Editing Mobilization (section)

===Mobilization in World War I===
[[Image:Schlieffen Plan.jpg|thumb|Map of the [[Schlieffen Plan]] and planned French counter-offensives]]

Intricate plans for mobilization contributed greatly to the beginning of [[World War I]], since in 1914, under the laws and customs of warfare then observed (not to mention the desire to avoid compromising national security), general mobilization of one nation's military forces was invariably considered an [[Casus belli|act of war]] by that country's likely enemies.

In 1914, the [[United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland|United Kingdom]] was the only [[Europe]]an [[Great Power]] without [[Conscription in the United Kingdom|conscription]]. The other Great Powers ([[Austria-Hungary]], [[Kingdom of Italy|Italy]], [[French Third Republic|France]], [[German Empire|Germany]] and [[Russian Empire|Russia]]) all relied on compulsory military service to supply each of their armies with the millions of men they believed they would need to win a major war. France enacted the "[[Conscription in France|Three Year Law]]" (1913) to extend the service of conscripted soldiers to match the size of the German army, as the French population of 40&nbsp;million was smaller than the German population of 65&nbsp;million people.<ref>{{harvp|Keegan|1999}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.tacitus.nu/historical-atlas/population/germany.htm
 |title=Population of Germany
 |publisher=Tacitus.nu |date=2008-08-30 |access-date=2014-05-13}}</ref> The [[Anglo-German naval arms race]] began, sparked by the German enactment of the [[German Naval Laws|Second Naval Law]]. Each of the Great Powers could only afford to keep a fraction of these men in uniform in peacetime, the rest were [[military reserve|reservists]] with limited opportunities to train. Maneuvering formations of millions of men with limited military training required intricate plans with no room for error, confusion, or discretion after mobilization began. These plans were prepared under the assumption of [[scenario|worst-case scenarios]].

For example, German military leaders did not plan to mobilize for war with Russia whilst assuming that France would not come to her ally's aid, or vice versa. The [[Schlieffen Plan]] therefore dictated not only mobilization against both powers, but also the order of attack—France would be attacked first regardless of the diplomatic circumstances. To bypass the fortified Franco-German frontier, the German forces were to be ordered to march through [[Belgium]]. Whether or not Russia had committed the first provocation, the German plan agreed to by [[William II, German Emperor|Emperor William II]] called for the attack on Russia to take place only after France was defeated.

[[File:Mobilisatiezakboekje van Joseph-Nicolas-François Vandebroek, item 3.jpg|thumb|left|Belgian army mobilisation papers to join a [[Lancers|Lanciers]] regiment]]
Similarly, the Russian [[Stavka]]'s war planning assumed that war against either Austria-Hungary or Germany would mean war against the other power. Although the plan allowed flexibility as to whether the main effort would be made against Germany or Austria-Hungary, in either case units would be mobilized on the frontiers of both Powers. On July 28, 1914, [[Tsar Nicholas II]] of Russia (William's cousin) ordered partial mobilization against Austria-Hungary only. While war with Austria-Hungary seemed inevitable, Nicholas [[Willy–Nicky correspondence|engaged in a personal dialogue with the German Emperor]] in an attempt to avoid war with Germany. However, Nicholas was advised that attempts to improvise a partial mobilization would lead to chaos and probable defeat if, as pessimists on the Russian side expected, no amount of diplomacy could convince the Germans to refrain from attacking Russia whilst she was engaged with Germany's ally. On July 29, 1914, the Tsar ordered full mobilization, then changed his mind after receiving a telegram from Kaiser Wilhelm. Partial mobilization was ordered instead.

The next day, the Tsar's [[Minister of Foreign Affairs (Russia)|foreign minister]], [[Sergey Sazonov]] once more persuaded Nicholas of the need for general mobilization, and the order was issued that day, July 30. In response, Germany declared war on Russia.

Germany mobilized under [[Helmuth Johann Ludwig von Moltke|von Moltke the Younger]]'s revised version of the [[Schlieffen Plan]], which assumed a [[two-front war]] with Russia and France. Like Russia, Germany decided to follow its two-front plans despite the one-front war. Germany declared war on France on August 3, 1914, one day after issuing an ultimatum to Belgium demanding the right of German troops to pass through as part of the planned pincer action of the military. Finally, Britain declared war on Germany for violating Belgian neutrality.

Thus the entangling alliances of the [[Triple Alliance (1882)|Triple Alliance]] and the [[Triple Entente]] directed the intricate plans for mobilization. This brought all of the Great Powers of Europe into the Great War without actually utilizing the provisions of either alliance.

[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 146-1994-022-19A, Mobilmachung, Truppentransport mit der Bahn.jpg|thumb|right|German soldiers in a railway [[Passenger car (rail)|car]] on the way to the front in August 1914. The message on the car reads '''Von München über Metz nach Paris'''. (From [[Munich]] via [[Metz]] to [[Paris]]).]]

