Editing Key management (section)

===Key exchange===
{{Main|Key exchange}}
Prior to any secured communication, users must set up the details of the cryptography. In some instances this may require exchanging identical keys (in the case of a symmetric key system). In others it may require possessing the other party's public key. While public keys can be openly exchanged (their corresponding private key is kept secret), symmetric keys must be exchanged over a secure communication channel. Formerly, exchange of such a key was extremely troublesome, and was greatly eased by access to secure channels such as a [[diplomatic bag]]. [[Clear text]] exchange of symmetric keys would enable any interceptor to immediately learn the key, and any encrypted data.

The advance of public key cryptography in the 1970s has made the exchange of keys less troublesome. Since the [[Diffie-Hellman]] key exchange protocol was published in 1975, it has become possible to exchange a key over an insecure communications channel, which has substantially reduced the risk of key disclosure during distribution. It is possible, using something akin to a [[book code]], to include key indicators as clear text attached to an encrypted message. The encryption technique used by [[Richard Sorge]]'s code clerk was of this type, referring to a page in a statistical manual, though it was in fact a code. The [[German Army (Wehrmacht)|German Army]] [[Enigma machine|Enigma]] symmetric encryption key was a mixed type early in its use; the key was a combination of secretly distributed key schedules and a user chosen session key component for each message.

In more modern systems, such as [[OpenPGP]] compatible systems, a session key for a symmetric key algorithm is distributed encrypted by an [[asymmetric key algorithm]]. This approach avoids even the necessity for using a key exchange protocol like Diffie-Hellman key exchange.

Another method of key exchange involves encapsulating one key within another. Typically a master key is generated and exchanged using some secure method. This method is usually cumbersome or expensive (breaking a master key into multiple parts and sending each with a trusted courier for example) and not suitable for use on a larger scale. Once the master key has been securely exchanged, it can then be used to securely exchange subsequent keys with ease. This technique is usually termed [[key wrap]]. A common technique uses [[block cipher]]s and cryptographic [[hash function]]s.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Block Cipher - an overview {{!}} ScienceDirect Topics|url=https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/engineering/block-cipher|access-date=2020-12-12|website=www.sciencedirect.com}}</ref>

A related method is to exchange a master key (sometimes termed a root key) and derive subsidiary keys as needed from that key and some other data (often referred to as diversification data). The most common use for this method is probably in [[smartcard]]-based cryptosystems, such as those found in banking cards. The bank or credit network embeds their secret key into the card's secure key storage during card production at a secured production facility. Then at the [[point of sale]] the card and card reader are both able to derive a common set of session keys based on the shared secret key and card-specific data (such as the card serial number). This method can also be used when keys must be related to each other (i.e., departmental keys are tied to divisional keys, and individual keys tied to departmental keys). However, tying keys to each other in this way increases the damage which may result from a security breach as attackers will learn something about more than one key. This reduces entropy, with regard to an attacker, for each key involved.

A [[Oblivious_pseudorandom_function#A_homomorphic_key_management_system|recent method]] uses an [[oblivious pseudorandom function]] to issue keys without the key management system ever being in a position to see the keys.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Jarecki |first1=Stanislaw |last2=Krawczyk |first2=Hugo |last3=Resch |first3=Jason |chapter=Updatable Oblivious Key Management for Storage Systems |date=2019 |title=Proceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security |volume=November 2019 |pages=379–393 |doi=10.1145/3319535.3363196 |isbn=978-1-4503-6747-9 |chapter-url=https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3319535.3363196 |access-date=Jan 27, 2024}}</ref>