Editing Iran–Contra affair (section)

===Modifications in plans===
Robert McFarlane resigned on 4 December 1985,<ref>{{cite web|title=Letter Accepting the Resignation of Robert C. McFarlane as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs|url=http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1985/120485d.htm|access-date=4 December 2012|archive-date=20 March 2014|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140320212108/http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1985/120485d.htm|url-status=dead}}</ref>{{sfn|Walsh|1993|loc=chpt. 1}} stating that he wanted to spend more time with his family,{{sfn|Reagan|1990|p=509}} and was replaced by Admiral [[John Poindexter]].<ref name="JP">{{Cite web|url=https://www.brown.edu/Research/Understanding_the_Iran_Contra_Affair/profile-poindexter.php|title=Understanding the Iran-Contra Affairs - The Legal Aftermath|website=www.brown.edu|access-date=5 July 2020|archive-date=17 May 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220517095623/https://www.brown.edu/Research/Understanding_the_Iran_Contra_Affair/profile-poindexter.php|url-status=live}}</ref> Two days later, Reagan met with his advisors at the White House, where a new plan was introduced. This called for a slight change in the arms transactions: instead of the weapons going to the "moderate" Iranian group, they would go to "moderate" Iranian army leaders.{{sfn|Reagan|1990|p=510}} As each weapons delivery was made from Israel by air, hostages held by Hezbollah would be released.{{sfn|Reagan|1990|p=510}} Israel would continue to be reimbursed by the US for the weapons. Though staunchly opposed by [[United States Secretary of State|Secretary of State]] [[George Shultz]] and [[United States Secretary of Defense|Secretary of Defense]] [[Caspar Weinberger]], the plan was authorized by Reagan, who stated that, "We were {{em|not}} trading arms for hostages, nor were we negotiating with terrorists".{{sfn|Reagan|1990|p=512}} In his notes of a meeting held in the White House on 7 December 1985, Weinberger wrote he told Reagan that this plan was illegal, writing: <blockquote>I argued strongly that we have an embargo that makes arms sales to Iran illegal and President couldn't violate it and that 'washing' transactions through Israel wouldn't make it legal. Shultz, Don Regan agreed.{{sfn|Kornbluh|Byrne|1993|p=216}}</blockquote> Weinberger's notes have Reagan saying he "could {{not a typo|answer charges}} of illegality but he couldn't {{sic|answer charge}} that 'big strong President Reagan passed up a chance to {{not a typo|free hostages}}'."{{sfn|Kornbluh|Byrne|1993|p=216}} Now retired National Security Advisor McFarlane flew to London to meet with Israelis and Ghorbanifar in an attempt to persuade the Iranian to use his influence to release the hostages before any arms transactions occurred; this plan was rejected by Ghorbanifar.{{sfn|Reagan|1990|p=510}}

On the day of McFarlane's resignation, [[Oliver North]], a military aide to the [[US National Security Council]] (NSC), proposed a new plan for selling arms to Iran, which included two major adjustments: instead of selling arms through Israel, the sale was to be direct at a markup; and a portion of the proceeds would go to the [[Contras]], Nicaraguan paramilitary fighters waging [[guerrilla warfare]] against the [[Sandinista National Liberation Front#1984 election|Sandinista government]], claiming power after an election full of irregularities.<ref>See ''Washington Post'' at the time.</ref>{{nonspecific|date=July 2022}} The dealings with the Iranians were conducted via the NSC with Admiral Poindexter and his deputy Colonel North, with the US historians Malcolm Byrne and Peter Kornbluh writing that Poindexter granted much power to North "who made the most of the situation, often deciding important matters on his own, striking outlandish deals with the Iranians, and acting in the name of the president on issues that were far beyond his competence. All of these activities continued to take place within the framework of the president's broad authorization. Until the press reported on the existence of the operation, nobody in the administration questioned the authority of Poindexter's and North's team to implement the president's decisions".{{sfn|Kornbluh|Byrne|1993|p=217}} North proposed a $15 million markup, while contracted arms broker Ghorbanifar added a 41-percent markup of his own.{{sfn|Walsh|1993|loc=vol. I}} Other members of the NSC were in favor of North's plan; with large support, Poindexter authorized it without notifying President Reagan, and it went into effect.<ref name="Avery">{{cite web|last=Avery|first=Steve|title=Irangate: Iran-Contra affair, 1985–1992|publisher=U-S-History.com|year=2005|url=http://www.u-s-history.com/pages/h1889.html|access-date=7 June 2008|archive-date=12 May 2011|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110512030446/http://www.u-s-history.com/pages/h1889.html|url-status=live}}</ref> At first, the Iranians refused to buy the arms at the inflated price because of the excessive markup imposed by North and Ghorbanifar. They eventually relented, and, in February 1986, 1,000 TOW missiles were shipped to the country.<ref name="Avery"/> From May to November 1986, there were additional shipments of miscellaneous weapons and parts.<ref name="Avery"/>