The mobilization was like a holiday for many of the inexperienced soldiers; for example, some Germans wore flowers in the muzzles of their rifles as they marched. Trains brought soldiers to the front lines of battle. The Germans timetabled the movements of 11,000 trains as they brought troops across the [[Rhine River]]. The French mobilized around 7,000 trains for movement. [[Horse]]s were also mobilized [[Horses in World War I|for war]]. The British had 165,000 horses prepared for [[cavalry]], the Austrians 600,000, the Germans 715,000, and the Russians over a million.<ref>{{harvp|Keegan|1999|loc=(footnote points to Bucholz, p. 163) pp. 73–74}}</ref>

Britain's [[Dominion]]s including [[Australia]], [[Canada]], [[New Zealand]] and [[Union of South Africa|South Africa]] were compelled to go to war when Britain did. However, it was largely left up to the individual Dominions to recruit and equip forces for the war effort. Canadian, Australian and New Zealand mobilizations all involved the creation of new field forces for overseas service rather than using the existing regimental structures as a framework. In the case of Canada, the Militia Minister, Sir [[Sam Hughes]], created the [[Canadian Expeditionary Force]] by sending telegrams to 226 separate reserve unit commanders asking for volunteers to muster at [[Valcartier]] in Quebec. The field force served separately from the [[Permanent Active Militia|Militia]] (Canada's peacetime army); in 1920 the [[Otter Commission]] was compelled to sort out which units would perpetuate the units that served in the trenches—the CEF or the prewar Militia. A unique solution of perpetuations was instituted, and mobilization during the Second World War did not repeat Sir Sam Hughes' model, which has been described by historians as being more closely akin to ancient Scottish clans assembling for battle than a modern, industrialized nation preparing for war.
[[File: Reservists at Gare de L'est, Paris (LOC).jpg|thumb|Photograph shows reservists and crowd at the [[Gare de Paris-Est]], Paris during the beginning of World War I]]

"Colonials" served under British command though, perhaps owing to the limited autonomy granted to the Dominions regarding their respective mobilizations, the Dominions eventually compelled the British government to overrule the objections of some British commanders and let the Dominion forces serve together instead of being distributed amongst various British divisions. The "colonials" would go on to be acknowledged by both the British and German high commands as being elite British units. In May 1918, when command of the [[Australian Corps]] passed from [[William Birdwood]] to [[John Monash]], it became the first British Empire formation commanded totally free of British officers.

On May 23, 1915, Italy entered World War I on the Allied side. Despite being the weakest of the big four Allied powers, the Italians soon managed to populate its army from 560 to 693 infantry battalions in 1916; the army had grown in size from 1&nbsp;million to 1.5&nbsp;million soldiers.<ref>{{harvp|Keegan|1999|p=275}} (note also: field artillery pieces went from 1,788 to 2,068)</ref> On August 17, 1916, [[Kingdom of Romania|Romania]] entered the war on the Allied side, mobilizing an army of 23 divisions. Romania was quickly defeated however by Germany, Austria-Hungary, and [[Kingdom of Bulgaria|Bulgaria]]. Bulgaria went so far as to ultimately mobilize 1.2&nbsp;million men, more than a quarter of its population of 4.3&nbsp;million people, a greater share of its population than any other country during the war.

The production of supplies gradually increased throughout the war. In Russia, the expansion of industry allowed a 2,000 percent increase in the production of artillery shells – by November 1915, over 1,512,000 artillery shells were being produced per month. In France, a massive mobilization by the female population to work in factories allowed the rate of shell production to reach 100,000 shells a day by 1915.<ref>{{harvp|Keegan|1999|pp=275–276}}</ref>

Both sides also began drawing on larger numbers of soldiers. The British Secretary of State for War, [[Horatio Kitchener, 1st Earl Kitchener|Lord Kitchener]], appealed for hundreds of thousands of soldiers, which was met with an enthusiastic response. 30 new British divisions were created. The response by volunteers allowed the British to put off the introduction of conscription until [[Military Service Act 1916|1916]]. New Zealand [[Conscription in New Zealand|followed suit]], with Canada also eventually introducing conscription with the [[Military Service Act (Canada)|Military Service Act]] in 1917.

On April 6, 1917, the [[United States]] entered the war on the Allied side. At the entrance, the U.S. only could mobilize its army of 107,641 soldiers, ranked only seventeenth in size worldwide at the time. The [[United States Navy]] quickly mobilized, adding 5 [[dreadnoughts]] to the Allied navy. However, conscription quickly ensued. By March 1918, 318,000 U.S. soldiers had been mobilized to France. Eventually, by October 1918, a force of  2&nbsp;million U.S. soldiers joined in the war effort.<ref>{{harvp|Keegan|1999|pp=351–353, 372–374}}</ref>