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Islam in Turkey
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=== Secularization era === [[File:Mustafa Kemal Paşa ve Abdurrahman Kamil Efendi (1930).jpg|thumb|212px|[[President of Turkey|President]] [[Mustafa Kemal Atatürk|Mustafa Kemal Pasha]] and [[Mufti]] Abdurrahman Kamil Effendi in [[Amasya]] (1930)]] The [[secularization]] of Turkey started during the last years of the [[Ottoman Empire]] and was a prominent feature of [[Atatürk's reforms]]. Under his leadership, the [[caliphate]] was abolished, and the secular power of religious authorities and functionaries was reduced and eventually eliminated. Religious foundations were nationalized. The influential and popular orders of the [[dervish]] brotherhoods ([[Tariqa]]) were also suppressed. ==== Republic period: 1923–present ==== {{main|Secularism in Turkey}} The withdrawal of Turkey, heir to the Ottoman Empire, as the presumptive leader of the international Muslim community, was symbolic of the change in the government's relationship to Islam. [[Secularism]] ''(or [[laiklik]])'' became one of the "[[Six Arrows]]" of Atatürk's program for remaking Turkey. Whereas Islam had formed the identity of Muslims within the Ottoman Empire, secularism was seen as molding the new Turkish nation and its citizens. [[File:Ankara_Kocatepe_Camii_Innen.JPG|thumb|212px|right|[[Kocatepe Mosque]], [[Ankara]].]] [[File:Mihrab,_Şakirin_Mosque_(7487730340).jpg|thumb|left|alt=The interior of a modern mosque. The camera is focused on its mihrab.|[[Şakirin Mosque]] in [[Istanbul]]. The mosque was designed by [[Zeynep Fadıllıoğlu]], the first woman to do so.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Strickland |first1=Carol |title=Mosque modern |url=https://www.csmonitor.com/The-Culture/Arts/2009/0803/p17s01-algn.html |journal=Christian Science Monitor |date=3 August 2009 |access-date=23 September 2020 |archive-date=19 November 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201119105753/https://www.csmonitor.com/The-Culture/Arts/2009/0803/p17s01-algn.html |url-status=live }}</ref>]] ==== Atatürk's Reforms ==== {{See also|Atatürk's Reforms}} In 1922, the new nationalist regime abolished the Ottoman sultanate, as well as the caliphate in 1924 - the religious office that Ottoman sultans had held for four centuries. Thus, for the first time in Islamic history, no ruler claimed spiritual leadership of Islam. Atatürk and his associates abolished certain religious practices and institutions and generally questioned the value of religion, preferring to place their trust in [[science]]. They regarded organized religion as an [[anachronism]] and contrasted it unfavorably with "civilization", which to them meant a [[Rationalism|rationalist]], secular culture. Unlike in the West, the establishment of secularism in Turkey was not a gradual process of separation of church and state. In the Ottoman Empire, all residents, at least theoretically, had been subject to traditional religious law, and Sunni religious organizations had been part of the state structure. However, the state usually had authority over the [[clergy]] and religious law (e.g. many Sultans are known to change [[Şeyhülislam]]s, who do not approve of state politics). When the reformers of the early 1920s opted for a secular state, they removed religion from the sphere of public policy and restricted it to exclusively that of [[Morality|personal morals]], behavior, and faith. Although private observance of religious rituals could continue, religion and religious organization were excluded from public life.