Editing Intentionality (section)

===Relationalism===
''Relationalists'' hold that having an intentional state involves standing in a relation to the intentional object. This is the most natural position for non-problematic cases. So if Mary perceives a tree, we might say that a perceptual relation holds between Mary, the subject of this relation, and the tree, the object of this relation. Relations are usually assumed to be existence-entailing: the instance of a relation entails the existence of its relata.<ref name="Bourget"/> This principle rules out that we can bear relations to non-existing entities. One way to solve the problem is to deny this principle and argue for a kind of ''intentionality exceptionalism'': that intentionality is different from all other relations in the sense that this principle does not apply to it.<ref name="Kriegel"/><ref>{{cite book |last1=Priest |first1=Graham |title=Towards Non-Being: The Logic and Metaphysics of Intentionality |date=2016 |publisher=Oxford University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/PRITNT |chapter=3. Objects of Thought |access-date=2020-11-11 |archive-date=2021-08-28 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210828101919/https://philpapers.org/rec/PRITNT |url-status=live }}</ref>

A more common relationalist solution is to look for existing objects that can play the role that the non-existing object was supposed to play. Such objects are sometimes called "proxies",<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Emery |first1=Nina |title=Actualism, Presentism and the Grounding Objection |journal=Erkenntnis |date=2020 |volume=85 |issue=1 |pages=23–43 |doi=10.1007/s10670-018-0016-6 |s2cid=125607032 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/EMEAPA |access-date=2020-11-11 |archive-date=2021-08-30 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210830120035/https://philpapers.org/rec/EMEAPA |url-status=live |url-access=subscription }}</ref> "traces",<ref>{{cite encyclopedia |last1=Menzel |first1=Christopher |title=Actualism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/actualism/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |date=2018}}</ref> or "ersatz objects".<ref>{{cite web |last1=Parent |first1=Ted |title=Modal Metaphysics |url=https://iep.utm.edu/mod-meta/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=12 November 2020 |archive-date=11 November 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201111212729/https://iep.utm.edu/mod-meta/ |url-status=live }}</ref> It has been suggested that [[abstract objects]] or [[Platonic forms]] can play this role. Abstract objects have actual existence but they exist outside space and time. So when Mary thinks about Superman, she is standing in a thinking relation to the abstract object or the Platonic form that corresponds to Superman. A similar solution replaces abstract objects with concrete mental objects. In this case, there exists a mental object corresponding to Superman in Mary's mind. As Mary starts to think about Superman, she enters into a relationship with this mental object. One problem for both of these theories is that they seem to mischaracterize the experience of thinking. As Mary is thinking about Superman, she is neither thinking about a Platonic form outside space-time nor about a mental object. Instead, she ''is'' thinking about a concrete physical being.<ref name="Kriegel" /><ref name="Bourget" /> A related solution sees possible objects as intentional objects. This involves a commitment to [[modal realism]], for example in the form of the [[David Lewis (philosopher)|Lewisian]] model or as envisioned by [[Extended modal realism|Takashi Yagisawa]].<ref>{{cite book |last1=Yagisawa |first1=Takashi |title=Worlds and Individuals, Possible and Otherwise |date=2009 |publisher=Oxford University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/YAGWAI |access-date=2020-11-11 |archive-date=2021-08-24 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210824042128/https://philpapers.org/rec/YAGWAI |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="Thomas">{{cite journal |last1=Thomas |first1=Andrew D. |title=Extended Modal Realism — a New Solution to the Problem of Intentional Inexistence |journal=Philosophia |date=2020 |volume=48 |issue=3 |pages=1197–1208 |doi=10.1007/s11406-019-00126-z |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/THOEMR-3 |doi-access=free |access-date=2020-11-11 |archive-date=2020-11-14 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201114050326/https://philpapers.org/rec/THOEMR-3 |url-status=live }}</ref>