Editing Metaphysical necessity (section)

=== '''Logical necessity as''' '''absolute''' '''necessity''' ===
If logical necessity is absolute, then all logical necessities (e.g., "if A then B") are also physical or metaphysical necessities. Some philosophers, notably [[Bob Hale (philosopher)|Bob Hale]], argue that logical necessity is absolute necessity, meaning there is no sense in which a logical necessity could be false.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Hale |first=Bob |date=1996 |title=Absolute Necessities |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2216238?origin=crossref |journal=Noûs |volume=30 |pages=93 |doi=10.2307/2216238|url-access=subscription }}</ref> Hale defines logical necessity broadly to include not only logical truths (e.g., "A or not-A") but also conceptual necessities, such as "all vixens are female," which depend on the meanings of nonlogical terms. His argument, inspired by Ian McFetridge, uses a [[reductio ad absurdum]]: assuming a logical necessity (e.g., "if A then B") and a possibility where it fails leads to a contradiction, suggesting logical necessities hold in all possible scenarios. Hale posits that logical necessity is the most restrictive modality, subsumed by all other necessities, making it absolute.{{cn|date=May 2025}}

Critics, such as Scott Shalkowski, challenge this view, arguing that Hale’s broadly logical necessity is not absolute because stricter necessities, like austerely logical necessity (truths dependent only on logical constants), exist.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Shalkowski |first=Scott A. |last2=Journal of Philosophy, Inc. |date=2004 |title=Logic and Absolute Necessity: |url=http://www.pdcnet.org/oom/service?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=&rft.imuse_id=jphil_2004_0101_0002_0055_0082&svc_id=info:www.pdcnet.org/collection |journal=Journal of Philosophy |volume=101 |issue=2 |pages=55–82 |doi=10.5840/jphil200410128 |issn=0022-362X|url-access=subscription }}</ref> Additionally, nontraditional logics, such as [[Paraconsistent logic|paraconsistent logics]], allow contradictions to be possible, undermining Hale’s assumption that contradictions are impossible. Shalkowski contends that Hale’s argument fails to establish logical necessity as absolute, as it does not address essentialist claims that metaphysical necessity is more fundamental.{{cn|date=May 2025}}