{{multiple image |align=right |direction=vertical |header=Along with the [[Rashidun|first four caliphs]], the names of Hasan and Husayn, considered among the first three [[Shia Imams]], are also prescribed in [[Sunni]] [[mosques in Turkey]] |width=210 |image1=01HSI1 (2099855672).jpg |caption1=[[Ali ibn Abu Talib]] at right and [[Husayn ibn Ali]] at left in [[Hagia Sophia]]. |image2=Name of Prophet Muhammad in Arabic in Hagia Sophia, April 2013.JPG |caption2=[[Hasan ibn Ali]] in [[Hagia Sophia]]. |image3=Hagia Sophia 83.JPG |caption3=[[Husayn ibn Ali]] in [[Hagia Sophia]]. }}In addition to the abolition of the caliphate, new laws mandated the abolition of the office of [[Şeyhülislam]] and the religious [[hierarchy]], the closing and confiscation of [[Sufism|Sufi]] lodges, meeting places, and [[Monastery|monasteries]] and the outlawing of their rituals and meetings, the establishment of government control over [[Waqf|vakıfs]] which had been inalienable under [[Sharia]], the replacement of sharia with adapted European legal codes; the closing of religious schools; the abandonment of the [[Islamic calendar]] in favor of the [[Gregorian calendar]] used in the West, and restrictions on public attire that had religious associations, with the [[Fez (clothing)|fez]] outlawed for men and the [[veil]] discouraged for women. Atatürk and his colleagues also attempted to "turkify" Islam through official encouragement of practices such as the usage of [[Turkish language|Turkish]] rather than [[Arabic]] at devotions, substituting the Turkish word [[Tanrı]] for the Arabic word [[Allah]], and incorporating Turkish into daily calls to prayer. These changes in devotional practices caused widespread criticism among Muslims, which led to a return to the Arabic version of the call to prayer in 1950, after the opposition party [[Democratic Party (Turkey, historical)|DP]] won the elections. Of longer-lasting effect were the regime's measures of prohibiting religious education, restricting the building of new [[mosque]]s, and transferring existing mosques to secular purposes - most notably the [[Hagia Sophia]] (Justinian's sixth-century Christian [[basilica]], which had been converted into a mosque by [[Mehmet II]]), which was turned into a museum in 1935. Muftis and [[imam]]s were appointed by the government, and religious instruction was taken over by the [[Ministry of National Education (Turkey)|Ministry of National Education]]. As a result of these policies, the Turkish Republic was judged negatively by some sections of the Muslim world. The common expectation was that these policies of the 1920s and 1930s would diminish the role of religion in public, which, however, did not occur. As early as 1925, religious grievances were one of the principal causes of the [[Sheikh Said Rebellion|Şeyh Sait rebellion]], an uprising in southeastern Turkey that may have claimed as many as 30,000 lives before being suppressed. Although Turkey was secularized at a legal level, religion remained a strong force. After 1950, some political leaders espoused support for programs and policies that appealed to the religiously inclined in an attempt to benefit from a lot of the population's attachment to religion. Such efforts were opposed by most of the state, who believed that secularism was an essential principle of [[Kemalist Ideology]]. This gradually led to a polarization of the entire country, which became especially evident in the 1980s, as a new generation of religiously motivated local leaders emerged to challenge the dominance of the secularized political elite. By 1994, slogans promising that a return to Islam would cure economic ills and solve the problems of bureaucratic inefficiencies had enough general appeal to enable avowed religious candidates to win mayoral elections in [[Istanbul]] and [[Ankara]]. ==== Multi-party period ==== Following the loosening of authoritarian political control in 1946, a large number of people began to openly call for a return to traditional religious practices. During the 1950s, even certain political leaders found it expedient to join religious leaders in advocating more state respect for religion.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Öztürk|first=Ahmet Erdi|date=2019-02-26|title=An alternative reading of religion and authoritarianism: the new logic between religion and state in the AKP's New Turkey|journal=Southeast European and Black Sea Studies|volume=19|pages=79–98|doi=10.1080/14683857.2019.1576370|s2cid=159047564|issn=1468-3857|url=http://repository.londonmet.ac.uk/5406/1/An-alternative-reading-of-religion-and-authoritarianism.pdf|access-date=4 June 2020|archive-date=22 November 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201122121007/http://repository.londonmet.ac.uk/5406/1/An-alternative-reading-of-religion-and-authoritarianism.