Editing Layforce (section)

===Bardia===
In early April Laycock received orders to begin carrying out raids on the Afrika Korps' lines of communication along the North African coast.<ref name=Saunders52/> On 12 April they carried out a preliminary move to [[Alexandria]], and three days later they received orders to carry out the [[Bardia raid]] and another on [[Bomba (Libya)|Bomba]].<ref name=website/> 'A' and 'C' Battalions were dispatched to attack Bardia, while four Troops from 'B' Battalion embarked on a [[destroyer]] and headed for Bomba. The attacks had to be abandoned, however, due to high seas which would have made disembarking and re-embarking too dangerous.<ref name=website/>

A few days later it was decided to implement the attack on Bardia. This time, the raiders were drawn from 'A' Battalion (No. 7 Commando), and embarked upon ''Glengyle''. A number of naval support elements were attached, including three [[Royal Australian Navy]] destroyers ({{HMAS|Stuart|D00|2}}, {{HMAS|Voyager|D31|2}}, and {{HMAS|Waterhen|D22|2}}) and the anti-aircraft cruiser {{HMS|Coventry|1916|6}}.<ref name=Saunders53>Saunders 1959, p. 53.</ref> Due to concerns about the force being attacked from the air, it was decided that the raid would take place under the cover of darkness; and, as a result, additional assets in the form of the submarine {{HMS|Triumph|N18|6}} and a detachment from the Folboat Troop (later known as the [[Special Boat Section]]) under [[Roger Courtney]] were tasked with providing navigational assistance by marking both the anchorage and landing beach.<ref name=Saunders53/>

The raid was carried out on the night of 19/20 April 1941,<ref name=Saunders53/> but things went awry from the beginning. The submarine missed its rendezvous with the landing ship, having been strafed by an Allied aircraft shortly before. Problems with the release gear for the assault craft meant that some of the commando parties were late getting ashore, and another landed at the wrong beach.<ref name=Saunders53/>

The landings went ahead unopposed and the commandos moved to the various objectives that had been identified by intelligence.<ref name=Saunders53/> Little damage was done as a number of the targets proved not to exist or were not where they were thought to be. One party was able to damage a bridge, while another set a tyre dump on fire and blew up the [[Breech-loading weapon|breeches]] of a number of naval guns. Due to the delays during the landings and the need to depart while it was still dark, time ran out and the commandos were forced to withdraw.<ref name=website/> On the way back, an officer was shot when he failed to respond correctly when challenged by a sentry; while 67 men, not knowing that there were no assault craft at their beach due to the earlier error, were left behind and later captured.<ref name=website/><ref>Saunders 1959, pp. 53–54.</ref>

Despite the lack of tangible success the raid was not a complete failure:<ref name=Saunders54>Saunders 1959, p. 54.</ref> the appearance of the commandos forced the Germans to divert the main part of an armoured brigade from Sollum in order to defend against further raids.<ref name=Saunders54/> Although there were still some elements of operational art that had to be refined, the raid demonstrated the strategic value that the commandos might have had within the theatre, if strategic imperatives and resource constraints had not served to derail the concept.<ref name=Saunders55/>