Both the sale of weapons to Iran and the funding of the Contras attempted to circumvent not only stated administration policy, but also the [[Boland Amendment]]. Administration officials argued that, regardless of Congress restricting funds for the Contras, or any affair, the President (or in this case the administration) could carry on by seeking alternative means of funding such as private entities and foreign governments.<ref name="Fisher">{{cite journal |last=Fisher |first=Louis |title=How Tightly Can Congress Draw the Purse Strings? |journal=American Journal of International Law |volume=83 |issue=4 |pages=758–766 |year=1989 |doi=10.2307/2203364 |jstor=2203364|s2cid=147213452 }}</ref> Funding from one foreign country, [[Brunei]], was botched when North's secretary, [[Fawn Hall]], transposed the numbers of North's [[Swiss bank]] account number. A Swiss businessperson, suddenly $10 million richer, alerted the authorities of the mistake. The money was eventually returned to the [[Sultan of Brunei]], with interest.<ref>{{cite news |author=<!--Staff writer(s); no by-line.--> |title=Brunei Regains $10 Million |work=The New York Times |edition=National |at=sec. A. p. 9 |agency=Associated Press |date=22 July 1987 |access-date=28 March 2008 |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1987/07/22/world/iran-contra-hearings-brunei-regains-10-million.html |archive-date=30 June 2009 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090630090545/http://www.nytimes.com/1987/07/22/world/iran-contra-hearings-brunei-regains-10-million.html |url-status=live }}</ref>

On 7 January 1986, John Poindexter proposed to Reagan a modification of the approved plan: instead of negotiating with the "moderate" Iranian political group, the US would negotiate with "moderate" members of the Iranian government.{{sfn|Reagan|1990|p=516}} Poindexter told Reagan that Ghorbanifar had important connections within the Iranian government, so, with the hope of the release of the hostages, Reagan approved this plan as well.{{sfn|Reagan|1990|p=516}} Throughout February 1986, weapons were shipped directly to Iran by the US (as part of Oliver North's plan), but none of the hostages were released. Retired National Security Advisor McFarlane conducted another international voyage, this one to [[Tehran]]—bringing with him a gift of a [[Bible]] with a handwritten inscription by Ronald Reagan<ref name="Gwertzman">{{cite news |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1987/01/11/us/mcfarlane-took-cake-and-bible-to-teheran-ex-cia-man-says.html |work=The New York Times |first=Bernard |last=Gwertzman |title=McFarlane Took Cake and Bible to Teheran, Ex-C.I.A. Man Says |date=11 January 1987 |access-date=9 February 2017 |archive-date=28 September 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190928033814/https://www.nytimes.com/1987/01/11/us/mcfarlane-took-cake-and-bible-to-teheran-ex-cia-man-says.html |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1987-01-28-mn-1439-story.html |work=Los Angeles Times |title=Calls President Courageous but Weak : Iranian Exhibits Bible Signed by Reagan |date=28 January 1987 |access-date=15 May 2012 |archive-date=20 November 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111120052254/http://articles.latimes.com/1987-01-28/news/mn-1439_1_rafsanjani |url-status=live }}</ref> and, according to [[George W. Cave]], a cake baked in the shape of a key.<ref name="Gwertzman"/> [[Howard Teicher]] described the cake as a joke between North and Ghorbanifar.{{sfn|Tower|Muskie|Scowcroft|1987|p=B-100}} McFarlane met directly with Iranian officials associated with Rafsanjani, who sought to establish US–Iranian relations in an attempt to free the four remaining hostages.{{sfn|Reagan|1990|pp=520–521}}

The US delegation comprised McFarlane, North, Cave (a retired CIA officer who served as the group's translator), Teicher, Israeli diplomat [[Amiram Nir]], and a CIA communicator.<ref>{{cite book |author=President's Special Review Board |author-link=Tower Commission |title=Report of the President's Special Review Board |url=http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=pur1.32754062647601;view=2up;seq=1 |date=February 26, 1987 |publisher=United States Government Printing Office |location=Washington, D.C. |page=237 |id= |oclc=15243889 |ref={{harvid|Report of the President's Special Review Board|1987}} |access-date=8 June 2015 |archive-date=5 February 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160205142211/http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=pur1.32754062647601;view=2up;seq=1 |url-status=live }}</ref> They arrived in Tehran in an Israeli plane carrying forged Irish passports on 25 May 1986.{{sfn|Kornbluh|Byrne|1993|p=249}} This meeting also failed. Much to McFarlane's disgust, he did not meet ministers, and instead met in his words "third and fourth level officials".{{sfn|Kornbluh|Byrne|1993|p=249}} At one point, an angry McFarlane shouted: "As I am a Minister, I expect to meet with decision-makers. Otherwise, you can work with my staff."{{sfn|Kornbluh|Byrne|1993|p=249}} The Iranians requested concessions such as Israel's withdrawal from the [[Golan Heights]], which the US rejected.{{sfn|Reagan|1990|pp=520–521}} More importantly, McFarlane refused to ship spare parts for the Hawk missiles until the Iranians had Hezbollah release the US hostages, whereas the Iranians wanted to reverse that sequence with the spare parts being shipped first before the hostages were freed.{{sfn|Kornbluh|Byrne|1993|p=249}} The differing negotiating positions led to McFarlane's mission going home after four days.{{sfn|Kornbluh|Byrne|1993|p=250}} After the failure of the secret visit to Tehran, McFarlane advised Reagan not to talk to the Iranians anymore, advice that was disregarded.{{sfn|Kornbluh|Byrne|1993|p=250}}