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref> A more direct manifestation of the growing reaction against secularism was the revival of the Sufi brotherhoods. Not only did suppressed Sufi orders such as the [[Qadiriyya|Kadiri]], [[Mevlevi]], [[Nakşibendi]], [[Khalidiyya|Khālidiyyā]] and [[Al-Ṭarīqah al-Tijāniyyah]] reemerge, but new movements were formed, including the [[Nursi|Nur]] [[Nur Movement|Cemaat]]i, [[Gülen movement]], [[Süleymancı|Sülaymānīyyā]], [[Community of İskenderpaşa]] and [[İsmailağa]]. The Tijāni became especially militant in confronting the state, damaging monuments to Atatürk to symbolize their opposition to his policy of secularization. This was, however, an isolated incident and only involved one particular [[Sheikh]] of the order. Throughout the 1950s, there were numerous trials of Ticani and other Sufi leaders for anti-state activities. Simultaneously, some movements, notably the Süleymancı and Nurcular, cooperated with those politicians perceived as supportive of pro-Islamic policies. The Nurcular eventually advocated support for Turkey's [[Multi-party system|multi-party political system]], and one of its offshoots, the [[Gülen movement]], had supported the [[True Path Party]] while the [[Hüseyin Hilmi Işık|Işıkçılar]] and [[Enver Ören]] had openly supported the [[Motherland Party (Turkey)|Motherland Party]] since the mid-1980s. [[File:ANKARA_KOCATEPE_CAMİİ.jpg|left|thumb|[[Kocatepe Mosque]], [[Ankara]].]] The demand for restoration of religious education in public schools began in the late 1940s. The government initially responded by authorizing religious instruction in state schools for those students whose parents requested it. Under the rule of the [[Democrat Party (Turkey, 1946–1961)|Democrat Party]] during the 1950s, religious education was made compulsory in secondary schools unless parents made a specific request to have their children excused. Religious education was made compulsory for all primary and secondary school children in 1982. The reintroduction of religion into the school curriculum raised the question of religious higher education. The seculars believed that Islam could be "reformed" if future leaders were trained in state-controlled seminaries. To further this goal, the government in 1949 established a faculty of divinity at [[Ankara University]] to train teachers of Islam and imams. In 1951 [[Democrat Party (Turkey, historical)|the Democrat Party]] government set up special secondary schools ([[İmam Hatip school]]s) for the training of imams and preachers. The number of these schools expanded rapidly to over 250 during the 1970s, when the pro-Islam [[National Salvation Party]] participated in coalition governments. Following the [[1980 Turkish coup d'état|1980 coup]], the military, although secular in orientation, viewed religion as an effective means to counter [[Socialism|socialist]] ideas and thus authorized the construction of 90 more İmam Hatip high schools. During the 1970s and 1980s, Islam experienced [[political rehabilitation]] due to center-right secular leaders perceiving religion as a potential bulwark in their ideological struggle with center-left secular leaders. A small advocacy group that became extremely influential was the [[Intellectuals' Hearth]] ({{langx|tr|Aydınlar Ocağı}}), an organization that holds the beliefs that true Turkish culture is a synthesis of the Turks' pre-Islamic traditions and Islam. According to the Hearth, Islam not only constitutes an essential aspect of Turkish culture, but is a force that can be regulated by the state to help socialize the people to be obedient citizens acquiescent to the overall secular order. After the 1980 coup, many of the Hearth's proposals for restructuring schools, colleges, and state broadcasting were adopted. The result was a purge from these state institutions of more than 2,000 intellectuals perceived as espousing leftist ideas incompatible with the Hearth's vision of Turkey's national culture. [[File:Blue_Mosque_2.jpg|thumb|262px|Interior of the [[Sultan