Editing Lloyd Fredendall (section)

===Tunisia, Oran, and Kasserine Pass===
[[File:Major General Lloyd Fredendall Visits a British Aircraft Carrier. 14 January 1943, Oran, Major General Lloyd Fredendall of the United States Army in North Africa, Paid a Visit To the British Aircraft Carrier, H A13895.jpg|thumb|right|Fredendall visits the British aircraft carrier {{HMS|Formidable|67|6}} at Oran, 1943.]]

After the Torch landings, Fredendall became the ''de facto'' military governor in [[Oran]]. Orders from his headquarters in the Grand Hotel of Oran were headed with "II Corps – In the Field," which prompted derision from his troops, who were living in spartan conditions.<ref>{{cite book |last=Atkinson |first=Rick |date=2002 |title=An Army at Dawn: The War in North Africa, 1942-1943 |url=https://archive.org/details/armyatdawnwarinn00atki |url-access=registration |location=New York |publisher=Henry Holt |page=[https://archive.org/details/armyatdawnwarinn00atki/page/273 273] |isbn=0-8050-8724-9}}</ref>

Fredendall was assigned to command the [[II Corps (United States)|U.S. II Corps]] in its [[Tunisian campaign|advance into Tunisia]] against [[Wehrmacht|German forces]]. (He thus became the second-oldest of the 34 generals to serve as a U.S. Army corps commander in World War II, after [[Innis P. Swift]], commander of the [[I Corps (United States)|I Corps]] in the [[Pacific War|Pacific]].) II Corps served under the [[First Army (United Kingdom)|British First Army]], whose commander, [[Lieutenant-general (United Kingdom)|Lieutenant General]] [[Kenneth Anderson (British Army officer)|Kenneth Anderson]], considered Fredendall incompetent well before the loss at Kasserine. Fredendall was given to speaking and issuing orders using his own slang, such as calling [[infantry]] units "walking boys" and [[artillery]] "popguns." Instead of using the standard military map grid-based location designators, he made up confusing codes such as "the place that begins with C." This practice was unheard-of for a general and distinguished graduate of the Command and General Staff School, who had been taught to always use standardized language and procedures to ensure clarity when transmitting orders under the stress of combat. Fredendall's informality often led to confusion among his subordinates, and precious time was lost attempting to discern his meaning.<ref>Carr, Vincent M., ''The Battle of Kasserine Pass: An Examination of Allied Operational Failings'', Air Command And Staff College, Maxwell AFB, (April 2003), pp. 18–21.</ref>

During the advance into Tunisia, Fredendall used an [[Military engineer|engineer]] [[Company (military unit)|company]] of the [[19th Engineer Regiment]] to build a large, dug-in [[corps]] headquarters [[bunker]] {{convert|70|mi}} behind the front in a place called Speedy Valley (nine miles southeast of [[Tébessa]]). Blasted and drilled out of solid rock, the bunker (actually two U-shaped complexes running {{convert|160|ft}} into the hillside) took three weeks to construct.<ref>Andrews, Peter, ''A Place to be Lousy In'', ''[[American Heritage Magazine]]'' (December 1991), Volume 42, Issue 8, pp. 100–109.</ref> An anti-aircraft battalion was emplaced to protect the headquarters. Fredendall also ordered a bulletproof [[Cadillac]] similar to Eisenhower's, and regularly phoned Oran to find out why it was not being delivered faster. Then-[[Brigadier general (United States)|Brigadier General]] [[Omar Bradley]] called the headquarters "an embarrassment to every American soldier," and General Eisenhower, the [[Supreme Allied Commander]] in North Africa, after viewing the elaborate structure, reminded his senior commanders that even generals must assume personal risk in combat.<ref>[[Stephen E. Ambrose|Ambrose, Stephen E.]], ''D-Day, June 6, 1944: The Climactic Battle of World War II'', Simon and Schuster (1994), {{ISBN|0-671-67334-3}}, {{ISBN|978-0-671-67334-5}}, p. 361: After observing Fredendall's huge underground HQ bunker located 70 miles behind the lines, Eisenhower had reminded his senior commanders that "Generals are expendable just as is any other item in an army."</ref> Fredendall rarely visited the front lines, and had a habit of disregarding advice from commanders who had been farther forward and had actually reconnoitered the terrain.<ref>MacDonald, Charles B., ''The Mighty Endeavor: The American War in Europe'', Da Capo Press (1992), {{ISBN|0-306-80486-7}}, {{ISBN|978-0-306-80486-1}}, pp. 125–126.</ref> He split up units and scattered them widely,<ref>[https://web.archive.org/web/20101102191921/http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,790808-1,00.html "Man Under A Star"], ''Time'' Magazine, March 29, 1943.</ref> and at critical defense points had positioned U.S. forces (against advice) too far apart for mutual support or effective employment of [[artillery]], the strongest American arm.<ref>Andrews, Peter, ''A Place to be Lousy In'', ''[[American Heritage (magazine)|American Heritage]]'' Magazine (December 1991), Volume 42, Issue 8, pp. 100–109.</ref><ref>MacDonald, pp. 125–126.</ref><ref>Carr, pp. 20–21.</ref>
 
