Editing Logical atomism (section)

=== Wittgenstein's principles ===

In his ''[[Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus]]'', Ludwig Wittgenstein explains his version of logical atomism as the relationship between proposition, state of affairs, object, and complex, often referred to as "Picture theory".<ref>{{Cite web|title = Wittgenstein, Ludwig {{!}} Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy|url = http://www.iep.utm.edu/wittgens/#H2|website = www.iep.utm.edu|access-date = 2015-12-14}}</ref> In view of Russell's version, the propositions are congruent in that they are both clear statements about an atomic entity. Every atomic proposition is constructed from "names" that correspond to "objects", and the interaction of these objects generates "states of affairs," which are analogous to what Russell called atomic facts. Where Russell identifies both particulars and universals, Wittgenstein amalgamates these into objects for the sake of protecting the truth-independence of his propositions; a self-contained state of affairs defines each proposition, and the truth of a proposition cannot be proven by the sharing or exclusion of objects between propositions. In Russell's work, his concept of universals and particulars denies truth-independence, as each universal accounts for a specific set of particulars, and the exact matching of any two sets implies equality, difference implies inequality, and this acts as a qualifier of truth. In Wittgenstein's theory, an atomic complex is a layered proposition subsuming many atomic propositions, each representing its own state of affairs.

Wittgenstein's handling of belief was dismissive and reflects his abstention from the epistemology that concerned Russell. Because his theory dealt with understanding the nature of reality, and because any item or process of the mind barring positive fact, i.e. something absolute and without interpretation, may become altered and thus divorced from reality, belief exists as a [[Sign (semiotics)|sign]] of reality but not reality itself. Wittgenstein was decidedly skeptical of [[epistemology]], which tends to value unifying metaphysical ideas while depreciating the casewise and methodological inspection of philosophy that dominates his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.<ref>{{Cite book|url=http://www.utppublishing.com/Wittgenstein-and-the-Study-of-Politics.html |title=Wittgenstein and The Study of Politics |chapter=Wittgenstein's Method of Perspicuous Representation |last = Temelini|first = Michael|publisher = University of Toronto Press|year = 2015|isbn = 978-1-4426-4633-9 |location = Toronto/Buffalo/London |pages = 68–94}}</ref> Furthermore, Wittgenstein concerned himself with defining the exact correspondence between language and reality wherein any explanation of reality that defies or overburdens these semantic structures, namely metaphysics, becomes unhinged. Wittgenstein's work bears the exact philosophical determinants that he openly dismissed, hence his later abandonment of this theory altogether.