Ahmed Mosque]], Istanbul, built in 1616.]] The state's more tolerant attitude toward Islam encouraged the proliferation of private religious activities, including the construction of new mosques and [[Qur'an]] schools in the cities, the establishment of Islamic centers for research on and conferences about Islam and its role in Turkey, and the establishment of religiously oriented professional and women's journals. The printing of newspapers, the publication of religious books, and the growth of innumerable religious projects ranging from health centers, child-care facilities, and youth hostels to financial institutions and consumer cooperatives flourished. When the government legalized private broadcasting after 1990, several Islamic radio stations were organized. In the summer of 1994, the first Islamic television station, [[Kanal 7]], began broadcasting, first in [[Istanbul]] and then in [[Ankara]]. Although the [[Tariqa|tarikah]] have played a seminal role in Turkey's religious revival and in the mid-1990s still published, several of the country's most widely circulated religious journals and newspapers, a new phenomenon, ''[[İslamcı Aydın]]'' (the Islamist intellectual), unaffiliated with the traditional Sufi orders, emerged during the 1980s. Prolific and popular writers such as [[Ali Bulaç]], [[Rasim Özdenören]], and [[İsmet Özel]] drew upon their knowledge of Western philosophy, [[Marxist]] sociology, and radical Islamist political theory to advocate for a modern Islamic perspective that does not hesitate to criticize societal issues while simultaneously remaining faithful to the ethical values and spiritual dimensions of religion. [[Islamism|Islamist]] intellectuals are harshly critical of Turkey's secular intellectuals, whom they fault for trying to do in Turkey what Western intellectuals did in Europe: substitute worldly [[materialism]], in its [[Capitalism|capitalist]] or socialist version, for religious values. On 15 July 2016, a [[coup d'état]] was attempted in Turkey against state institutions by a faction within the [[Turkish Armed Forces]] with connections to the Gülen movement, citing an erosion in secularism. ==== Diyanet and secularism ==== [[File:Sabancı_Merkez_Camii_3_(34360910156).jpg|thumb|212px|right|[[Sabancı Merkez Camii]], [[Adana]], built in 1998, It was the largest [[mosque]] in Turkey when it was built.]] There is an administration called "Presidency of Religious Affairs" or [[Presidency of Religious Affairs|Diyanet]]<ref>{{Cite web | url=http://www.diyanet.gov.tr | title=T.C. Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı | İman | İbadet | Namaz | Ahlak | access-date=22 November 2021 | archive-date=25 October 2015 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151025153632/http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/tr/icerik/ibrahim-bedrettin-elmali/2395 | url-status=live }}</ref> manages 77,500 mosques. This state agency, established by [[Mustafa Kemal Atatürk|Atatürk]] (1924), finance only [[Sunni]] Muslim worship Other religions must ensure a financially self-sustaining running and they face administrative obstacles during operation.<ref>{{Cite journal|title = Turkey's Diyanet under AKP rule: from protector to imposer of state ideology?|journal = Southeast European and Black Sea Studies|volume = 16|issue = 4|pages = 619–635|last = Ahmet Erdi Öztürk|s2cid = 151448076|doi = 10.1080/14683857.2016.1233663|year = 2016|url = http://repository.londonmet.ac.uk/5402/1/Turkeys-Diyanet-under-AKP-rule-from-protector-to-imposer-of-state-ideology.pdf|access-date = 4 June 2020|archive-date = 6 May 2020|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20200506210706/http://repository.londonmet.ac.uk/5402/1/Turkeys-Diyanet-under-AKP-rule-from-protector-to-imposer-of-state-ideology.pdf|url-status = live}}</ref> {| border="3px solid" style="margin:0 auto; padding: 0; font-size: 90%; center:; :; :" |- |+ <span style="color:#003366; font-size:125%;">Situation of the [[denominations of Islam]] in Turkey</span> |- !bgcolor="#003366" align="center" width="30%"|<span style="color:#000; font-size:100%;">Religions</span> !bgcolor="#003366" align="center" width="10%"|<span