Editing James Jesus Angleton (section)

===Suspicion of infiltration===
Angleton held a general belief that all secret intelligence agencies should be assumed to be penetrated by others, or at least that a reasonable chief of counterintelligence should assume so.{{citation needed|date=August 2015}} Angleton's view was influenced by his direct experience with the manipulation of German intelligence during World War II, the [[Cambridge Five]], and the success of American infiltration efforts in the Third World. In particular, Angleton's close association with Philby heightened Angleton's suspicions and led him to double-check "potential problems".{{Citation needed|date=July 2023}} Angleton's position in the CIA and his close relationship with Director [[Richard Helms]] in particular expanded his influence, and as it grew, the CIA split between Angletonians and anti-Angletonians.{{Citation needed|date=July 2023}} This conflict rose in particular regard to [[Anatoliy Golitsyn]] and [[Yuri Nosenko]], who defected from the Soviet Union to the United States in 1961 and 1964, respectively.

Golitsyn defected via [[Helsinki]] on December 15, 1961. He and his family flew with a CIA escort to Sweden and then to the United States, where he was interviewed by Angleton personally.<ref>{{cite web |author=<!--Not stated--> |title=NARA Record Number: 104-10169-10125 |url=https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=23302#relPageId=7 |access-date=28 June 2021 |website=Mary Ferrell Foundation |publisher= }}</ref><ref name="Mitrokhin2">[[Christopher Andrew (historian)|Christopher Andrew]] and [[Vasili Mitrokhin]] (2000). ''The Mitrokhin Archive: The KGB in Europe and the West.'' Gardners Books. {{ISBN|0-14-028487-7}}.</ref> Golitsyn limited his initial debriefing to a review of photographs to identify KGB officers and refused to discuss KGB strategy. After Golitsyn raised the possibility of serious infiltration with MI5 in a subsequent debriefing, MI5 shared the concern with Angleton. He responded by asking Helms to allow him to take responsibility for Golitsyn and his further debriefing. Golitsyn ultimately informed on many famous Soviet agents, including the [[Cambridge Five]], which led to their apprehension.<ref name="Mitrokhin2" /> Angleton identified Golitsyn as "the most valuable defector ever to reach the West".<ref>{{cite web |last1=Herron |first1=Caroline Rand |last2=Wright |first2=Michael |date=2 February 1986 |title=THE NATION; A K.G.B. Defector Who May Not Be |url=https://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F50710FE3B5C0C718CDDAB0894DE484D81&n=Top/Reference/Times%20Topics/Organizations/K/KGB |via=NYTimes.com}}</ref><ref name="Nosenko2">[[Walter Pincus]], ''[[The Washington Post]]'', August 27, 2008, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/26/AR2008082603493.html Yuri I. Nosenko, 81; KGB Agent Who Defected to the U.S.]</ref>

However, other allegations Golitsyn made, including that Prime Minister of the United Kingdom [[Harold Wilson]] was a Soviet agent and that the [[Sino-Soviet split]] was a "charade," were ultimately found to be false.<ref name="Mitrokhin2" />  Golitsyn also claimed that a mole who had been stationed in West Germany, was of Slavic descent, had a last name that might end in "sky" and definitely began with a "K", and operated under the KGB codename "[[Sasha (espionage)|Sasha]]".<ref>{{Cite journal |last=U.S. Central Intelligence Agency |date=2013 |title=James J. Angleton, Anatoliy Golitsyn, and the "Monster Plot": Their Impact on CIA Personnel and Operations |url=https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB431/docs/intell_ebb_019.PDF |journal=Studies in Intelligence |volume=55 |issue=4 |pages=45}}</ref> Angleton believed this claim, with the result that anyone who approximated this description fell under his suspicion.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Ignatius |first=David |date=March 8, 1992 |title=Desperately Seeking Sasha |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/entertainment/books/1992/03/08/desperately-seeking-sasha/01e18014-0b4f-437d-aa21-4443079cda0c/ |newspaper=The Washington Post}}</ref>

Angleton became increasingly convinced that the CIA was compromised by the KGB.<ref name="BeardenRisen2003">{{cite book |last1=Bearden |first1=Milton |url=https://archive.org/details/mainenemyinsides00bear |title=The Main Enemy: The Inside Story of the CIA's Final Showdown with the KGB |last2=Risen |first2=James |date=2003 |publisher=Random House Publishing Group |isbn=978-1588363060 |page=[https://archive.org/details/mainenemyinsides00bear/page/38 38] |access-date=15 November 2013 |url-access=registration}}</ref> Golitsyn convinced Angleton that the KGB had reorganized in 1958 and 1959 to consist mostly of a shell, incorporating only those agents whom the CIA and the FBI were recruiting, directed by a small cabal of puppet masters who doubled those agents to manipulate their Western counterparts. Although Golitsyn was a questionable source, Angleton accepted significant information obtained from his debriefing by the CIA.<ref name=":2" />

In 1964, Yuri Nosenko, a KGB officer based in [[Geneva]], insisted he needed to defect to the United States because his role as a double agent had been discovered, and he was being recalled to Moscow.<ref name=":1">[[Tom Mangold|Mangold, Tom]]. ''Cold Warrior: James Jesus Angleton: The CIA's Master Spy Hunter''. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991. {{ISBN|0-671-66273-2}}.</ref> Nosenko was allowed to defect, although the CIA was unable to verify a KGB recall order. Golitsyn had said from the beginning that the KGB would try to plant defectors in an effort to discredit him. Under great duress, Nosenko failed two highly questionable [[Polygraph|lie detector]] tests but passed a third test monitored by several Agency departments.<ref>[[Gerald Posner|Posner, Gerald]], ''Case Closed'' (New York:Random House, 1993, pgs. 40–42)</ref> Judging his claim (as well as additional claims regarding [[Lee Harvey Oswald]]) to be improbable, Angleton permitted David Murphy, head of the Soviet Russia Division, to hold Nosenko in solitary confinement for over three years. This confinement included 16 months in a small attic with no windows, furniture, heat or air conditioning. Human contact was completely banned. Nosenko was given a shower once a week and had no television, reading material, radio, exercise, or toothbrush. Interrogations were frequent and intensive. Nosenko spent an additional four months in a ten-foot by ten-foot concrete bunker in [[Camp Peary]].<ref name="Nosenko2" /> He was told that this condition would continue for 25 years unless he confessed to being a Soviet spy.<ref>Posner, p.39</ref> Nosenko did not appear to have shaken Angleton's faith in Golitsyn, although Helms and [[J. Edgar Hoover]] thought otherwise. Hoover's objections are said to have been so vehement as to severely curtail counterintelligence cooperation between the FBI and CIA for the remainder of Hoover's service as FBI director. Nosenko was found to be a legitimate defector, a lieutenant colonel. He became a consultant to the CIA.<ref name="Nosenko2" /> Golitsyn, who had defected years before, was unable to provide concrete support for his views of the KGB.

Angleton came into increasing conflict with the rest of the Agency, particularly the [[Directorate of Operations (CIA)|Directorate of Operations]], over the efficacy of their intelligence-gathering efforts. He questioned this without explaining his broader views on KGB strategy and organization.{{citation needed|date=October 2023}}

In his 2022 book, ''Uncovering Popov's Mole'', researcher [[John M. Newman]] argues that Bruce Solie of the Office of Security was very probably the mole and that he misled Angleton, his protégé, into believing the traitor was in the Soviet Russia Division.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Newman |first=John M. |title=Uncovering Popov's Mole: The Assassination of President Kennedy |pages=44–49 |year=2022 |isbn=979-8355050771 |language=EN}}</ref>