During the [[Battle of Kasserine Pass]], Eisenhower sent Major General [[Ernest N. Harmon]] to report on the fighting, to assist Fredendall and the other Allied commanders, and to determine whether Fredendall or his [[1st Armored Division (United States)|1st Armored Division]] commander, Major General [[Orlando Ward]], should be replaced.<ref>Carr, p. 28.</ref> Harmon noted that Fredendall and his superior, Anderson, rarely saw each other, and failed to properly coordinate and integrate forces under their command. Fredendall was barely on speaking terms with Ward, whom he had deliberately left out of operational meetings after Ward had repeatedly protested the separation of his command into weaker 'penny packet' forces distributed across various sectors of the front.<ref name="ossad"/><ref>Carr, p. 30.</ref>

Allied forces were bereft of [[air support]] during critical attacks, and were frequently positioned by the senior command in positions where they could not support each other. Subordinates later recalled their utter confusion at being handed conflicting orders, not knowing which general to obey—Anderson or Fredendall. While interviewing field commanders, Harmon heard much criticism over what many Allied officers viewed as a [[coward]]ly, confused, and out-of-touch command. Noting that Fredendall seemed out of touch (and at one point, intoxicated), he requested and received permission to go to the front and intervene where necessary to shore up Allied defenses.<ref>[[Carlo D'Este|D'Este, Carlo]], ''Eisenhower: A Soldier's Life'', Orion Publishing Group Ltd. (2003), {{ISBN|0-304-36658-7}}, {{ISBN|0-304-36658-7}}</ref>

[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 101I-557-1002-10, Tunesien, amerikanische Kriegsgefangene.jpg|thumb|left|American troops taken prisoner at Kasserine Pass marching through a Tunisian village, January 1943.]]

On March 5, 1943, after the American [[Battle of Kasserine Pass|rout at Kasserine Pass]], Eisenhower visited II Corps headquarters and conferred with Brigadier General Bradley. Eisenhower asked "What do you think of the command here?" Bradley's response was "It's pretty bad. I've talked to all the [[Division (military)|division]] commanders. To a man they've lost confidence in Fredendall as the corps commander." British [[General (United Kingdom)|General]] [[Harold Alexander, 1st Earl Alexander of Tunis|Sir Harold Alexander]], the [[18th Army Group]] commander, informed Eisenhower that he would welcome a replacement for Fredendall.<ref>[[Martin Blumenson|Blumenson, Martin]], ''Masters of the Art of Command,'' Da Capo Press (1990), {{ISBN|0-306-80403-4}}, {{ISBN|978-0-306-80403-8}}, p. 284.</ref> Eisenhower offered the II Corps command to Harmon, who declined on the grounds that it would be unethical to appear to personally benefit from his negative assessment of Fredendall.

Eisenhower then decided on [[Major general (United States)|Major General]] [[George S. Patton]] as Fredendall's replacement. On March 5, 1943, Eisenhower personally flew to [[Tébessa|Tebessa]] to inform Fredendall of his decision to replace him, which he couched in terms of a routine reassignment.<ref>[[John Eisenhower|Eisenhower, John S. D.]], ''Allies: Pearl Harbor to D-Day'', Da Capo Press (2000), {{ISBN|0-306-80941-9}}, {{ISBN|978-0-306-80941-5}}, pp. 279–280.</ref> Eisenhower arranged the replacement so that Fredendall's reputation was not formally brought into disrepute, an action some believe he soon came to regret.<ref>Blumenson, pp. 282–284.</ref><ref>Eisenhower, John S. D., ''Allies: Pearl Harbor to D-Day'', Da Capo Press (2000), {{ISBN|0-306-80941-9}}, {{ISBN|978-0-306-80941-5}}, p. 280: "Upon assuming command of II Corps, Patton was given specific personal written instructions by Eisenhower, including this directive: "You must not retain for ''one instant'' any man in a responsible position where you have become doubtful of his ability to do his job."</ref> On March 6, 1943, Patton replaced Fredendall. When Patton arrived at II Corps headquarters, Fredendall was at breakfast. Patton had disliked Fredendall in 1941 when they were both division commanders at [[Fort Benning]], [[Georgia (U.S. state)|Georgia]]. After a brief conference, Patton formally relieved him, saying II Corps "was primarily a tank show and I know more about tanks." Patton noted in his diary that Fredendall was "Very nice, conducted himself well – very well." In a letter to his wife Beatrice that day, Patton even wrote that "Fredendall is a great sport, and I feel sure, is a victim largely due to circumstances beyond his control." However, only a week later, after an initial inspection of his new command, Patton had completely changed his mind: "I cannot see what Fredendall did to justify his existence."<ref>Perry, Mark, ''Partners in Command: George Marshall and Dwight Eisenhower in War and Peace'', London: Penguin Group (2007), {{ISBN|1-59420-105-6}}, {{ISBN|978-1-59420-105-9}}, p. 178.</ref> Fredendall was the first of seven American corps commanders in World War II to be "relieved of command", most for medical reasons.

In his after-action report for the Kasserine battles, the [[2nd Armored Division (United States)|2nd Armored Division]] commander, Major General [[Ernest N. Harmon]], called Fredendall both a moral and physical coward and later said he was "a son of a bitch".<ref>D'Este, Carlo, ''Patton: A Genius for War'', Harper/Collins (1996), {{ISBN|0-06-092762-3}}, {{ISBN|978-0-06-092762-2}}, p. 460.</ref>