style="color:#000; font-size:100%;">Estimated population</span> !bgcolor="#003366" align="center" width="10% |<span style="color:#000; font-size:100%;">Expropriation <br />measures<ref name="la croix">{{cite news|url=http://www.la-croix.com/Urbi-et-Orbi/Actualite/Monde/Le-gouvernement-turc-va-restituer-des-biens-saisis-a-des-minorites-religieuses-2011-08-29-704560|title=Le gouvernement turc va restituer des biens saisis à des minorités religieuses|newspaper=La Croix|date=29 August 2011|access-date=23 February 2017|via=www.la-croix.com|archive-date=7 October 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171007120136/https://www.la-croix.com/Urbi-et-Orbi/Actualite/Monde/Le-gouvernement-turc-va-restituer-des-biens-saisis-a-des-minorites-religieuses-2011-08-29-704560|url-status=live}}</ref></span> !bgcolor="#003366" align="center" width="50%"|<span style="color:#000; font-size:100%;">Official recognition through the Constitution or international treaties</span> !bgcolor="#003366" align="center" width="10%"|<span style="color:#000; font-size:100%;">Government Financing of places of worship and religious staff</span> |- !scope="row" style="background:#CCCCFF;text-align:left" | [[Sunni]] Islam - [[Hanafi]] & [[Shafi'i]] | align="right"| more than 85%<ref name="interaktif.konda.com.tr"/><ref>{{Cite web |date=2009-10-07 |title=Mapping the Global Muslim Population |url=https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2009/10/07/mapping-the-global-muslim-population/ |access-date=2022-08-17 |website=Pew Research Center's Religion & Public Life Project |language=en-US |archive-date=14 June 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220614051531/https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2009/10/07/mapping-the-global-muslim-population/ |url-status=live }}</ref> | align="center"| No | align="center"| Yes through the Diyanet mentioned in the Constitution (art.136)<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/anayasa/anayasa_2011.pdf |title=Türki̇ye Büyük Mi̇llet Mecli̇si̇ |access-date=8 March 2013 |archive-date=8 December 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141208135008/http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/anayasa/anayasa_2011.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref> | align="center"| Yes through the Diyanet<ref name="obtic">{{cite web |url=http://obtic.org/Dosyalar/Cahiers%20de%20l%27Obtic/CahiersObtic_2.pdf |title=Cahiers de L'obtic |publisher=Observatoire de recherche interdisciplinaire sur la Turquie contemporaine |date=December 2012 |access-date=2013-03-08 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131002163826/http://obtic.org/Dosyalar/Cahiers%20de%20l%27Obtic/CahiersObtic_2.pdf |archive-date=2013-10-02 }}</ref> |- !scope="row" style="background:#CCCCFF;text-align:left" | [[Shia]] Islam - [[Alevism|Alevi]]<ref name="Amman">Not recognized as an [[Islamic]] [[fiqh]] [[madh'hab]] by ''the [[Amman Message]].''</ref> |rowspan=2| less than %5 to more than 30%<ref name="web.archive.org"/><ref name="interaktif.konda.com.tr"/><ref name="pewresearch.org"/> |rowspan=2 align="center"| Yes<ref name="clarke"/> | align="center"| No.<ref name="ovipot">{{cite web|url=http://ovipot.hypotheses.org/1348|title=Les minorités non musulmanes en Turquie : "certains rapports d'ONG parlent d'une logique d'attrition", observe Jean-Paul Burdy|date=2010 |doi=10.58079/smk9 |access-date=23 February 2017|archive-date=28 November 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171128183620/http://ovipot.hypotheses.org/1348|url-status=live |last1=Lisa Deheurles-Montmayeur }}</ref> In the early fifteenth century,<ref name="Persée »">{{cite journal|title=Notes et documents sur les Ottomans, les Safavides et la Géorgie, 1516-1521|journal=Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique|first=Jean-Louis|last=Bacqué-Grammont|volume=20|issue=2|pages=239–272|doi=10.3406/cmr.1979.1359|year=1979}}</ref> due to [[Ottoman persecution of Alevis|the unsustainable Ottoman oppression]], [[Alevi]]s supported [[Ismail I|Shah Ismail I]] who had Turkmen origins. [[Ismail I|Shah Ismail I]] supporters, who wear a red cap with twelvefolds in reference to the 12 Imams were called [[Qizilbash]]. [[Ottoman Empire|Ottomans]] considered the [[Qizilbash]] ([[Alevi]]) as appendages of [[Safavid Iran|Safavid Empire]]. Today, [[Cemevi]], places of worship of [[Alevi]]-[[Bektashi]] have no official recognition. |rowspan=2 align="center"| No<ref name="obtic"/> |- !scope="row" style="background:#CCCCFF;text-align:left" | [[Shia]] Islam - [[Bektashi]]<ref name="Amman"/> | align="center"| No.