Editing Logicism (section)

=== History ===
Gödel 1944 summarized the historical background from [[Leibniz]]'s in ''Characteristica universalis'', through Frege and Peano to Russell: "Frege was chiefly interested in the analysis of thought and used his calculus in the first place for deriving arithmetic from pure logic", whereas Peano "was more interested in its applications within mathematics". But "It was only [Russell's] ''[[Principia Mathematica]]'' that full use was made of the new method for actually deriving large parts of mathematics from a very few logical concepts and axioms. In addition, the young [[science]] was enriched by a new instrument, the abstract theory of relations" (p. 120-121).

[[Stephen Cole Kleene|Kleene]] 1952 states it this way: "Leibniz (1666) first conceived of logic as a science containing the ideas and principles underlying all other sciences. Dedekind (1888) and Frege (1884, 1893, 1903) were engaged in defining mathematical notions in terms of logical ones, and Peano (1889, 1894–1908) in expressing mathematical theorems in a logical symbolism" (p.&nbsp;43); in the previous paragraph he includes Russell and Whitehead as exemplars of the "logicistic school", the other two "foundational" schools being the intuitionistic and the "formalistic or axiomatic school" (p.&nbsp;43).

Frege 1879 describes his intent in the Preface to his 1879 ''Begriffsschrift'': He started with a consideration of arithmetic: did it derive from "logic" or from "facts of experience"?
:"I first had to ascertain how far one could proceed in arithmetic by means of inferences alone, with the sole support of those laws of thought that transcend all particulars. My initial step was to attempt to reduce the concept of ordering in a sequence to that of ''logical'' consequence, so as to proceed from there to the concept of number. To prevent anything intuitive from penetrating here unnoticed I had to bend every effort to keep the chain of inferences free of gaps . . . I found the inadequacy of language to be an obstacle; no matter how unwieldy the expressions I was ready to accept, I was less and less able, as the relations became more and more complex, to attain the precision that my purpose required. This deficiency led me to the idea of the present ideography. Its first purpose, therefore, is to provide us with the most reliable test of the validity of a chain of inferences and to point out every presupposition that tries to sneak in unnoticed" (Frege 1879 in van Heijenoort 1967:5).

Dedekind 1887 describes his intent in the 1887 Preface to the First Edition of his ''The Nature and Meaning of Numbers''. He believed that in the "foundations of the simplest science; viz., that part of logic which deals with the theory of numbers" had not been properly argued – "nothing capable of proof ought to be accepted without proof":
:In speaking of arithmetic (algebra, analysis) as a part of logic I mean to imply that I consider the number-concept entirely independent of the notions of intuitions of space and time, that I consider it an immediate result from the laws of thought . . . numbers are free creations of the human mind . . . [and] only through the purely logical process of building up the science of numbers . . . are we prepared accurately to investigate our notions of space and time by bringing them into relation with this number-domain created in our mind" (Dedekind 1887 Dover republication 1963 :31).

Peano 1889 states his intent in his Preface to his 1889 ''Principles of Arithmetic'':
:Questions that pertain to the foundations of mathematics, although treated by many in recent times, still lack a satisfactory solution. The difficulty has its main source in the ambiguity of language. ¶ That is why it is of the utmost importance to examine attentively the very words we use. My goal has been to undertake this examination" (Peano 1889 in van Heijenoort 1967:85).

Russell 1903 describes his intent in the Preface to his 1903 ''Principles of Mathematics'':
:"THE present work has two main objects. One of these, the ''proof'' that all [[pure mathematics]] deals exclusively with concepts definable in terms of a very small number of fundamental logical concepts, and that all its propositions are deducible from a very small number of fundamental logical principles" (Preface 1903:vi).

:"A few words as to the origin of the present work may serve to show the importance of the questions discussed. About six years ago, I began an investigation into the [[philosophy]] of Dynamics. . . . [From two questions – acceleration and absolute motion in a "relational theory of space"] I was led to a re-examination of the principles of Geometry, thence to the philosophy of [[continuity (mathematics)|continuity]] and infinity, and then, with a view to discovering the meaning of the word ''any'', to Symbolic Logic" (Preface 1903:vi-vii).