse societies within the Empire]], was highly variable, with some units long standing firm despite the odds, like the [[Polish Legions in World War I|Polish Legions]] at the [[Battle of Kostiuchnówka]], whereas others readily retreated in panic or surrendered, as at the [[Battle of Lutsk]].<ref name=Dowling />{{rp|78–79}}<ref name="Austria-Hungary and the Brusilov Offensive" />{{rp|42–44}}

Though the campaign was devastating to the Austro-Hungarian Army, Russian losses were very high.<ref>{{cite journal |first= Graydon A.  |last= Tunstall |title= Austria-Hungary and the Brusilov Offensive of 1916 |journal= The Historian |volume= 70 |issue= 1 |year= 2008  |pages= 30–53 [p. 52] |doi=10.1111/j.1540-6563.2008.00202.x |doi-access=  }}</ref> German forces were sent to reinforce, and the initial Russian advantages waned. Though Russian attacks continued for months, their cost in Russian men and materiel increased while gains diminished. In the end, much like the bold French tactics of ''la percée'' at the Second Battle of Artois, these tactics were too costly to maintain. The [[Imperial Russian Army]] never fully recovered, and the monumental losses of so many Russian soldiers helped fuel the [[Russian Revolution]] of 1917, leading to disbanding the Imperial Russian Army.<ref name="Austria-Hungary and the Brusilov Offensive" />{{rp|53}}

Though the Brusilov Campaign impressed the German Army High Command, how this may have influenced their further development of infiltration tactics is not known.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Edmonds |first1=J. E. |last2=Davies |first2=C. B. |last3=Maxwell-Hyslop |first3=R. G. B. |series=History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, by Direction of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence |title=Military Operations France and Belgium, 1918: The German March Offensive and its Preliminaries |date=1935 |publisher=HMSO |location=London |isbn=978-0-89839-219-7 |edition=Imperial War Museum & Battery Press |page=489 }}</ref> Elements of Brusilov's tactics were eventually used by the [[Red Army]] in developing their [[Deep Battle]] doctrine for World War II.<ref>"Brusilov's breakthrough is the forerunner of remarkable breakthroughs, carried out by the Red Army in the Great Patriotic War."
- M. Galaktionov, Preface to «Моим воспоминаниям» (''My Recolections''), Aleksei Brusilov, republished 1946.</ref>