<ref name="ovipot"/> In 1826 with the abolition of the [[Janissary]] corps, the [[Bektashi]] [[Khanqah|tekke]] ''([[dervish]] convent)'' were closed.<ref name="clarke"/><ref name="janissaire">{{cite web|url=http://janissaire.hautetfort.com/archive/2008/05/14/les-janissaires-1979-de-vincent-mansour-monteil.html|title=Blog Hautetfort : Erreur 404|access-date=23 February 2017|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160303181641/http://janissaire.hautetfort.com/archive/2008/05/14/les-janissaires-1979-de-vincent-mansour-monteil.html|archive-date=3 March 2016}}</ref> |- !scope="row" style="background:#CCCCFF;text-align:left" | [[Shia]] Islam - [[Ja'fari]] | align="right"| ~1% <br /> | align="center"| | align="center"| No<ref name="ovipot"/> | align="center"| No<ref name="obtic"/> |- !scope="row" style="background:#CCCCFF;text-align:left" | [[Shia]] Islam - [[Alawites]]<ref name="Amman"/> | align="right"| ~1%<ref>{{Cite news |last=Spencer |first=Richard |date=2016-04-03 |title=Who are the Alawites? |language=en-GB |work=The Telegraph |url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/04/02/who-are-the-alawites/ |access-date=2022-08-14 |issn=0307-1235 |archive-date=10 October 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221010114444/https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/04/02/who-are-the-alawites/ |url-status=live }}</ref> | align="center"| | align="center"| No<ref name="ovipot"/> | align="center"| No<ref name="obtic"/> |- !scope="row" style="background:#CCCCFF;text-align:left" | [[Non-denominational Muslim|Ghair Muqallid]] and [[Quranist Muslim]] | align="right"| ~2% <ref name="pewforum.org"/> | align="center"| - | align="center"| - | align="center"| - |- |} {{further|Alevi history|Ottoman persecution of Alevis|Bektashism and folk religion|Kizilbashes|Ismail I|Safavid conversion of Iran to Shia Islam}} The Diyanet is an official state institution established in 1924 and works to provide Quranic education for children, as well as drafting weekly sermons delivered to approximately 85,000 different mosques. Furthermore, the Diyanet employs all of the imams in Turkey.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.csia-oxford.org/diyanet-presidency-religious-affairs|title=CSIA|access-date=11 November 2019|archive-date=22 December 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191222043126/https://www.csia-oxford.org/diyanet-presidency-religious-affairs|url-status=live}}</ref> When collecting tax, all Turkish citizens are equal. The tax rate is not based on religion. However, through the Diyanet, Turkish citizens are not equal in the use of revenue. The Presidency of Religious Affairs, which has a budget over U.S. $2.5 billion in 2012, finance only [[Sunni]] Muslim worship.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Sözeri|first1=Semiha|last2=Öztürk|first2=Ahmet Erdi|date=September 2018|title=Diyanet as a Turkish Foreign Policy Tool: Evidence from the Netherlands and Bulgaria|journal=Politics and Religion|language=en|volume=11|issue=3|pages=624–648|doi=10.1017/S175504831700075X|s2cid=148657630|issn=1755-0483|url=http://repository.londonmet.ac.uk/5404/1/Diyanet_Ozturk-Sozeri.pdf|access-date=4 June 2020|archive-date=6 May 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200506210735/http://repository.londonmet.ac.uk/5404/1/Diyanet_Ozturk-Sozeri.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref> [[Sufi order]]s like [[Alevi]]-[[Bektashi]], [[Bayrami]]-[[Jelveti]], [[Halveti]] ''([[Gulshani]], [[Jerrahi]], [[Nasuhi]], [[Rahmani]], [[Sunbuli]], [[Ussaki]]),'' [[Hurufi]]-[[Rüfai]], [[Malamati]], [[Mevlevi]], [[Nakşibendi]] ''([[Khalidiyya|Halidi]], [[Naqshbandi Haqqani Sufi Order|Haqqani]]),'' [[Qadiri]]-[[Galibi Order|Galibi]] and [[Ja'fari jurisprudence|Ja'fari Muslims]]<ref name="clarke">The World of the Alevis: Issues of Culture and Identity, Gloria L. Clarke</ref> are not officially recognized. {{Sunni Islam|collapsed=1}} ==== Headscarf issue ==== {| class="wikitable" border="1px black" style="float:right; margin-center:1em" |- ! colspan="3" style="background:#f99;" |Do you cover when going outside?<ref name="TR100">{{Cite web |title=TR100 |url=https://interaktif.konda.com.tr/turkiye-100-kisi-olsaydi |access-date=2022-08-11 |website=interaktif.konda.com.tr |archive-date=25 June 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220625123924/https://interaktif.konda.com.tr/turkiye-100-kisi-olsaydi |url-status=live }}</ref> |-Answers | || 2011 || 2021 |- | No, I do not || 37% || 41% |- | Yes, I wear a headscarf || 53% || 48% |- | Yes, I wear a [[türban]] || 9% || 10% |- | Yes, I wear a [[çarşaf]] || 1% || 1% |} {{main|Headscarf controversy in Turkey}} Although intellectual debates on the role of Islam attracted widespread interest, they did not provoke the kind of controversy that erupted over the issue of appropriate attire for Muslim women. During the early 1980s, female college students who were determined to demonstrate their commitment to Islam began to cover their heads and necks with scarves and wear long, shape-concealing overcoats. The appearance of these women in the [[citadel]]s of Turkish secularism shocked those men and women who tended to perceive such attire as a symbol of the Islamic traditionalism they rejected. Militant secularists persuaded the Higher Education Council to issue a regulation in 1987 forbidding female university students to cover their heads in class. Protests by thousands of religious students and some university professors forced several universities to waive enforcement of the dress code. The issue continued to be seriously divisive in the mid-1990s. Throughout the first half of the 1990s, highly educated, articulate but religiously pious women have appeared in public dressed in Islamic attire that conceals all but their faces and hands. Other women, especially in [[Ankara]], [[Istanbul]], and [[İzmir]], have demonstrated against such attire by wearing revealing fashions and Atatürk badges. The issue is discussed and debated in almost every type of forum – artistic, commercial, cultural, economic, political, and religious. For many citizens of Turkey, women's dress has become the issue that defines whether a Muslim is secularist or religious. In 2010, the Turkish Higher Educational council (YÖK) lifted the ban on headscarves at the universities. Since the start of his presidency, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has drastically increased the amount of religious high schools across Turkey to support his plan on bringing up a more pious generation. However, this push on piousness in school children seems to have had an adverse effect, for there is anecdotal evidence of a notable number of Turkish students from religious high schools admitting their loss of faith in Islamic beliefs, which has caused substantial amount of discussion among politicians and religious clerics.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-43981745|title=Losing their religion: The young Turks rejecting Islam|last=Girit|first=Selin|date=2018-05-10|access-date=2019-11-10|language=en-GB|archive-date=3 April 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190403210646/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-43981745|url-status=live}}</ref> [https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/turkey-hijab-headscarf-police-officers-uniform-approved-muslim-women-a7213861.html More recently in 2016, Turkey approved hijab as the part of the official police uniform]. For the first time, female officers will be able to cover their heads with a headscarf under their police caps. This act was pushed by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's Islamist-rooted Justice and Development Party (AKP) that have been pushing for relaxed restrictions on the hijab.
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